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MISSION: Alterra is the main centre of expertise on rural 
areas and water management in the Netherlands. It was 
founded 1 January 2000. Alterra combines a huge range of 
expertise on rural areas and their sustainable use, including 
aspects such as water, wildlife, forests, the environment, 
soils, landscape, climate and recreation, as well as various 
other aspects relevant to the development and management of 
the environment we live in. Alterra engages in strategic and 
applied research to support design processes, policymaking 
and management at the local, national and international 
level. This includes not only innovative, interdisciplinary 
research on complex problems relating to rural areas, but also 
the production of readily applicable knowledge and expertise 
enabling rapid and adequate solutions to practical problems. 
The many themes of Alterra's research effort include relations 
between cities and their surrounding countryside, multiple 
use of rural areas, economy and ecology, integrated water 
management, sustainable agricultural systems, planning for 
the future, expert systems and modelling, biodiversity, 
landscape planning and landscape perception, integrated 
forest management, geo-information and remote sensing, 
spatial planning of leisure activities, habitat creation in 
marine and estuarine waters, green belt development and 
ecological webs, and pollution risk assessment. 
Alterra is part of Wageningen University Research Centre 
(Wageningen UR) and includes two research sites, one in 
Wageningen and one on the island of Texel. 
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Abstract 
I.M. Buizer, 2008. Worlds Apart; Interactions between Local Initiatives and 
Established Policy. PhD thesis Wageningen University and Research; 252 pp. 
 
This thesis presents three case studies about private actors aspiring to realize 
their innovative ideas on land management and design in three different areas 
in the Netherlands. In appearance, these three areas are very different but 
they are all dynamic and are all located near cities. In size, the areas range 
from seventy to a few hundred hectares. Socially, they are highly dynamic as 
well, with various groups and organizations seeking either to make changes or 
to conserve what they value, and taking action to promote their ideas. 
However, it was clear from the start that the ways in which the initiators of 
these ideas gave meaning to the three areas differed from the ideas enshrined 
in existing policies. It is argued that the initiatives must be looked at in the 
context of various pleas for ‘interactive policy making’, since these generate 
expectations about the scope for initiatives to come from private actors. The 
question is whether these pleas really imply scope for two-way traffic, allowing 
‘space for policy innovation’ through local initiatives which do not originate 
from government actors. Indeed, the three case studies show that there is 
ample innovative potential at the local level and that ideas do get implemented 
after considerable efforts. The fact that these initiatives were implemented was 
also due to other factors, such as the personal zeal and perseverance, trust and 
empathy that could develop among people involved ‘in the field’. However, the 
cases also show that there is only limited politicized discussion about the 
possible wider policy implications of these local innovations.  
 
This study revealed this asymmetry between local innovative potential and a 
seeming lack of responsiveness on the part of established policy by means of an 
analysis of 1) the relationships between discourses, actor coalitions, rules and 
resources at the level of day-to-day interactions between the initiatives and 
established policy, and 2) the influence of structural forces such as 
Europeanization, distantiation, juridification and sectoralization on these 
everyday practices. The study explored how these structural forces contributed 
to a form of depoliticization in the case study areas.  
 
 
Keywords: local initiatives, policy arrangements, participation, sub-
politicization, depoliticization, discourse, duality of agency and structure, space 
for policy innovation, interpretive analysis, urban-rural relationships 
 
  
 vi 
For Pim 
 
 
  
 vii 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 5 
1.1  Three social spatial situations 5 
1.2  Involving private actors 9 
1.3 Positioning the researcher 12 
1.4  Initial questions 14 
1.5  Reading this book 15 
Chapter 2: Conceptual framework 17 
2.1 Introduction 17 
2.2  Local initiatives and existing policy: dualities of agency and structure 18 
2.3  Further conceptualizing the interplay of local initiatives and existing policy 20 
2.3.1  Introduction 20 
2.3.2  Policy arrangements 22 
2.3.3  Institutionalization of policy arrangements 28 
2.3.4  The influence of sub-politics, political modernization 29 
2.3.5  Dualities and dualism: introducing the time dimension 33 
2.4  Space for policy innovation 37 
2.4.1  Looking for non-institutionalized initiatives 37 
2.4.2  Discretionary space 38 
2.4.3 ‘ Innovation’, a growth industry 40 
2.5  “Sensitizing devices, nothing more” 42 
2.6  Research Questions 43 
Chapter 3: Methodological Account 45 
3.1  Introduction 45 
3.2  Three different cases 47 
3.3  Three different roles 48 
3.4  Interpretive inquiry 53 
3.5  Action Research 54 
3.6  In the name of ‘trustworthiness’: criteria and techniques 57 
3.7  Progressive refinement of sensitizing concepts by action and reflection 60 
Chapter 4: From Biesland to Brussels 63 
4.1  Introduction 63 
4.2  The area 66 
4.3  Operative policy: “Every city needs a forest” 67 
4.4  A long story 71 
4.5  Interpretation 97 
4.5.1  Origin of the initiative in the context of existing policy 97 
4.5.2  Discourse, actors, rules and resources 98 
viii 
4.5.3  Structural transformations; depoliticization rather than sub 
-politicization 105 
4.5.4  Space for policy innovation: selective elasticity 107 
4.6  The relational dimension and my own positionality 109 
4.6.1  The relational dimension 109 
4.6.2  Positioning the researcher 111 
Chapter 5: Transcending boundaries at the Dutch-Belgian border 113 
5.1  Introduction 113 
5.2  The area 117 
5.3  Operative policy: economic opportunities beat the drum 117 
5.4  A story 118 
5.5  Interpretation 135 
5.5.1  Origin of initiative in the context of the existing policy  
arrangement 135 
5.5.2  Discourse, actors, rules and resources 136 
5.5.3  Structural transformations; depoliticization 141 
5.5.4  Space for policy innovation 143 
5.6  The relational dimension and my own positionality 145 
5.6.1  The relational dimension 145 
5.6.2  Positionality 147 
Chapter 6: From opposition to collaboration in the Loonsche Land 149 
6.1  Introduction 149 
6.2  The area 150 
6.3  Operative policy 154 
6.4  A story 155 
6.5  Interpretation 169 
6.5.1  The origin of the initiative 169 
6.5.2  Discourse, actors, rules and resources 170 
6.5.3  Sub-politicization 173 
6.5.4  Space for policy innovation 174 
6.6  The relational dimension and my own positionality 175 
6.6.1  Socio-relational factors 175 
6.6.2  Positionality 176 
7. Comparison of the cases 179 
7.1  Introduction 179 
7.2  Origins of the initiatives 181 
7.3  Stability and dynamics 184 
7.4  Sub-politicization and other structural processes 187 
7.5  Space for policy innovation 196 
7.6  Other explanatory factors 197 
7.7  Conditions impeding or enabling space for policy innovation 198 
 ix 
8. Conclusions 201 
8.1  Introduction 201 
8.2  Theoretical reflections 202 
8.3  Positionality 213 
8.4  The Need to Reconnect 215 
Summary 221 
Bibliography 233 
Curriculum vitae 241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Acknowledgements 
 1 
Acknowledgements 
It is with a feeling of relief and regret that I view the approaching date of 
defending this thesis. Relief, because the combination of writing this thesis 
in parallel with project work sometimes felt like having to paint a portrait 
while sitting in a roller coaster. Regret, because there were many good 
sides to it. Carrying out the PhD research gave the project work a deeper 
dimension that may easily have passed by unnoticed. Additionally, working 
on the thesis made me discover more of myself. And luckily, finishing this 
thesis is just a step in a learning process which I hope to continue.  
 
The influence of my parents came at a very early stage of that learning 
process. Thank you Kees and Willy for making me deeply aware that our 
natural environment is not something to take for granted. In terms of the 
process that I went through, thank you for sincerely and consistently 
asking ‘How ARE you?’, and ‘Could you summarize in a few words what 
your thesis is about?’  
 
At Alterra, I thank Wim Timmermans and Hein van Holsteijn in particular 
for giving me the chance to invest time in the PhD research, as well as the 
LNV research programmes ‘KB1’ and Groene Metropolen. When we started 
this we did not know where and when it would end. Thank you for 
providing the springboard from which I could ‘dive into the deep end’. Jaap 
Lengkeek, my promotor, offered me serious time that allowed me to step off 
the roller coaster on a weekly basis. Jaap, together with co-promotor Jan 
van Tatenhove, formed the supervisory team. At times it must have been 
difficult to do this job – therefore I thank both of you for your patience and 
confidence. Jan, ‘father of the policy arrangements approach’ inspired me to 
combine my ‘practical work’ with theoretical reflections, and Jaap – thank 
you for your jokes, and for helping me through difficult stages of the work.  
 
Colleagues at the Social Spatial Analysis Group at the Hucht – you were 
brilliant! The coffees in Carla van Zwaaij’s office at the Hucht, sometimes 
together with Fred and Henda – our conversations went in all directions 
and were probably a mystery to outsiders; even so it did provide us with 
many a laugh!  Carla – you were the greatest, without you …. (I don’t know 
what kind of terrible thing would have happened). 
 
Marlies Brinkhuijsen and Marielle van der Zouwen are my ‘paranimfen’ (a 
typically Dutch cultural thing). Marlies with you I shared an office in the 
Hucht, but not just that: I could pour out my heart to you whenever I 
Acknowledgements 
2 
needed to (and… thank you for bringing Christmas trees in my life when 
they were most needed). You are still showing solidarity PhD-wise and I am 
confident you will present a wonderful thesis in due time. I am grateful you 
became a true friend! Marielle I’ve known you a little longer and even if it 
is only since last year that our paths crossed again, I can not tell you how 
happy I am about that. Not only because the way in which Marlies and you 
are picking up the role of ‘paranimfen’ is beyond all my expectations! 
Nonetheless I am very thankful for that. In the meantime, while still 
having one foot in the Alterra urban-rural interactions team (because of 
you I could not really say goodbye anyway), the other foot is in the Forest 
and Nature Policy Group. Bas Arts: thank you so much for that. Despite 
the fact that our cooperation started only last June, I am already looking 
forward to experiencing a lot more of it. I am very much enjoying the work 
with the group – its members make me think even harder (thank you 
Esther!) and it is amazing how I already feel connected to them. What is 
making things easier for me is that the two University groups and the 
Alterra team, are now in one corridor at Gaia (thanks to whoever made 
that planning). But I miss Tamara Ekamper, a genuine team player – you 
took good care of continuity in the projects while I was trying to find some 
peace of mind to finish this work. Judith, thank you for passionately taking 
over when Tamara started a new job in Zwolle, closer to her roots (good 
choice!). Annelies Bruinsma, without you I would definitely have lost my 
sanity and who knows what else, thank you for being supportive and a 
miracle organization-wise. Pieter van Breemen and Peter van den Beld: 
thanks for your help to let me see what is really important!   
 
This thesis would be very thin and shallow without my experiences in the 
field. Anton – thanks to you I know about trees and landscapes and a lot 
more that my eyes could not see before. To all visionaries and supporters of 
‘the Polder of Biesland’, ‘the Loonsche Land’, ‘the Grensschap; what you did 
is far more important than this book, and I am immensely grateful to you; 
for your openness, your inspiration and intelligence. The world will be 
better of if you continue doing what you do! Particularly Jan and Mieke 
Duijndam and Inge de Vos: you were a mix of ‘colleague and friend in-the-
field’ – and indispensable for me. Mieke Pijffers: thanks for making some 
very beautiful booklets, making tangible what was done in these areas. 
Clare McGregor and Henny Michel: what is a thesis worth when it is not 
accessible, both in terms of proper language and lay-out? Thanks to all 
others who I did not mention – I hope to be seeing you in the future, 
professionally or otherwise! 
 
 Acknowledgement 
 3 
My life-long friends and family – my courageous sister Christie, Margrita 
and her family in Mexico (Thanks for asking when I told you about my 
findings : “Is that not obvious?” Uhhh….), Paula (member of the Ministry of 
Silly Walks as well, and always near) and Justin (beats Jamie), Ann, Anne 
Marie and Bart (could we borrow Floris more often now?), Nathalie and Eri, 
Annemarie, Marjon, AnneMiek, Anneke and Jaap, Jacqueline and Wim, 
Tineke (thanks for keeping an eye on me when Pim was abroad) and Piet, 
Michiel and Ronald, oma de Groot, Inge, Ida, Esmée (thanks for ultimate 
relax-time!), Rosalie, Jantine, Irene, Ellen, sailing friends, inspiring Sound 
of Science, and all others, thanks for being there all the time! 
 
A special word to Gerhard. Gerhard – you shared the start of this special 
project with me. And a lot more! I am extremely happy that you are still my 
close friend. 
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to Pim, to thank him for bringing 
my attention to things that can not be written down or captured in words - 
pure things for which the intellect is to limited. If it looks like I’m thinking 
too much – would you please tell me a story and hand me a tool so we can 
do something real, out at sea or somewhere else outside, as you always do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
4 
 
 
 
Map 1: Location of the three areas in the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alterra Top10smart 2006 
 Introduction 
 5 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Three social spatial situations 
This thesis presents three case studies about private actors aspiring to 
realize their innovative ideas on land management and design in three 
different areas in the Netherlands. In appearance, these three areas are 
very different but they are all dynamic and are all located near cities. In 
size, the areas range from seventy to a few hundred hectares (see maps at 
the end of this section). Socially, they are highly dynamic as well, with 
various groups and organizations seeking either to make changes or to 
conserve what they think of value, and taking action to promote their ideas. 
However, it was clear from the start that the ways in which the initiators of 
these ideas gave meaning to the three areas differed from the ideas 
contained in policies. The emergence of three initiatives aiming ‘to make a 
difference’ to the appearance of the areas, as well as to change the ways in 
which people relate to the areas and to each other, was the starting point of 
my study. This is also the orientation of Social Spatial Analysis as a field of 
study: 
 
“Social-spatial analysis is a field of expertise in Wageningen that is concerned 
with the knowledge of the use, valuation and experience of the living 
environment by individuals, groups and organizations. This knowledge is related 
to the question of how people perceive their environment, how they react to 
changes in it, and how this can be addressed in terms of design (Lengkeek 2002: 
3, translation MB).  
 
The ideas that I studied came into being in a world full of existing policies 
and practices. Although in fact ‘existing policy’ is not static and constantly 
alters or reproduces itself, the initiators to some extent needed to challenge 
a fairly stable status quo. The people behind the three initiatives had been 
operating on the policy-making ‘scene’ for what I consider relatively long 
periods of time. These initiators had to work hard to penetrate domains 
with a much longer history and a stable institutional environment. My 
study focused on the dynamics of what happened in the interaction between 
local initiatives and existing policy. I wanted to know what their ability to 
become ‘stayers’ delivered after a few years, what position they acquired in 
relation to existing policy, how the latter changed or did not change, and in 
what way the initiatives themselves changed in the process. I was involved 
in all three situations and followed what happened at close range.  
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In the case of Biesland, I was directly involved as a researcher and project 
leader of the research project connected to it, and as a ‘process facilitator’, 
for a period of five years. My direct involvement with the other two cases as 
a project leader was intensive too, but shorter-term and restricted to 
specific phases of the process. 
 
The Biesland case focuses on an agricultural enclave in a heavily urbanized 
area in the West of the Netherlands. When a farmer and a nature 
conservationist met up with some researchers, they decided to team up to 
try to realize their vision of a far-reaching integration of nature values into 
agricultural activities at farm level. The coalition that emerged in relation 
to the idea gradually grew, gained support and input from city dwellers, 
and became institutionalized in various local arenas. The initiative entailed 
ideas that diverge from ‘business as usual’ in farm and nature management 
practices, and also incorporated ideas on how to organize implementation. 
A local ‘foundation’ was to govern implementation. The case also shows how 
a search for “new” area-oriented (territorial) governance has to deal with 
‘European’ discourse and practices. The researchers, of whom I was one, 
had access to research budgets which made it possible to invest 
considerable time and energy in the project. The money went into research 
and “process costs” for facilitating the complex process of linking the many 
decision-making levels involved. The project was largely financed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Food Quality (ANF): the 
Ministry that is most sceptical about the project’s feasibility, but which has 
also provided it with a status, research capacity and the financial means for 
implementation.  
 
My second case focuses on a group of Belgian and Dutch citizens and 
municipal officials who organized themselves in the ‘Grensschap’, and who 
meet at an interactive event organized by researchers at the request of the 
municipality of Maastricht and officials of the Ministry of ANF. The 
Grensschap’s mission is to collaborate with municipalities to protect and 
enhance the “values of the unique historic landscape between Maastricht 
and the Kempen in the border area of the Netherlands and Belgium” (their 
website). The citizens connected to the Grensschap wished to give the area 
a stronger identity, for example by giving it a name, by organizing various 
activities in the area and by acquiring the means to realize various art 
installations which invite people to look at the area in a new way. 
Collaboration with the authorities was an important feature of the group’s 
strategy, and it applied a degree of self-censorship to its own ideas in order 
to make realization feasible. At times when ‘win-win’ outcomes seemed 
unattainable, the group faced difficult choices and wrestled with its 
position and role in relation to the formal representative bodies. 
Nevertheless, due to its successes, members of the group stayed motivated 
 Introduction 
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to invest time and energy in activities. The group was sometimes even in 
danger of collapsing under the many activities it was involved in. 
 
The third case deals with plans by one of the Netherlands’ oldest and most-
visited theme parks, the Efteling, to build accommodation for its visitors. 
Initially nature organizations resisted these building plans. After years of 
strife and legal procedures however, the erstwhile opponents signed a 
covenant for the realization of a common plan. For the first time in many 
years, nature and building activities did not seem to conflict. In the plan, 
which our research institute was commissioned to develop and of which I 
became project leader, the construction of new accommodation was 
combined with measures to enhance natural and historical values over a 
larger area. Both the Efteling and nature organizations have committed 
themselves to the plan and provided input into it, taking joint steps to get it 
endorsed by policy-making bodies at municipal, provincial and national 
level (the Ministry of ANF is involved here too). Established rules about 
‘nature compensation’ have complicated the process of getting it further, 
however, due to the continued dominance of mainstream policy ideas about 
building activities in nature areas and the rules of the game attached to 
this discourse. In spite of the various hurdles, the plan was carried forward. 
Due to the persistence of the brand new collaboration and with the help of 
officials who were looking for openings in the rules, the plan did not 
disappear into the proverbial bottom drawer. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether and to what extent mainstream policy-making principles 
will be evaluated in the light of a success like this. 
 
A common characteristic of all three situations is that the areas concerned 
were subject to multiple policies and policy interpretations from various 
actors. Albeit in different ways and to different extents, municipal, 
provincial, the water authority, Ministerial and EU legislation all played a 
role in the planning, design and management of the areas. To the policy 
analyst, the most interesting aspect of this is the way coalitions were 
formed that attempted to achieve a divergence from established policy, in 
terms of both contents and organization. 
 
The three areas cannot easily be categorized as ‘urban’, ‘rural’, ‘nature’ or 
‘recreational’. And, as the three stories reveal, such categorization is 
subjective and depends on the observer’s own orientation and outlook. In 
this respect, the most striking common feature of the three cases is the 
territorial outlook of the initiators behind the ideas. 
Chapter 1  
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1.2 Involving private actors 
This book describes interactions between policy makers and coalitions of 
private actors such as citizens, enterprises and researchers. Even though 
‘policy makers’ are generally associated with formal government bodies, all 
of the above-mentioned actors are, in fact, policy makers. Indeed, the policy 
development process is shaped by these actors together. I have chosen not 
to take various government policies as the starting point of my analysis, 
but rather the local initiatives which primarily originate outside the 
traditional government ‘sources’ of policy development. In policy-dense 
countries such as the Netherlands, such local initiatives often cannot 
simply go their own way. They need to link up effectively with operative 
policy, to conform to certain rules, to get access to resources, and to obtain 
support from politicians. The search for ‘contact’ is not a one-way quest by 
the private initiators, however; state actors are also looking for ways to 
relate to these local ideas originating outside the institutions of 
government. I wondered whether and how these interactions could shed 
light on the conditions under which such local initiatives could succeed, not 
just locally, but also by feeding their ideas and experience into the ‘broader’ 
policy-making process, so that they do not remain isolated local initiatives. 
 
I wish to place the subject in the context of two phenomena: firstly, the 
practices that come under the label ‘interactive policy making’, and 
secondly, the manifestations of processes of ‘sub-politicization’. ‘Interactive 
policy making’ refers to the attempts of governments to involve citizens and 
other private actors at an early stage of the policy decision-making process. 
I do not consider these efforts to be truly ‘interaction’-oriented if they can 
only be organized by governments on their terms. In my opinion, a focus on 
local initiatives, and on what happens once these challenge established 
policy, provides insight into the real extent to which governments are 
seeking to establish ‘interactive’ policy making.  
 
Interactive policy making is a way for government bodies in the 
Netherlands to substantiate their pleas for a greater role for private actors 
in the policy-making process (see for instance www.andereoverheid.nl). 
This applies to the domain of spatial policy as much as to any other 
(www.gebiedsgerichtbeleid.nl). Interactive policy making should be 
understood in its historical context. For a long time, the political 
administrative system of the Netherlands was in the grip of irreconcilable 
differences between various socio-political ‘zuilen’ or blocks. The resulting 
stalemates were breached in the second half of the last century by means of 
a ‘consensus democracy’, or ‘pacification democracy’ (Lijphart 1968). 
Chapter 1  
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Pacification was arranged by the political elite, at a distance from ‘ordinary’ 
citizens and preferably without interference by the media. From the mid 
1960s onwards, citizens loosened their ‘chains’ to these socio-political blocks 
and became politically aware and active. This gave rise to a more open 
attitude on the part of the political elite: they introduced participatory 
practices such as ‘de inspraak’, which is a form of consultation about pre-
developed plans. Participation appeared to be largely symbolic, taking place 
only at the end of decision-making processes and leaving little space for 
input by anyone but the elite (for a historical overview, see Duijvendak and 
Krouwel 2001). In fact, the practices of the pacification-era continued. The 
question Duyvendak and Krouwel posed was whether recent activities 
labelled ‘interactive policy making’ were ‘just’ a continuation of this history 
of pacification by the elite, or whether they represented a historical 
breakthrough. They conclude that interactive policy making is just a “minor 
innovation of pacification democracy”. Duijvendak and Krouwel: 
 
“(...) at first sight, greater political activity by citizens and a more responsive 
administration seem to run counter to the traditions of pacification democracy. 
Whoever looks further sees something different: the underlying principles of 
pacification democracy are still in place; this is possible because participation by 
citizens is limited and the administration more dictatorial than it looks. 
Interactive policy making heralds a new phase of pacification democracy, and is 
popular because it matches Dutch traditions” (Duijvendak and Krouwel in 
Edelenbos and Monnikhof 2001: 21). 
 
So far, two ‘generations’ of participation policy have been identified. The 
first, summarized as ‘consultation’, was related to increased political 
activity by citizens in the sixties. Consultation processes placed citizens in 
a ‘reactive’ role. The second generation of ‘interactive policy making’ was a 
reaction to the reactive character of the first generation. It emerged in the 
nineties and is still going strong. The widespread current support for 
‘interactive’ approaches in politics and administration is reflected in the 
variety of labels attached to them. ‘Interactive policy making’, ‘open 
planning processes’ or ‘co-decision-making’ are just a few examples. In the 
past few years, government has made various efforts to get citizens and 
societal organizations participating in decision making about, for instance, 
major infrastructural works, water-related projects, and plans for rural 
areas or environmental policies in cities. Akkerman et al. emphasize that 
most efforts to promote and support new forms of public participation come 
from ‘above’ (Akkerman in Engelen et al. 2004a: 297 and Akkerman et al. 
2004b). There is an impressive amount of literature on these efforts, mainly 
in the fields of public administration, political and policy science 
(Koppenjan in Edelenbos en Monnikhof 2001, Edelenbos and Monnikhof 
2001, Van Woerkum and Aarts 2003, ROB 2002, Pröpper en Steenbeek 
1999, Soeterbroek 2002, Van Woerkum 2000, Van Stokkom 2002, 
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Edelenbos 2005). Most authors agree however that the ‘state of the art’ in 
interactive policy making is still generally poor in terms of concrete 
influence on outcomes (Duijvendak and Krouwel 2001, Goverde and Lako 
2005, Edelenbos and Klijn 2005, Cornips 2006a, 2006b). In an investigation 
of the innovative potential of interactive policy, Van Tatenhove emphasizes 
that it can only be fairly evaluated if the institutional context of interactive 
policy is taken into consideration and that policy experiments need to be 
reflective in order to achieve innovation. An experiment is reflective, he 
says, when actors can change the constellation of relevant rules and 
resources and thereby question the foundations of existing policy (Van 
Tatenhove in Grin et al., (eds) 2006: 161).  
 
These ideas are part of a third generation of thinking about political 
participation in which politics is increasingly seen as being conducted at a 
variety of places besides parliaments and elected councils. This trend is 
often referred to as the dispersion and displacement of politics (Engelen 
and Sie Dhian Ho (eds) 2004). In this line of argument, active citizenship 
can be expressed in a wide variety of participatory practices: empowered 
participatory governance (Fung and Wright 2001). A number of different 
names are used for these practices, including collaborative dialogues, 
deliberative policy practices and argumentative planning. The essential 
idea is that the variety of new practices “leads to a reinvention of politics” 
(Hajer 2003: 98). Thus, while the second generation of participation policy 
does not question the traditional institutions, the third generation 
explicitly considers alternative options. 
 
Ulrich Beck can be considered to belong to the same intellectual family. His 
main argument is that society finds itself in a phase of ‘reflexive 
modernization’, meaning that the very by-products of industrial society lead 
to its own ‘self-destruction’ (Beck 1994: 2). I will come back to this idea in 
chapter two. For now, it is important to note that Beck’s account of 
contemporary society contains a concept that is of special interest in the 
context of this study: ‘sub-politics’. According to Beck, the sub-politicization 
of society means that society is increasingly being shaped from below. 
 
‘There are even opportunities for courageous individuals to ‘move mountains’ in 
the nerve centres of development. Politicization thus implies a decrease of the 
central rule approach’ (Beck 1994: 23). 
 
And elsewhere Beck states: 
 
 ‘It is decisive that (…) sub-politics liberates politics by shifting, opening and 
connecting the rules and laws of the political, as well as by making these 
negotiable and make-able’ (Beck 1997: 97, translation MB).  
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This situation needs to be acknowledged, because if politics continues to be 
equated with the formal political system and the state, then opportunities 
to politicize society in other ways than through these established systems 
will be missed. As Hajer phrases this: 
 
“ (…) one might even argue that the failure to recognize the significance of these 
processes of policy-induced deliberation will erode the legitimacy of politics, 
whereas the active attempt to seek to incorporate these processes might precisely 
enhance the legitimacy of politics” (Hajer in Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 99). 
 
In this study, I wish to approach the issue from the angle of initiatives that 
were organized by local, mainly private actors from specific territories1. 
Obviously, these initiatives did not come about in an institutional void, and 
I find it especially interesting to analyse what happened when they 
confronted established policy. But first I would like to know why those 
initiatives came about. Apparently the initiators wished to do things 
differently. Is it realistic to expect that the ambition of participation can 
also be two-way traffic? If so, it means that established policy does not 
dictate what is possible, but that such initiatives are also able to generate 
wider policy implications.  
1.3 Positioning the researcher 
Various experiences preceded this study, including for example my active 
membership of societal organizations, my work on earlier research projects 
and my previous studies and employment. Undoubtedly, these experiences 
coloured my choice of focus and expectations, just as my positionality as a 
contract researcher influenced what I was able to see (see also Allen 2005). 
Moreover, the contracted projects themselves influenced what happened in 
the three cases. In the conclusion of each case-oriented chapter, I will 
reflect on these influences; I will also say more about this in chapter three. 
In the following I summarize some other personal experiences that I think 
influenced my outlook and my positionality (see also Ateljevic 2005). 
 
Ever since my studies in public administration more than ten years ago, I 
have been interested in the peculiarities of the interface between 
governments and civil society, particularly in relation to environmental 
issues and developing countries. At Leiden University, I got acquainted 
with implementation studies such as that of Pressman and Wildavsky, and 
with the dilemmas of ‘street-level bureaucrats’, as Lipsky called them: the 
                                                        
1  The Grensschap case to an extent is an exception, as it started from a public 
participation event that had been organized by the municipality, the Ministry of LNV 
and contracted researchers. 
 Introduction 
 13 
conflict between having to implement a predetermined policy and 
acknowledging that real situations require a considerable degree of freedom 
to interpret and in fact create that policy. These dilemmas interested me 
more than the ‘tools’ and instruments of government that we were also 
taught. In my MSc studies, I therefore chose to do research on the 
interaction between government officials and forest-dwellers in the North-
East of the Philippines. I learned that the cultures of these two groups were 
so different that there was often no face-to-face interaction at all (Buizer 
1994). I have always been driven to try to understand people’s motivations 
and points of view. One of the papers I wrote in the context of 
communication studies was on the role of ‘empathy’ in scientific research. 
My first job concerned the training of Philippine government officials in a 
specific participatory method called Rapid Appraisal of Agricultural 
Knowledge Systems - RAAKS (Engel 1995). Again, I was struck by the 
sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the officials’ strong preference for 
office work and quantitative data and, on the other hand, the efforts by 
development organizations to persuade the same officials to establish 
intensive contact and face-to-face dialogue with the people in the rural 
areas. In this period I was particularly inspired by the work of the political 
scientist Scott about “the weapons of the weak, everyday forms of silent 
resistance’ (Scott 1985), because his detailed anthropological work focusing 
on individuals in their particular contexts showed the subtleties of 
resistance in an unorthodox way. My next job as a policy advisor to the 
European Parliament on nature, environment and development issues put 
me in touch with a completely different variation on government-civil 
society interaction, much of which also took place ‘behind the scenes’. The 
various lobbying efforts by environmental and development organizations 
to get their issues higher on the European policy agenda were often 
successful. These organizations were also able to prevent developments 
that they thought undesirable by referring to European legislation, such as 
the Habitats or Birds directives, which they themselves had co-authored.  
 
In my next job as a contract researcher, in which I deal once again with 
‘local people and their organizations’, it has often struck me that the way 
power and participation had been theorized about, analysed and 
methodologically elaborated in various social sciences oriented towards 
developing countries could be of greater use for situations in the 
Netherlands. Although this interest did not in itself become the topic of my 
research, it reflects my concern about the ‘how’ of participation and power.  
 
Generally speaking, the government – civil society interface with respect to 
spatial and environmental issues continued to be an important thread 
through my learning experience as a practitioner. This accounts for both 
the topic of the present study and my sympathy for the ‘actors in the field’ 
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and their efforts to make a difference to ‘their areas’. It was and still is my 
ambition to contribute to a democratization of research, meaning that 
research activities become less a ‘remote’ affair which ignores the 
importance of local actors’ knowledge, and more a democratic undertaking 
which grants citizens agency by inviting them to participate in 
deliberations. I was inspired by Yanow: 
 
“When the problem is seen as differences in the bases of knowledge – technical-
rational-university-based expertise versus lived-experience-based expertise – the 
terms of engagement change. Citizens are, in this view, no longer denied agency, 
linguistically-conceptually at least, as so many ‘targets’ of policy missiles (a 
metaphor common, still, in policy language). This enlarges the range of action not 
only for policy analysis not only for policy analysis as a deliberative practice, in 
which non-traditionally expert citizens are nonetheless accorded respect for 
having expertise in their own lives and, hence. Invited to participate in 
deliberations as partners; but it also recasts the role of policy analyst, from 
technical expert to expert in deliberative processes (Yanow in Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003: 245). 
 
I think my learning curve as regards being an ‘expert in deliberative 
processes’ is still steep.  
 
Fortunately, a number of scientists are currently emphasizing the 
importance of reflecting upon one’s own role and position as a researcher. 
And as this book will show, I was not always happy with my own role. 
Ignoring one’s positionality will not reduce its influence, while making it 
explicit will at least make it a possible topic of debate. What is more, a 
growing number of scientists stress the advantages of being involved in the 
situation that one investigates, since it provides direct information which is 
not filtered through respondents’ personal versions of what has happened 
in the past. 
1.4 Initial questions 
My research questions evolved, then, from the above-mentioned 
experiences. Against the background of policy developments such as 
interactive policy making and macro-sociological theories about the 
involvement of private actors in politics and policy-making, I am interested 
in looking at specific cases in which more or less ‘bottom-up’ initiatives for 
innovation have challenged existing policies. As I have mentioned, I was 
involved in three such situations as a contract-researcher. The ideas that 
came up in these situations did not automatically fit into existing policy. 
These are the questions that I consider relevant: 
1. What is the origin and general background of the various local 
initiatives and how do these relate to existing policies? 
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2. What happened in the interactions between initiatives and existing 
policy in the three cases? 
3. If policy change came about, how did that happen and what conditions 
‘helped’ or ‘hindered’ the initiatives? 
The overall objective of the study is to gain in-depth insight into the finer 
details of the social-spatial dynamics involved in efforts to realize change in 
relation to specific areas, especially when these local changes necessitate 
policy change on a larger scale. The insights gained into the conditions 
which facilitate or hinder such change should be useful for a wide variety of 
‘policy makers’ (‘official’ ones as well as local actors). Of course, it is not 
possible to be exhaustive, nor are the conditions found in the three cases 
universal. Nevertheless, they can sensitize as to what mechanisms policy 
makers have to reckon with in situations in which ideas for policy change 
do not (only) come from the traditional policy-making bodies. 
1.5 Reading this book 
The next chapter is an exploration of some theoretical perspectives that 
could serve my purposes. The analytical framework should enable me to 
take into account the dynamics of how policy is changed, shaped or 
reproduced when private actors attempt to realize their divergent ideas. As 
the foregoing short introduction to the three cases revealed, these ideas 
may focus either on an innovation in the contents of the policy domain or on 
organizational aspects. The framework should also establish a connection 
between sociological theory about structural forces and everyday 
experiences in a specific policy situation. 
 
The theoretical chapter ends with a reformulated set of research questions. 
I then go on to discuss the methodological approach in chapter three, which 
provides the link between the theory in chapter two and the case studies in 
chapters four, five and six. In chapter seven I will compare and contrast the 
cases in terms of the research questions, and in chapter eight I will draw 
conclusions about theoretical lessons, my positionality and the broader 
implications of the research. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual framework 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter one I explained my main research aim: to expand our 
understanding of innovative, local territorial initiatives by (mainly) private 
actors, and their interactions with existing policies. I placed this aim in the 
context of three generations of thinking about participation. Roughly, 
‘consultation’ processes emerged in the nineteen sixties and seventies, but 
had little impact on the power of the political elites. Then in the nineties, 
‘interactive policy-making’ became popular. The term ‘interactive policy-
making’ referred to the attempts of governments (‘from above’) to involve 
citizens and other private actors at an early stage of the policy-making 
process. Interactive policy making is still popular among politicians and 
policy makers. However, interactive practices are often criticized as ‘old 
wine in new bottles’ and as failing to lead to any real influence of private 
actors on decision-making. The third generation of participatory 
approaches was ‘sub-politics’, a term which refers to new forms of politics 
outside conventional bodies of representation. Although they stem from 
different backgrounds, and the last refers to a much more radical 
transformation than the first two, these concepts were all born of an 
ambition to revitalize democracy.  
 
Because of my interest in the question of whether policy change came about 
as a result of local initiatives, a useful tool for ranking the different types of 
participation I encountered in terms of their influence could be a 
‘participation ladder’. Examples of such ladders include Arnstein’s and its 
successors, such as Pröpper’s version which grouped styles of governance 
into interactive policy making, symbolic interaction and non-interaction. I 
consider these ladders as useful tools for discussing the significance of the 
various participatory styles, especially when this is done in a dialogue with 
stakeholders (Arnstein 1969, Pröpper and Steenbeek 1999, Edelenbos and 
Monnikhof 1998, Pretty 1995). However, the categorizations are not 
particularly geared to reaching a better understanding of the ‘how’ of power 
behind the participatory processes and their outcomes – which is what I 
found most interesting. Moreover, while I did consider it important, it was 
not my main concern to assess the quality of the initiatives in terms of their 
internal democratic character. Instead, the focus here was on the 
interactions between local territorial initiatives and established policy. 
 
Chapter 2  
18 
The task of this chapter is to find an appropriate analytical framework for 
getting to grips with situations in which local initiatives challenge existing 
policy, which means that the ambition to participate comes mainly from 
local stakeholders. As was briefly indicated in the previous chapter, the 
framework should meet the following requirements: 
- it should enable us to conceptualize local initiatives as well as existing 
policies and especially their interaction; it should therefore take into 
account processes of institutionalization (while staying alert to the 
possibility that some initiatives may only become institutionalized to a 
limited extent or may even ‘die an early death’, while others may get 
more firmly embedded in institutional structures); 
- it should take into consideration the fact that interactions between 
existing policies and local initiatives are about both the contents of 
ideas and ‘organization’, including ways of cooperating, new 
partnerships, systems of control and finance, etc;  
- it should acknowledge that the interactions take place in a context of 
structural processes, of which sub-politicization is especially relevant in 
the context of this research. 
 
2.2 Local initiatives and existing policy: dualities of 
agency and structure 
In view of the focus on the interaction between local initiatives and existing 
policy, in which neither of the two is static, Giddens’ structuration theory 
seemed to offer an appropriate framework. In my view, both local 
initiatives and existing policy could be understood in terms of interaction 
between structure and agency. According to Giddens, institutions refer to 
practices which have the greatest time-space extension. “Institutions”, he 
writes, “are by definition the more enduring features of social life” (Giddens 
1984: 24). It is crucial according to Giddens that institutions are understood 
in terms of structuration theory. The theory evolved from his 
dissatisfaction with, on the one hand, structuralist thinking which 
attributed too much power to structures (rules and resources) and too little 
to the capacities of individuals, and, on the other hand, with voluntarist 
thinking which tended to attribute too much autonomy to individuals. So, 
applying their approach to the interaction between local initiatives and 
existing policy, structuralists (or determinists) would explain change or 
stability by referring to structural properties (“the rules are the cause of 
inertia”), while voluntarists would focus on the activities of individuals (“if 
they want, they can change the rules”). Structuration theory recognizes the 
enabling and constraining influence of both agency and structure and 
focuses on their interplay. 
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Thus, Giddens’ structuration theory assumes that there is a duality of 
structure and agency, commonly referred to as ‘duality of structure’. Agency 
refers to people’s ability to act, and structure refers to rules and resources. 
Duality of structure means that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
actor and structure in which actors are neither powerless subjects of 
structure, nor powerful enough to change structure according to their 
wishes. Actors are knowledgeable about possibilities for acting at odds with 
those structures, but as they also function within those structures, they 
automatically reproduce them by taking them into account when they act. 
  
In Giddens’ own words, duality of structure means: 
 
“Structure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; 
the structural properties of social systems do not exist outside of action but are 
chronically implicated in its production and reproduction” (1984: 374). 
 
When the perspective of a duality of structure is used as the lens through 
which to look at the interactions between local initiatives and existing 
policy, they do not respectively represent actor and structure. Rather, 
duality of structure is present on both sides of the interaction. Local 
initiatives can be depicted as attempts to exert agency power. They emerge 
however in a context of rules and resources (structure), which may be both 
enabling and constraining. Local initiators may draw upon those structural 
properties or, on the contrary, may be constrained by them. And there is 
another side to that coin: structure is not a static resource to draw on – it is 
constantly changed or reproduced by human agency. This means that 
‘existing policy’ is not a static entity either, even if institutionalized policy 
can be recognized as ‘a more enduring feature of social life’. Referring to 
Giddens’ ideas, Patsy Healey (1997, see also 2006) expresses these 
dynamics as follows:  
 
“We live through culturally-bound structures of rules and resource flows, yet 
human agency, in our continually inventive ways, remakes them in each 
instance, and in remaking the systems, the structuring forces, we also change 
ourselves and our cultures. Structures are ‘shaped’ by agency, just as they in turn 
‘shape’ agency” (Healey 1997: 47). 
 
Giddens’ theory was often criticized for still placing too much emphasis on 
agency. For according to Giddens, the way in which structural forces 
influence human action is through human knowledgeability. Actors know of 
structures and so when they take action, structures are present through 
their knowledge. This point of departure means that the initiatives that 
came up in the three areas analysed in this study were not structure-less 
from the beginning, even if actors may not at first have been conscious of 
these pre-existing structures and may have discovered them along the way.  
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Structuration theory has also been criticized for bringing with it a major 
methodological problem. The same problem emerges in relation to the 
framework that I will choose to analyse my cases with. In brief, it is still 
debated whether Giddens sees structure and agency as separate or as 
inseparable entities. The core question is how the interrelationship 
between agency and structure can be investigated if structuration theory 
implies that they are inseparable – in other words, if structuration theory 
‘collapses’ agency and structure. To know more about their interrelation-
ship, Archer says, we have to identify and describe agency and structure as 
separate entities. Giddens himself seemed to recognize this and solved it by 
introducing the concept of ‘bracketing’, meaning that structure and agency 
were alternately placed between brackets while the focus was on the other. 
I will get back to this issue and to a possible way of dealing with it with the 
help of Archers work, after I have shown in the next section how the 
analytical framework used here relates to the ‘duality of structure and 
agency’. In this study, I adopt Giddens’ central idea that neither agency nor 
structure should be assumed to determine the other, while making use of 
Archers analytical dualism as well. In concrete terms, this means that 
actors who feel attached to an area and also feel a need to do things 
differently, have the option of changing rules and resources, while at the 
same time they are never entirely free to do so. Likewise, ‘existing policy’ is 
the outcome of the previous interplay of actor and structure. Thus, the first 
requirement to the research framework is met: the idea of the interplay 
between actor and structure enables us to conceptualize local initiatives 
and existing policies, and especially their dynamic interaction.  
2.3 Further conceptualizing the interplay of local 
initiatives and existing policy 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Van Tatenhove et al. elaborated on structuration theory with a view to 
developing a better approach to analysing the institutionalization of 
environmental policy. However, their publications, with contributions from 
various angles, have illustrated that the approach can be applied to other 
domains as well (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy (eds) 2000 and Arts and 
Leroy (eds) 2006). These domains include nature policy, water manage-
ment, cultural heritage preservation, rural areas and infrastructure.  
The policy arrangements approach emphasises how multi-actor policy 
processes are embedded in institutions (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004). 
This approach meets my second requirement by explicitly bringing in a 
discursive dimension. By incorporating discourse, it enables us to pay 
attention to the varying content of initiatives and existing policy, and to 
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how these change over time. It meets the third requirement by 
distinguishing a duality of structure at two levels: within day-to-day policy 
practices and between day-to-day policy practices and broader, structural 
transformations. I will elaborate on this in the following sections.  
 
The policy arrangement approach builds further on several, mainly 
sociological and institutionalist theories. For full details of the theoretical 
roots of the approach, I would refer interested readers to various 
contributions by Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy (Arts and Leroy 2003 
(eds): 13, Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy 2000 (eds), Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004 and 2006). Briefly, besides Giddens’ structuration theory, 
outlined in these chapters, inspiration has also come from Elias’ ideas on 
figuration and Bourdieu’s notion of field (Arts and van Tatenhove 2004), as 
well as from sociological analyses of post-modernity, post-materialism and 
reflexive modernization, from policy science and public administration 
research on networks, and from recent theories about phenomena such as 
internationalization and multi-level governance (Arts and Leroy 2003 
(ed.):13 – 16)2. The theory has also been fed by its authors’ criticism of the 
voluntaristic nature of Dutch public administration research, which they 
see as too optimistic about the performative impact of strategic action by 
actors, while neglecting the impact of structural variables such as rules 
(Leroy, Arts and Van Tatenhove in Arts and Leroy 2003: 9, 14).  
 
In sum, the policy arrangements approach seems to provide a suitable ‘lens’ 
through which to look at this research, chiefly for three reasons: 
- Its practical elaboration of the duality of structure and agency, enabling 
me to further conceptualize the interaction between local initiatives and 
existing policies, and the institutionalization thereof; 
- The link it makes between contents and organization: local initiatives 
and the policies they challenge are about much more than substantive 
ideas on the design of an area. They include ideas on for example new 
modes of cooperation and communication, new partners, rules and 
administration; 
- The relation it presupposes between day-to-day practices and alleged 
broader structural processes such as sub-politics. 
 
In the following, I will first outline the concept of policy arrangements and 
explain how the approach elaborates the duality of structure and agency at 
two levels: at the level of day-to-day policy practices and at the level of the 
interface of day-to-day practices and more macro, structural processes. I 
will then elaborate on day-to-day policy practices in ‘policy arrangements’ 
by means of four dimensions, which combine the duality of structure and 
                                                        
2  For more elaborate work on multi-level governance, see  Hooghe and Marks 2001 
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agency and the duality of contents and organization (2.3.2). I will examine 
the way institutionalization is looked at in the policy arrangements 
approach (2.3.3) and connect the concept of sub-politics, which was 
introduced in the first chapter with that of ‘political modernization’, the 
umbrella term used by the authors of the policy arrangements approach for 
more macro structural processes (2.3.4). However, these accounts do not 
explain how I will deal with the aforementioned methodological ‘problem’ of 
structuration theory, which tends to recur in the policy arrangements 
approach too: the problem of how to explore the actor-structure connection 
not just in theoretical terms but also in practical research. This 
methodological problem needs to be discussed in this theoretical chapter 
because it has its origin in beliefs about the entities the world consists of 
and the concepts used to refer to them. This will be addressed in section 
2.3.5, drawing to a close this brief and narrowly focused theoretical 
exploration, which outlines how I look at local initiatives and existing 
policy and provides the overture to the key concept of ‘space for policy 
innovation’. 
  
2.3.2 Policy arrangements 
Policy arrangements constitute an institutional concept (Leroy and Arts 
2006:13). Like institutions, the concept of policy arrangements is located on 
the crossroads of the axis agency/actor versus structure on the one hand 
and the axis discourse versus organization on the other hand. Policy 
arrangements are defined by Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy as  
 
“the temporary stabilisation of the organisation and substance of a policy domain 
at a specific level of policy making” (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy 2000: 54). 
 
As I have mentioned, policy arrangements refer to day-to-day policy 
practices. The concept is about what actors think and actually do in 
relation to a certain policy domain3, who rules by means of what resources, 
and who does not. The terms actors, rules and resources refer to the 
organization of a policy domain. Discourse refers to the substance of a 
policy domain. The additional phrase ‘at a specific level of policy making’ 
was left out of later definitions, as it is precisely the multi-level character of 
some arrangements that may (partly) explain why the arrangement is 
stabilized – or, conversely, why it is changed. At this level of day-to-day 
practices in policy arrangements, four dimensions operationalize the idea 
that actor and structure are interrelated (Giddens’ idea of a duality of 
structure). In the following I will briefly explain what is meant by the four 
dimensions. 
 
                                                        
3 The approach was initially thought up to be used in relation to environmental policy. 
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Discourse 
The policy arrangements approach subscribes to Hajer’s definition of 
discourse, which implies that discourse and practices are intertwined: there 
is a meaning in all practices. In Hajer’s definition, discourse is:  
 
“a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, 
reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 1995: 44). 
 
Thus, analysing discourse means that developments are assumed to depend 
largely on how they are perceived and socially constructed and on the ways 
in which these perceptions or meanings are embedded in social and 
institutional practices. Words, and policy vocabulary in particular, are an 
expression of such perceptions, as are all kinds of unspoken practices and 
communications. To stay within the scope of this study, a changing 
relationship between ‘city’ and ‘countryside’ can serve as an example. If city 
and countryside are, for instance, categorized as separate entities which 
are unlikely ever to form a harmonious relationship, then planning practice 
is likely to be geared to confirming that idea, which is expressed in policy 
terms such as ‘red’ and ‘green contours’. These are the boundaries drawn on 
maps to indicate where building development is allowed (the red contour), 
and where rural, landscape and nature areas should be preserved (the 
green contour). Other examples are the practices in which rules make it 
easier to build in ‘open spaces’ within the built environment than in areas 
that are considered to belong to ‘the countryside’. This interpretation of 
discourse is closely connected to Foucault’s interpretation, which 
emphasizes the enabling and constraining role of power. In a critical article 
on the various misapplications of Foucault’s work, Hook interprets the 
essence of the French philosopher’s writings as follows: 
 
“From the outset, then, Foucault is involved in a concerted attempt to restore 
materiality and power to what, in the Anglo-American tradition, has remained 
the largely linguistic concept of discourse; it is equally clear that he wants to 
centre the analysis of discourse within the field of political action. These 
concerns with not underestimating the functioning of discourse lead also to his 
emphasis on the fact that discourse is both that which constrains and enables 
writing, speaking, thinking. What he terms ‘discursive practices’ work in both 
inhibiting and productive ways, implying a play of prescriptions that designate 
both exclusions and choices (Foucault 1981a). These processes, of formation and 
constraint, production and exclusion, are inseparable. More than this, they are 
both complementary to and constitutive of one another; discourse is formed and 
exists through their mutual constitution (Foucault 1981a). (In: Hook 2001: 522-
523) 
 
This brief detour into Foucault is enough to underline the emphasis in his 
work on the relationship between practice and discourse. In this view, it is 
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fundamental that discourse is placed in the field of political action (not just 
of linguistics), that it is assumed both to enable and to constrain, to include 
and exclude, and that discourse encompasses practice, including 
institutional practice.  
 
Such an approach to discourse acknowledges the possibility of various 
coexisting discourses. This idea helps us to identify the ways in which some 
discourses are more strongly buttressed by institutional practices than 
others, perhaps even to the extent that no alternative action is possible. A 
discursive notion may also come up while the practices which have 
developed along with other discursive notions still prevail in an implicit, 
barely recognizable way. These practices may almost have become an 
automatism; they are seldom questioned.  
 
So, in addition to the analysis of what is said, written in documents, or 
expressed in any other way, it is important to study the institutional 
context and practices in which this takes place. This context “co-determines 
what can be said meaningfully” (Hajer 1995: 2). As Hajer states: 
 
“It (discourse analysis MB) is not as much an approach that puts the strength 
and power of institutions in perspective, as an approach which emphasizes the 
role of discursivity therein” (Hajer 2000: 21, transl MB). 
 
Discourse is used in the policy arrangements approach with a similar 
reference to the relationship between discourse and institutional 
practices. The approach facilitates an investigation into the power 
relations involved in discursive practices, and an assessment of the 
degree of congruence between a change of policy vocabulary and a 
change of institutional practices. With reference to the vigorously 
publicized policy ambition ‘Room for the River’, for instance, Wiering 
and Arts (2006) conclude that there is a discursive shift and a change of 
rules, but that one cannot speak of ‘deep institutional change’, since the 
power structure and administrative organisation of Dutch water 
management remained largely unchanged. 
 
Since this research is about the interactions between local initiatives and 
established policy, I look at how a problem or a situation is perceived and 
constructed by those who take an initiative on the one hand, and by those 
representing established policy on the other hand. I also consider how 
mutual perceptions change in the process. I analyse how the latter relate to 
institutional practices, how these practices change or do not change, and 
how they in turn influence those perspectives.  
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Actors and coalitions 
Actors are individuals or organizations involved in urban-rural policies 
concerning a specific region, either as part of the established policy 
arrangement, or as part of the initiative which has not yet institutionalized 
into an arrangement. A coalition consists of more than one actor. Actors 
may cooperate in a coalition to achieve (more or less) shared objectives, by 
allocating resources in a specific way, agreeing upon certain rules of the 
game or by employing specific storylines or other discursive notions in such 
a way as to further their objectives. As Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy 
(2000: 57) point out, there may be supporting as well as challenging 
coalitions. When the object of study is the interactions between local 
initiatives and established policy, as it is here, then one can look for the 
coalitions that are formed to support or challenge the initiative. It would be 
too simple however to say that a certain coalition that is supporting the 
local initiative is then the ‘challenging’ coalition of established policy, as 
supportive and challenging acts may alternate continuously. The focus in 
this study is on how coalitions are formed, how they change and/or overlap, 
and what they do to express a challenge or support.  
 
Resources and power 
The dimension ‘resources’ is closely connected to discourse, actors and 
rules. There are different types of resources. Financial resources may be 
the first to come to mind, but knowledge, land or legitimacy (for instance 
the size of membership of an organization) are also sources of power. Those 
who have control over the collection and distribution of resources may 
influence outcomes more than those who do not have such control. The 
examples mentioned so far refer to resources and power as something that 
can be put to use, depending on actors’ capacities. They are not often very 
visible, however, especially when they are firmly embedded in institutional 
structures and rules. It is as if they are a contextual ‘given’ that forestalls 
opportunities for ‘doing things otherwise’. 
 
Arts, Leroy and Van Tatenhove consider ‘resources and power as one of the 
four dimensions. However, a real-life story about the development of an 
initiative and its interactions with existing policy makes sense if there is 
attention for how the use of resources, and the power derived from it, are 
related to the ways in which actors organized themselves to obtain that 
power, to the vocabulary a certain coalition uses in its struggle for 
influence, or to the rules that help or hinder them in achieving their 
objectives. This means that I look at power as an overarching concept, of a 
different order than resources. Actors who organize themselves in order to 
become more influential in decision-making processes also create power. 
For example, rules of the game, as embedded in laws, give power to those 
referring to them. Discourse can also be a powerful resource, for instance by 
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implying what can be part of an agenda and what can not. Local initiatives 
appealing to other discourses than the ones figuring in formal policy may 
easily fall victim to that mechanism. Power is a much-debated issue and it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to give an overview of the theories of 
various authors about it. Van Tatenhove gives an overview of how power is 
problematized in various policy theories (1993: 86). 
 
With regard to resources in the interplay between an initiative and 
established policy, one can examine the resource availability and use by the 
various parties involved, to see if anything changes in the way resources 
are mobilized or allocated. Resources may at some point be consolidated in 
policy in a way that restricts the scope for changing their distribution. In 
my three case studies, I focus on the dynamics of how resources are used by 
various actors, how an established distribution of resources may constrain 
or promote innovation, and how various actors try to put the resources to 
their own use.  
 
Rules of the game 
The fourth dimension of the policy arrangements approach is rules of the 
game. These may be formal or informal. Formal rules are fixed in legal 
texts and documents; informal rules represent the do’s and don’ts of a 
political culture. Both formal and informal rules set boundaries to what an 
actor or an actor coalition may achieve, and they also create possibilities. 
So they are both constraining and enabling. Rules are not just a property of 
established policy arrangements. Initiators of innovative ideas may also 
adopt informal rules of the game. In the interaction between formal policy 
and local initiatives, the ‘operative rules’ are often claimed to be the main 
obstacle to innovation. The problem can lie in their discursive contents (the 
ideas behind the rule) or in the way certain actor coalitions use them and 
keep them in place. 
 
Open concepts 
A policy arrangement is visualized as a tetrahedron in which each of the 
four corners represents one of the dimensions (Leroy, Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2003: 17). A change in one of the dimensions will affect the other 
dimensions and change the shape of the entire figure. 
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Figure 1: The changing dimensions of a policy arrangement 
Source: Leroy, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2003: 17, second figure added by MB 
 
Change may occur in a policy arrangement in many different ways: a new 
actor coalition may find resources to experiment and thereby gain access to 
policy agendas; a discursive shift may occur in a broader context and 
enthuse actors from within the ‘temporary stabilized arrangement’ to 
rethink the operative policy; a new rule may be imposed, for instance by 
international organizations, that challenges actors to find a new balance.  
 
The above illustrates how the dimensions of discourse, coalitions, resources 
and rules are open categories. They have to be open, because just like 
discourse and practice, they are interrelated (Metze in Van den Brink and 
Metze 2006: 79). Looking at the ‘rule’ dimension of an interaction, for 
instance, does not reveal much about a situation if one does not also look at 
who decides on those rules and who is affected by them, and what discourse 
the rules represent. ‘Discourse coalitions’ (Hajer 1995) may be seen as a 
concept which addressed the interrelationship between two dimensions. In 
this study, an interpretation of discourse was adopted which assumes that 
all dimensions relate to discursive notions. Such a perspective follows from 
the definition of discourse as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a 
particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical 
and social realities’ (Hajer 1995: 44), because the setting and applying a 
rule, allocating resources or forming a coalition are also such practices. 
Essentially, this means that all practices are considered as meaningful and 
as channels of discourse. Conversely, discourse comes into being in social 
practices and would not exist without ‘being practiced’. Similarly, in 
explanations of change or stability, the dimensions should be looked at in 
their mutual relationship.  
Because the dimensions are open concepts, they can be used as ‘sensitizing 
concepts’. According to Blumer (1954), sensitizing concepts ‘merely suggest 
directions along which to look’. I will say some more about this in section 
2.5. Howarth and Stavrakakis even suggest that openness is a ‘condition’ in 
order to articulate concepts on the basis of empirical situations. 
 
 
Discourse   
Rules of the Game  
Discourse  
Rules of the Game   
Resources  
Actors  Resources
Actors 
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“Discourse theorists seek to articulate their concepts in each particular 
enactment of concrete research. The condition for this conception of conducting 
research is that the concepts and logics of the theoretical framework must be 
sufficiently ‘open’ and flexible enough to be adapted, deformed and transformed 
in the process of application” (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000). 
 
Open concepts need to be applied before they can acquire a more 
substantive significance. Applying them will give rise to more specific, 
empirically grounded insights into the meaning of these concepts in 
particular situations. 
 
On the other hand, the risk of ‘collapsing’ concepts also surfaces again, this 
time not in relation to actor and structure, but in relation to ‘discourse’ and 
‘practice’, and ‘discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game’. Before I  
finally get to this problem, however, I will first say a bit more about the 
institutionalization of policy arrangements and structural processes of 
‘political modernization’, both of which form an important part of the policy 
arrangements approach. 
 
2.3.3 Institutionalization of policy arrangements 
The three initiatives and their struggles with existing policy give rise to 
institutionalist types of questions such as: How their local orientation could 
have enduring impact; what it was that made them last as long as they did; 
what observable short-term difference they made in relation to the policies 
that they challenged; whether they remained once-off, locality-specific 
incidents in relation to existing policy or had wider implications for policy 
development in relation to other domains or areas?  
To deal with these questions, it is helpful to use the distinction between 
two dimensions of institutionalization: structuring4 and stabilization. Van 
Tatenhove describes the difference: 
 
“The process of structuring (systematization, organization) refers to “the 
introduction of a certain degree of order in the social domain” (Peper 1973: 153). 
Activities are tuned to each other and are therefore predictable to some extent. In 
the process, structures are not just produced by social interaction, but are also 
reproduced (compare Giddens 1979: 129). The process of stabilization 
(continuation, preservation) refers to the social-temporal dimension of the 
institutionalization process. In other words, each structure contains ‘built-in’ 
provisions for preserving the pattern of activities” (Van Tatenhove 1993: 10, 
translation MB). 
 
In a process of structuring, the emphasis is on the production (or 
reproduction) of contents and organization in interactions. Interactions 
                                                        
4  Note that I chose to use ‘structuring’ instead of ‘structuration’, to avoid mix-up with 
Giddens’ concept of structuration which has a different meaning. 
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therefore consolidate the content and organization of a policy domain. 
Stabilization refers to a next step: the consolidation of the outcomes of 
those interactions in rules and resources. Van Tatenhove and Leroy 
summarize the two processes concisely: 
 
“Structuration refers to the (re)production of content and organization of a policy 
domain in interaction, whereas stabilization refers to the ‘preservation’ of 
contents and organizations in specific policy concepts and arrangements” (Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy 2000: 19). 
 
A local initiative may arise in reaction to how things were already settled. 
The initiators represent a wish to innovate, to ‘do things differently’, even if 
not specifically in relation to one policy domain. They may feel that the 
local setting that they focus on requires such a different approach in order 
to accommodate their wishes. In the process of their ‘coming into being’ as a 
‘local initiative’, there is structuring. For example, a pattern of meetings 
with particular people at particular times may develop. Explicitly or 
implicitly, the initiators may reach an agreement about how they wish to 
work together. After this process of structuring, stabilization may follow. 
The initiative is linked up with rules and/or resources and changes the 
existing allocations or rules (or details in them). For example: initiators get 
access to financial resources or to a certain source of knowledge, which 
furthers the implementation of their initiative. The other scenario is that 
the initiative never gets to that stage, but gradually collapses and remains 
an incident. 
 
Whether structuring and/or stabilization took place, and if so, by what 
interplay of discourse, actors, resources and rules, is an empirical matter 
that I wish to find out more about. It is not unproblematic to determine the 
exact boundaries of a policy arrangement. Nor is it simple to pinpoint the 
exact moment at which a process of structuring is transformed into a 
process of stabilization. Such an undertaking is an empirical affair (see also 
Van der Zouwen 2006). On the basis of empirical findings, a moment may 
be identified when the existing policy can be argued to have opened up to 
the initiative, or to parts of it. There may also be a moment when the 
arrangement may reasonably be argued to have closed to the initiative. 
Existing policy may change as a result of interaction with the initiative; the 
initiative itself may also change. What changes and what does not, and how 
that happens in phases of structuring and stabilisation is what my research 
aims to clarify.  
2.3.4 The influence of sub-politics, political modernization 
As indicated, the policy arrangements approach operationalizes the idea 
that institutional dynamics (or stabilization) are a matter of duality of 
structure and agency. It does so at two levels. The first is the level of 
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everyday policy practices in so-called policy arrangements, a level at which 
structural properties (rules, resources, discourses) and agentic properties 
(actor coalitions) interfere with each other, causing change or stability in 
the arrangement. Secondly, the duality of structure and agency is 
conceptualized at a higher ‘macro’ level, by means of the concept of ‘political 
modernization’. Political modernization refers to the processes or trends 
that are less easily influenced because they are situated at a level beyond 
everyday practices.  
 
While policy arrangements refer to policy practices in a specific policy 
domain, political modernization refers to broader structural transfor-
mations. Examples are processes such as Europeanization or individual-
ization (van Tatenhove et al. 2000: 35 - 53, Arts and van Tatenhove 2006). 
 
“It (political modernization, MB) tries to capture those structural 
transformations in political domains in contemporary societies which have or 
may have consequences for day-to-day policy practices” (Arts and Van Tatenhove 
2006). 
 
Such structural transformations are operative in various policy domains, 
albeit in different ways and to different extents. In relation to 
Europeanization, for instance, agriculture and defence policies have a long 
European tradition, while policy domains such as nature and environment 
have only been Europeanized more recently. Everyday practices in policy 
arrangements and the structural transformations of political modernization 
are both useful concepts for understanding and explaining policy processes 
and their outcomes. 
 
Arts and Van Tatenhove define political modernization as: 
 
“the shifting relationships between the state, market and civil society in political 
domains of societies – within countries and beyond - as a manifestation of the 
‘second stage of modernity’, implying new conceptions and structures of 
governance”. (Ibid., 29) 
 
They continue by stating: 
 
“Inspired by Held (1989), we define ‘the political domain of society’ as the setting 
in which different groups (from state, civil society and market) produce and 
distribute resources (power and domination), rules (institutions) and meaning 
(discourses) in order to shape public life (Ibid.). 
 
So in order to understand political modernization, it is important to 
understand what the first and second stages of modernity are. The concepts 
are derived from Beck’s theory on the ‘risk society’. In the first stage of 
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modernity, governments play a central role in managing society, and the 
key features are ‘control’ and ‘manageability’, instrumental rationality, 
bureaucratic divisions of labour and scientization. It is also typical of the 
first stage of modernity that policy and policy organizations are organized 
along sectoral lines. These very characteristics of early modernity, Beck 
theorizes, lead to a second phase of modernity (also labelled late or reflexive 
modernization). In this phase, risks start to dominate which are the 
unintended side effects of early modernity. These side effects undermine 
trust in the rule of the central state. Now these dangers or risks, according 
to Beck, bring with them a process of ‘sub-politicization’. 
 
“The concept of ‘sub-politics’ refers to politics outside and beyond the 
representative institutions of the political system of nation-states. It focuses 
attention on signs of an (ultimately global) self-organization of politics, which 
tends to set all areas of society in motion. Sub-politics means ‘direct’ politics – 
that is, ad hoc individual participation in political decisions, bypassing the 
institutions of representative opinion-formation (political parties, parliaments) 
and often even lacking the protection of the law. In other words, sub-politics 
means the shaping of society from below” (Beck 1996: 18). 
 
With the concept of sub-politicization, Beck seeks to articulate the trend 
that society is increasingly being shaped ‘from below’. Examples of sub-
politicization that Beck refers to in his work are the world-wide movement 
against nuclear testing at Mururoa, the mass consumer protests against 
the disposal of an obsolete oil rig ‘Brentspar’ in the North Sea (Beck 1996 
1997), and the BSE crisis, the public perception of which, according to Beck, 
gave rise to the fastest passage of laws in the history of the German 
Republic (Beck et al. 2003:14). 
 
It is clear from the above quote and the examples that Beck concentrates 
his idea of sub-politics on global movements. In this thesis, however, I will 
concentrate on initiatives with a local, territorial orientation. They reach 
further than a neighbourhood park or street, but are still very local, 
especially as compared with the global examples that Beck refers to. Still, I 
would like to find out whether the sub-politics thesis also applies to this 
level. It seems as if Beck’s idea should not be restricted to the global level. 
Now how does the thesis of sub-politics link to the concept of political 
modernization? According to Arts, Leroy and Van Tatenhove ‘political 
modernization’ has two dimensions. The first dimension of political 
modernization is governance: an ‘increasing interweaving of state, market 
and civil society in new institutional arrangements’ (Arts and Van 
Tatenhove 2004: 344, see also Arts and Leroy 2006: 275). The second 
dimension of political modernization is the second, or reflexive, stage of 
modernization: “new political practices outside the formal institutions of 
the nation state” (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006: 30). In their empirical 
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work, however, they have not so far dealt with ‘sub-political arrangements’ 
(Arts and Leroy 2006: 275). This ‘bias’, they state, is partly because 
empirical work on that dimension of political modernization still needs to 
be carried out. Another reason they mention is that environmental politics 
is characterized by a lack of sub-politics (ibid.: 276). Instead of reflection, 
reactions of institutions of state, market and civil society, are characterised 
by ‘reflexes’ referring to “more problem-solving by the classical institutions” 
(Arts and Van Tatenhove 2006: 30). I hope to be able to say more about this 
on the basis of the three empirical situations studied. The fact that my 
starting point was three initiatives that did not form part of formal policy 
arrangements (even though, as the following will make clear, they often 
emerged in reaction to formal policy), prompts me to pay special attention 
to the question of sub-politicization. I will use the term sub-politicization 
rather than sub-politics because it expresses the dynamic nature of the 
phenomenon. 
 
The above sections, 2.3.2 – 2.3.4 summarized the policy arrangements 
approach. The approach fulfils the requirements proposed as guidelines for 
my research. In addition to the duality of actor and structure, the approach 
also refers to substance and organization, and the duality of discourse and 
practice, and on the potential influence of structural processes such as sub-
politicization on everyday practice. 
 
In sum, the policy arrangements approach implies four dualities: 
- between contents and organization; 
- between discourse and practice; 
- between agency and structure; 
- between everyday practices in policy arrangements and the wider 
structural transformations of political modernization.  
The framework has not so far solved the analytical problem of dualities 
that Archer raised. Rather, it has added to the problem by adding new 
dualities which I will have to address as well.  
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2.3.5 Dualities and dualism: introducing the time dimension 
So a remaining task is to find a way to investigate these dualities. In this 
respect, I already pointed at the methodological ‘problem of duality of 
structure’. The ‘problem’ is that what is integrated into the concept of 
duality of structure needs to be separated again at the methodological level 
in order to become researchable. It is this act of separating that carries a 
risk of reintroducing dualism into the analysis, implying that either agency 
or structure is attributed predominant explanatory power. This is exactly 
what I am trying to prevent, along with many other policy analysts and 
sociologists who have faced the same pitfall.  
 
In the above I presented the dimensions of the policy arrangement 
approach one by one. In analytical approaches to dynamic real-life 
situations however, it is not as easy to distinguish them like this. In 
accounts of those situations, analyses of the interference of events seem to 
reflect the situations more accurately. Accounts emphasizing relationships 
are more recognizable than isolated descriptions of dimensions, which seem 
too abstract, and static.  
 
We can imagine for instance, a hegemonic discourse that may function as a 
powerful resource for some and deprive others of influence. The story will 
be about discourse, actors and resources at the same time. Placing the 
separate dimensions in the foreground while failing to uncover the 
connections between them, gives rise to abstract and insufficiently dynamic 
accounts of a situation. Just as rules and resources have their discursive 
dimension, so do actor coalitions, which led Hajer to speak of ‘discourse 
coalitions’ (Hajer 1995). Anyhow, discourse and practice are often seen as 
two sides of one coin, at least, in institutionalist analyses. The setting of 
rules, the allocation of resources or the formation of a coalition are also 
discursive practices, in fact. There is always at least one discursive notion 
behind them. However, the making of conceptual distinctions for analytical 
purposes too often seduces us into thinking that the world actually is like 
that. That is why I make such a point of emphasizing that the 
interrelations between the concepts of the theoretical framework create a 
better understanding of human action than do the concepts in themselves. 
In the end, it is those interrelations that explain most about what 
happened in the three cases in this study.  
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While discourse analysis is rapidly growing in popularity, the search for a 
way to conceptualize ´practice´ has only started recently. Referring to 
Wagenaar and Cook5, Hajer and Wagenaar state that  
 
“Practice integrates the actor, his or her beliefs and values, resources and 
external environment, in one ´activity system´, in which social, individual and 
material aspects are interdependent. The focus in such activity systems is on the 
way the different elements relate to each other rather than on the elements 
themselves” (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 20).  
 
This is how I wish to look at the elements of the policy arrangements 
approach, just as the authors of the approach intended. Yet this is not an 
easy thing to accomplish if a framework distinguishes so expressly between 
various sub-concepts. 
 
So far, I have said nothing about the dimension of time. I have used the word 
‘situations’ a lot, as if everything happens in situations. However, these 
situations have a history. The way in which discourse, actors, resources and 
rules of the game relate to each other at a specific moment in time, is partly a 
result of earlier interactions that have stabilized and become structural in 
character. When an initiative was launched to make changes to a specific 
territory, and had to interact with established policy in order to do so, what 
existed prior to its emergence? And what resulted from the interactions? How 
could I bring in this time dimension into the research?  
 
In the context of structuration theory, there is a discussion in the social 
sciences, and between critical realists and constructivists in particular, 
about the way in which the duality of structure can be known or 
investigated. I found this discussion to be of particular interest because it 
addresses the question how to investigate the time dimension. At the heart 
of the discussion is the question whether agency and structure are 
separable or whether they should be considered as inseparable entities (see 
Archer 1995, Stones 2001). It is clear from the foregoing that my point of 
departure is that an account of social interactions only makes sense if it 
includes the relationships between all of them. So when the interaction 
between local initiatives and existing policy is the topic of research, one 
should focus on interrelationships and interdependencies, not on the 
dimensions themselves. The latter would provide static descriptions which 
offer an inadequate account of the duality of agency and structure. For 
                                                        
5  Wagenaar and Cook distinguish various uses of the term practice: as mere doing 
(Comte), as practical wisdom or phronesis (Aristotle), as habitus (Bourdieu), as 
particular configuration of human activity (MacIntyre), as constitutive meanings 
(Taylor) or as a theory of action or an ´activity system´ (Lave) (Wagenaar and Cook 
2003: 144 - 149). For another overview of different traditions of practice see Kemmis 
and McTaggart in Denzin and Lincoln 2000. 
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these dimensions set each other in motion and it is their mutual 
relationship that determines the progress and outcome of any interaction. 
The same holds for the interaction between initiative and existing policy. 
To investigate the relationships requires that the elements forming the 
relationship are separable. The analyst can look for ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ 
as separately identifiable entities, and then focus on how they are related 
over time. The methodological consequence of this viewpoint is that it is 
possible to investigate how a structural circumstance at a given time 
influences social interaction at a subsequent time, which in turn 
‘elaborates’ on structure (Archer 1995). Archer says that 
 
“(the) scheme of Structural Conditioning ? Social Interaction ? Structural 
Elaboration which crucially is stretched out over time, underlies all my work” 
(Archer 1996: 697-698). 
 
Opinions differ on whether this line of reasoning is in accordance with 
Giddens’ idea on the relationship between actor and structure. Archer says 
it is not, because she does not believe that Giddens thinks that structure 
could ‘pre-exist’ agency. However, I tend to agree with Stones (2001), who 
says that Giddens implies that structure may be considered to precede 
agency, but not in the sense that it is always completely external to agency. 
Instead, he “conceptualizes structure as being partly within the agent as 
knowledgeability or memory traces” (Stones 2001: 18). This does not mean 
abandoning Archer’s proposed separation of these elements for analytical 
purposes. Moreover, the strength of Archer’s approach is the way she 
brings a temporal dimension into the analysis of structuration processes by 
introducing the scheme of ‘structural conditioning ? social interaction ? 
structural elaboration’, which is also referred to as ‘sequencing’. This is the 
only way to “acknowledge the interplay between structure and agency” and 
so “this has to be predicated upon some autonomy and independence being 
assigned to each” (Archer 1985: 80).  
 
More elaborately, she visualizes her scheme as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Morphogenetic sequence  (Archer 1995: 76) 
 
T2 T
3
Structure 
Interaction 
Structural elaboration 
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Chapter 2  
36 
I will make use of the sequencing method in my stories about the three 
situations. In the analysis of these stories, sequential interrelationships 
will be highlighted, particularly the ways in which larger scale structural 
processes such as sub-politicization impact on, and are reproduced by, these 
day-to-day policy practices. It is crucial that the two tasks are taken up in 
an analysis such as mine, rather than separating the two ways of looking at 
social phenomena. Archer: 
 
“(W)ithin social theory in general (…), considerably more effort has been devoted 
to conceptualizing how structural and cultural properties of society are 
transmitted to agents and condition their doings than has been given to the other 
side of the equation, namely how they are received and responded to by agents in 
return” (Archer on her website: www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/staff/-
academicstaff/archer/msarcher/research/). 
 
In the same line of thinking, I hope to pay attention to both sides of the 
‘equation’. So when I want to know more about the origins of the initiatives, 
I look at the structural conditions and how these formed the context for 
social interaction. I seek to clarify social interaction taking place at the 
interface of initiative and existing policy, by means of the dimensions 
discourse, actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game. Finally, to see 
what comes of the social interaction, I want to know whether and how it 
gave rise to ‘structural elaboration’, which can also be defined in terms of 
stabilisation. When structural elaboration takes place, the results of social 
interactions are consolidated into rules and resources. Structural processes 
such as sub-politicization may be the outcome of social interactions (i.e. 
structural elaboration), but at a later stage, they may also give rise to social 
interactions, changing structures in their turn. 
In the context of my research, I elucidate ‘structural elaboration’ by means 
of the term ‘space for policy innovation’, which will be further explained in 
section 2.4.   
 
To conclude this section, I wish to say one more thing about the 
methodological difficulty of structuration theory. I cite Flyvbjerg at length 
because he is optimistic about the possibility of keeping agency and 
structure together at the methodological level. He writes: 
 
“As anyone has tried it can testify, it is a demanding task to account 
simultaneously for the structural influences that shape the development of a 
given phenomenon and still craft a clear, penetrating narrative or microanalysis 
of that phenomenon. (…) Social scientists tend to generate either macrolevel or 
microlevel explanation, ignoring the critical connections. Empirical work follows 
the same pattern. (…) Structural analyses and studies of actors each get their 
share of attention, but in separate projects, by separate researchers. Those who 
join structure and actor in empirical work most often do so by theoretical 
inference: data at one level of analysis are coupled with theoretical speculation 
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about the other. (…) There is mounting evidence, however, that the 
actor/structure connection is not an insurmountable problem” (Flyvbjerg 2001: 
138). 
 
I hope to contribute in this research to the ‘demanding task’ that Flyvbjerg 
points at, and I believe that this can be done using Archer’s ‘analytical 
dualism’ or morphogenetic approach6, as she calls it, and I hope to 
demonstrate that investigating the interplay between actor and structure is 
not really problematic if it is done by taking the time dimension into 
account to separate actor and structure. 
2.4 Space for policy innovation 
2.4.1 Looking for non-institutionalized initiatives 
As I have already indicated, sub-politicization is a macro-sociological thesis 
about the changing loci of politics in an ever more complex society. The 
thesis suggests that a greater role is to be reserved for citizens and their 
organizations or social movements, especially in relation to the growing 
risks of an environmental crisis. My cases will provide more specific 
insights into sub-politicization because they are about initiatives coming 
‘from below’ (even though in the Grensschap case, the first contacts were 
established in the context of an interactive event which had been organized 
‘from above’). 
I need an additional concept, however, to draw attention more explicitly to 
what local initiatives that were not yet institutionalized may achieve, and 
to focus on their development as the initiatives and existing policy 
gradually position themselves in relation to each other. Such a concept 
should operationalize ‘structural elaboration’ in the context of this 
particular research, meaning that it should suit the purpose of analysing 
what comes of the interactions of local initiatives and existing policy. I 
suggest using the term ‘space for policy innovation’.  
 
Space for policy innovation refers to the possibilities arising when existing 
policy ‘opens up’ to policy options which had not been possible so far. It is 
the enabling space created when the existing order or ‘temporarily 
stabilized’ relations between actors, resources, rules and discourse are 
challenged and changed.  
 
Figure 2 can now be tailored to the specifics of my research. The left, light 
grey oval indicates that most research efforts so far have focussed on this 
                                                        
6  Morphogenesis refers to ‘those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s 
given form, structure or state’ (quote to Walter Buckley by Archer: 1995: 75).  
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part of the scheme, whereas the right, dark grey oval refers to the part of 
the scheme that is generally less well investigated. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Rephrased scheme Structural conditions, Social Action, Structural 
Elaboration 
 
Whereas the foregoing placed the concept of ‘space for policy innovation’ in 
the context of the other concepts used here, the following two sections deal 
with how ‘space for policy innovation’ relates to other well-known concepts 
in public administration literature. The first is ‘discretionary space’ which, 
as mentioned when I spoke of my positionality, featured in my university 
training but did not appear to fit with my topic. 
 
2.4.2 Discretionary space 
How does ‘space for policy innovation’ relate to a well-known concept such 
as ‘discretionary space’? Does a concept such as ‘space for policy innovation’ 
not simply add to our vocabulary without substantively contributing to it? 
In my view, the two concepts differ fundamentally, even though both of 
them may play a role in the interaction of initiatives and established policy 
arrangements. ‘Discretionary space’ was a reaction to the supposed 
‘implementation failure’, which was high on research and policy agendas in 
the eighties. It was assumed in most of these studies that ‘good’ policy 
formulation was the prerequisite for unproblematic implementation. 
Negative surprises at the implementation stage were considered as proof 
that policy had not been accurately formulated. Pressman and Wildavsky 
criticized this point of departure: “Instead of asking why the process of 
implementation was faulty, we ask why too much was expected of it” (1973: 
xxiv). In their influential book on implementation (1973) they argue that 
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policies and implementation should be viewed as two sides of the same coin, 
and that the latter can inform the former to a large extent:  
 
“The learning society views the implementer as a source of new information. On 
this basis, a case can be made for the reconceptualization of implementation as 
an exploratory rather than an unquestioning, instrumental, and even 
subservient type of behavior” (ibid. 256).  
 
The subtitle of their book on an economic development program which 
initially seemed to have everything it needed for success, is telling of their 
perspective: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland; 
Or, why it's amazing that federal programs work at all, this being a saga of 
the Economic Development Administration as told by two sympathetic 
observers who seek to build morals on a foundation of ruined hopes. 
 
Pressman and Wildavsky consider implementation as an evolutionary 
process. Therefore, they state “now it is time to bring in a real devil - the 
divorce of implementation from policy” (135), and "implementation should 
not be divorced from policy" (143). They were of the opinion that whoever 
thought that policies should and could unambiguously be translated to 
action, would eventually feel cheated. Rather, they stated that policies have 
to be interpreted and renegotiated in order to come to terms with a much 
more complex reality than they initially presuppose. The authors 
emphasized that this process of interpretation and negotiation was not 
something to be avoided, but was a way to improve policy implementation. 
By considering implementation as an integral part of the policy process, the 
policy could become part of a more comprehensive learning process.  
 
Following this tradition, the concept of ‘discretionary space’ was launched 
by Lipsky to draw attention to the enabling potential of implementation 
(Lipsky 1980). According to Lipsky, the ‘street-level-bureaucrat’ in large 
bureaucracies, who, according to the command-and-control model, would 
merely have to implement the policies developed at higher levels, was in 
fact a policymaker himself. He could use his discretionary space to make 
policies workable.  
 
The two studies I have just cited were both valuable in their time and are 
still relevant today.  
However, the concept of discretionary space is not particularly suitable in 
the context of issues addressed here. ‘Discretionary space’ is a concept that 
matches with the idea that policy institutions make policies first and then 
face the challenge of implementing them. The key question that is 
addressed is how ‘street-level bureaucrats’ or ‘front-line operatives’ can 
improve the implementation of state policies by using their discretionary 
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powers. But the intentions of the state are still considered point of 
departure. The question addressed is not how bureaucracies can become 
more open or responsive to ideas from private actors. Emphasizing the 
power of ‘street-level-bureaucrats’ to make policies fit better with social 
realities, and the importance of discretionary space to have implementation 
power, still fits within an idea of ‘government’ in which the state is the 
primary locus of policy-making.  
 
The distinction between space for policy innovation and discretionary space 
is a reflection of the difference between government and governance. Van 
der Zouwen sums this up: 
 
“Generally, ‘government’ is (…) understood as a hierarchical style of policy 
making in which governmental bodies dominate. ‘Governance’, obviously, 
represents a policy-making style which challenges this dominant governmental 
position’ (Van der Zouwen 2006: 17) 
 
‘Space for policy innovation’ is a governance concept. As indicated, the 
source of innovation may be governmental bodies but it may be local 
initiatives as well. This research focusses on the latter, but this does not 
exclude the possibility that street-level-bureaucrats play a role, just as 
higher-level bureaucrats may. That, the analysis of the cases will tell. 
Assessing ‘space for policy innovation’, then, is first and foremost an 
empirical question. 
 
2.4.3 ‘Innovation’, a growth industry 
‘Innovation’ has become something of a ‘growth industry’. Perhaps because 
of this, it gives rise to critical questions about its meaning. The most 
popular approach to innovation nowadays is ‘system innovations’, referring 
to comprehensive changes of entire governing systems (see for instance 
InnovatieNetwerk 2000). Perhaps superfluously (since it is no different 
from the view taken elsewhere in this study), I wish to emphasize here that 
innovation is not considered as an essentially objective, neutral thing, but 
as a social construct (see also Rogers and Shoemaker in Engel 1995). Also, 
it is not a precondition that the innovative idea has ‘never and nowhere 
been invented before’. What is of importance is that the ‘innovative’ idea 
can reasonably be described in terms of its difference from existing policies. 
Innovation is also something gradual. In the sequence of events, an idea 
may gradually disappear from agendas and be forgotten, or it may be taken 
up to improve or modify existing policy (at one or more of the many levels of 
policy-making). 
 
For the purposes of this research, space for policy innovation is related to 
structural elaboration. When an innovative idea that is turned into a 
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collaborative initiative does not, in the end, lead to a change in the rules 
and resources that actors may draw on to influence their social world, then 
there is no space for policy innovation. When, positively formulated, the 
local initiative leads to a change of rules and resources, space for policy 
innovation emerges. What types of space for policy innovation can be 
discerned, and how these emerge is an empirical matter.  
 
The relation between innovation and policy arrangements is not 
unproblematic. Boonstra states critically that the policy arrangements 
approach can hardly account for the emergence of new arrangements 
because of its emphasis on that which is already stabilized. That which 
already has firm institutional anchors draws more attention. This difficulty 
may partly be related to the position of the researcher; perhaps one needs 
to be deeply involved in a situation first if one is to be able to find and 
unravel these ‘not-yet-stabilized’ initiatives. Boonstra distinguishes 
between ‘emerging arrangements’ on the one hand, and ‘stable regional 
arrangements’ (2004: 25, 31) on the other hand. This distinction is useful 
for drawing attention to that which is not yet institutionalized. The 
question remains, however, whether initiatives such as the ones selected 
here will institutionalize into ‘arrangements’ at all. Also, whether an 
initiative remains local or leads, for instance, to a reconsideration of 
existing government policy options is a matter of judgment that needs to be 
made on the basis of empirical data. 
 
It is exactly as Van der Zouwen wonders in her study, also with reference to 
Boonstra: 
 
“When has a new practice enough ‘body’ to really distinguish it as a new policy 
arrangement? (…) I wonder whether I would have paid attention to this 
‘arrangement in gestation’ if it had not institutionalized into a more mature 
arrangement (…). More generally, one could argue that the policy arrangement 
approach has no specific tools to clearly focus on initiatives which do not 
eventually institutionalize into an arrangement and to assess whether and under 
what circumstances and conditions they are likely to do so (or not)” (2006: 227). 
 
The concepts introduced here are perhaps not exactly the ‘tools’ that Van 
der Zouwen refers to, but I expect the concept of space for policy innovation 
to invite us to look for results of social interaction that were not yet part of 
existing policy, but which may give rise to the formation of a renewed 
arrangement. This will provide the basis of a better insight in the 
circumstances and conditions which influence how innovative initiatives 
institutionalize, or how they don’t.  
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2.5 “Sensitizing devices, nothing more” 
“There is, of course, no obligation for anyone doing detailed empirical research, in 
a given localized setting, to take on board an array of abstract notions that would 
merely clutter up what could otherwise be described with economy and in 
ordinary language. The concepts of structuration theory, as with any competing 
theoretical perspective, should for many research purposes be regarded as 
sensitizing devices, nothing more” (Giddens 1984: 326). 
 
The foregoing presents a framework that fulfils the requirements put 
forward in the introduction to this chapter. The concepts making up this 
framework serve as sensitizing concepts, which means that I will look for 
manifestations of these concepts and how they are related, in empirical 
situations.  
 
According to Blumer (1954), “sensitizing concepts” lack the specification of 
attributes or benchmarks that is characteristic of definitive concepts.  
 
“Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing 
concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer 1954: 7). 
 
For this reason, there is the possibility that the concepts can be refined on 
the basis of the three situations. This will also prevent the analysis from 
becoming isolated in a world of its own. The concepts are guidelines for the 
analysis, rather than imperatives. I may also bring other aspects to the 
surface if what I see in the three situations prompts me to do so. The policy 
arrangements approach sensitizes the researcher to how actors attempt to 
get their initiatives implemented in the context of temporarily stabilized 
practices, some of which are expected to be changeable and others less 
flexible. It also inspires the researcher to look for structural forces that may 
seem to be beyond the control of local initiators of policy change, as well as 
for the interrelations between discourse, actors, resources and rules of the 
game in relation to a policy domain in empirical situations, and how these 
processes give rise to structural elaboration. When I speak of the 
‘interconnections between actors, resources, rules and discourse’ they 
‘sensitize’ us to look at what happens in the real world, but they still need 
to be refined and perhaps complemented in order to specify what is going 
on out there.  
 
In addition to policy arrangements, another sensitizing concept making up 
the policy arrangements approach is political modernization, which refers 
to broader structural transformations beyond day-to-day policy practices. 
Here I focus on what is alleged to be one of those structural transfor-
mations: the trend of sub-politics. By means of the cases, I will find out 
whether and in what form sub-politics manifests itself in the three 
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situations. The sequencing method will introduce a time dimension by 
means of which structural conditions, social interactions and structural 
elaboration can be identified, successively. The concept ‘space for policy 
innovation’ urges us to look at the outcome of the interaction between a 
local initiative and existing policy.  
 
In the final chapter my concepts will be evaluated against the background 
of empirical experiences. This evaluation will bring to light whether 
essential processes remained invisible because of the adopted framework.  
2.6 Research Questions 
On the basis of the concepts explained in the above, the research questions 
can be reformulated as follows: 
1. What was the origin of the initiative and how did it relate to then 
existing arrangements?  
2. How do discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest 
themselves over time, in the interaction between initiative and existing 
policy? 
3. Does the case point to sub-politicization or can other structural 
transformations be discerned?  
4. What types of space for policy innovation emerged and how can they be 
characterized? 
5. What are enabling or impeding conditions for the emergence of space 
for policy innovation?  
 
In the next chapter I will deal more profoundly with methodological issues 
and describe the steps taken to get where I wanted to go. 
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Chapter 3: Methodological Account 
“(Policy analysis, MB) is no longer about the invention of solutions for society; it often 
finds itself in the ‘mud’ of policy practice, trying to assist in the discovery of new policy 
options and the formulation of compelling arguments” (Hajer en Wagenaar 2003: 19). 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines how the research was conducted, or in Yanow’s terms: 
how it is that I did what I did (Yanow 2003). As such, it connects the 
analytical framework (chapter 2) with the case studies (chapters 4, 5, 6). It 
presents the strengths and weaknesses of the steps taken, as well as how I 
think these weaknesses could be dealt with. 
 
My own experiences in various contract-research projects laid the 
foundation for this PhD research. These projects were commissioned by 
government institutions (national government, province and municipality) 
and (in one case) by a private company. As project leader and researcher 
and/or advisor in these projects, I was actively involved in what was going 
on and had my own ideas about what was to be done in terms of ‘process 
management’. When there was sufficient overlap of ideas with funders and 
funding was arranged, a research process could start that was never just 
research, and never predictable. In all of the three cases, research was 
combined with decision making by various actors at various levels (be it 
companies, steering committees of alderman or other executive bodies or 
the European Commission). There were also in all three cases more 
informal processes of mobilization and decision-making by state and 
private actors. While implementing such multi-faceted projects, I always 
felt that there was much more to be learned than the answers to the 
practical questions that we were trying to solve within the boundaries of 
the funded projects’ objectives. Often, I felt I had to stay at the surface of 
important processes, while there was a lot going on beneath the surface 
which it would be interesting to discover and to share experiences about 
with others. I was therefore happy that I was offered the opportunity to 
combine my contract research work at Alterra with a more in-depth study 
at the Social Spatial Analysis chairgroup of Wageningen University. By 
that time, the Biesland case and the Grensschap projects had already 
started; along with the Efteling case, they formed the topic of my research. 
This begs the question: how does this study meet criteria of ‘scientific rigor’. 
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This chapter will explain that traditional criteria such as validity, 
replicability, generalizability and objectivity, belonging to the positivist 
research tradition, will be replaced by other criteria and their 
accompanying techniques7.  
 
Being involved in actual cases or projects had advantages. It meant that I 
had relatively easy access to all kinds of information. It also meant that I 
could ‘feel atmospheres’ such as disappointment, inspiration, trust, and 
anger - things which often cannot be read from words, or observed if one 
does not know the people involved quite well. Besides, these sorts of 
emotion do not surface so easily a long time after the event, when a 
retrospective interview can finally take place. Thus, what may have 
remained hidden from more distant observers was quite accessible for me. 
Participating in meetings, following the exchange of e-mails, frequenting 
kitchen-table discussions, talking during occasional car rides and the 
constant exchange of phone calls all gave insights that allowed detailed 
descriptions of what had happened, of emotions accompanying key events 
in the process and of strategic thinking of actors involved. Because of this, I 
often felt like an ‘anthropologist in the field’ who was, at the same time, 
involved in the process of change. Due to difference in the research budgets 
and the scope of the three projects, the intensity of the contact was different 
too. Contact was most lengthy and intense (and still is) in the Biesland 
case. The duration of the projects was shorter in both the Grensschap and 
the Loonsche Land cases. As a result, contacts were intense for a short 
period, after which I had to fall back on research methods such as 
interviewing. The following two sections will describe the differences and 
how I coped with them. Section 3.2. briefly introduces some basic 
similarities and differences. Section 3.3. looks more closely at the 
differences, paying special attention to my positionality and roles. In 
section 3.4 I will explain how Action Research played a role in the first and 
(to a limited extent) the second phase of the present study. In section 3.5 I 
will outline the principles of interpretive inquiry, and in section 3.6 I will 
discuss the research criteria underpinning these approaches.  
 
 
                                                        
7  For an overview of research paradigms (“the basic belief system or worldview that 
guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways”) see Guba and Lincoln in Denzin and Lincoln, 
1994. 
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3.2 Three different cases 
At first sight, my three cases are very different – and are perhaps even 
more so upon closer investigation. And yet there are some similarities if one 
looks at them from a distance: 
1. All three cases are about initiatives which can be related to ‘spatial 
issues’ at the interface of the policy domains of urbanization, cultural 
history, water, recreation, agriculture and nature; 
2. They are about concrete areas in which I worked as a contract 
researcher;  
3. The initiatives originate mainly with private actors; 
4. Citizens and/or societal organizations, politics, administration, 
researchers and public officials play a role in all three cases; 
5. The contents of the initiatives conflict to a greater or lesser extent with 
existing policy and can, in that sense, be labelled ‘innovative’. 
A sixth, incidental similarity was the scale of the areas involved: from 70 
hectares (Efteling) to a few hundreds of hectares (Grensschap). 
 
At a more specific level, it was known in advance that the cases would 
differ in various ways: 
1. The origin of the various initiatives was different: citizens who 
participated in an ‘interactive event’ organized by the municipality 
(Grensschap), a coincidental meeting of a farmer, volunteer and 
researcher (Biesland), the agreement between a private company and 
societal organizations (Efteling); 
2. Researchers played different roles in the projects (as ‘traditional’ 
researchers, as process facilitators, and as a combination); 
3. The initiatives refer to different policy domains and to either one or 
more levels of government (agriculture, for instance, is strongly 
influenced by the European Union and to a lesser extent so is nature, 
whereas cultural history and spatial planning are more of a regional or 
national matter);  
4. Because of this, the initiatives required input into decision making at 
various levels (regional in the Grensschap case, local and national in 
the Efteling case, and local and European in the Biesland case). 
 
Contrary to the views of some of my colleague researchers on this departure 
from their traditional research paradigms, I do not see this lack of 
comparability as a weakness of the research. Instead, I think that even 
single cases can give rise to invaluable insights about how things work in 
particular contexts (see also Flyvbjerg 2001: 77, Yin 1994: 130). This is not 
to say that ‘nothing is comparable’ in the three situations. Stake (2000) 
distinguishes three types of case studies: Intrinsic case studies, which are 
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meant to get a better understanding in a particular case; instrumental case 
studies, which use a particular case to provide a deeper insight into a 
broader issue or to formulate a generalization; and collective case studies in 
which a number of cases are investigated to get a grasp on a phenomenon 
(Stake in Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 435-454). I would locate my own study 
in the first category and somewhere in between the first and the second 
category because it also produces suppositions or assumptions about what 
is more general. I do not see the production of 'hypothesis generalizations' 
as a prerequisite for ‘good’ scientific research output, but will do so in order 
to stimulate debate. 
 
In sum, the above presents some basic points of departure as to the use of 
the case study method in this research. It should:  
1. give insight into the variety of ways in which actions and context are 
related with respect to the research question,  
2. serve as a basis for rich empirical data provided by the contract 
researcher,  
3. be a potential source of hypothesis generalizations which should, as 
proof of the pudding, be communicated in such a way as to become 
‘input to the ongoing social dialogue’ (Flyvbjerg 2001). 
 
3.3 Three different roles  
In the cases, I was not in the ‘neutral’, detached position that is often 
expected from researchers. The question is whether one assumes that 
'detached researcher status' is possible at all. I believe there is no 
privileged space for the researcher from which he or she can draw objective 
conclusions about what is going on. It is therefore important to be explicit 
about one’s positionality (Ateljevic et al. 2005). 
 
For sure, the fact that I was a contract researcher influenced the course of 
events. Funders pay for a project on the condition that it renders results 
within a certain budget and time span, even though these sometimes 
appear to be changeable, as in the Biesland case. “Result-drivenness” was 
important – it prevented a funder from being left ‘empty-handed’ when 
legitimizing the investment to his or her superiors, be they politicians or 
others (cf. Allen 2005). With regard to our own organization, it was at the 
back of our minds that we had to achieve a certain level of ‘productivity’, 
which was measured by means of the percentage of our time that had to be 
spent on funded projects (mostly 80-85%). What complicated things was 
that the projects were not of the ‘on demand delivery’ type. First of all, 
because ideas took shape in interaction: “the demand” was not very clear at 
the beginning of the three research projects. Secondly, my PhD-study 
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reached further than our own involvement in the processes: things 
happened both before and after the contract research projects and I had to 
do some extra work to find out about them. Thirdly ‘the’ funders were not 
monoliths but organizations in which there were battles to be fought, not 
the least between the contact persons who wanted the research done and 
those who made the decisions about that. My role and the intensity of my 
involvement differed over the three cases and I will therefore say a bit more 
about this in terms of each case. 
 
Biesland 
Unlike the other cases, my involvement in developments in the ‘Polder van 
Biesland’ only ended in early spring 2007, when we found another project 
leader. In July 2006, the European Commission finally approved of the 
proposed activities and instruments, which meant that there were no 
longer any obstacles to implementing the ideas from that end. My diary 
about this case in the meantime covers 5 years of intensive involvement. 
The research took place in many places: in the offices of the Ministry and 
the province, at the kitchen table, in the community centre (‘buurthuis’), 
with groups of 20 people in the farm living room, or in among the cows in 
the ‘melkput’ (a modern type of milking stall), at the offices of the European 
Commission, at the ministry, in the rooms of the municipal council, in the 
hay-barn which we converted several times to a meeting room, and on the 
phone! My diary on this project contains many pages. I wrote down details 
without always knowing at the time of writing what their relevance was. I 
also tried to be specific about my personal feelings in specific situations: 
disappointment, enthusiasm, doubt.  
 
We were setting up a ‘monitoring and evaluation’ process which draws 
heavily on the input of local knowledge. Meanwhile, we have met the 
citizen involved several times (at least twice a year), and the researchers 
carried on with their work in between the meetings. At the end of my study 
(which was not the end of the project), I discussed with key stakeholders to 
discuss the mechanisms that I had ‘retrieved’ from my experiences which 
had been ‘stored’ in the form of diary entries, minutes of meetings, e-mails, 
photographs. My role as a project-leader was multi-faceted: coordination of 
the multidisciplinary research work which I wanted done together with 
local stakeholders as much as possible, acquisition of funding, coordination 
of the decision-making process, making sure that information from ‘the 
field’ was also given to decision makers who played a role from a greater 
distance. Luckily I did not have to do this alone. Project management was 
not easy in terms of coping with the internal organization of the research 
institute, either. Because of the research setup the farmer was also a paid 
member of the research team. We also had to hire people from outside the 
organization in order to be able to do all the relevant research. For several 
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years, I had to defend this situation with might and main: it was not 
considered financially advantageous for the organization for a considerable 
part of the research work to be ‘outsourced’. I often felt that I had to 
compromise on time because of tight budgets. It is important to note that 
the funding organizations were large: a national ministry and a province. 
This made it possible for close cooperation to evolve at the ‘field level’, even 
though others within these organizations were not always very keen to 
fund what we were doing. It was partly for this reason that what happened 
was never predictable and project plans were always being changed along 
the way. 
 
Grensschap 
That it is not always easy to speak of either ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’ is 
illustrated by the Grensschap case. What started as a ‘top-down’ initiative 
to organize participation led to the foundation of an organization of Dutch 
and Belgian citizens and officials who shared their concern for the Western 
city border of the city of Maastricht. My involvement in the Grensschap 
case was restricted to the ‘interactive’ event organized by the municipality 
and the Ministry, in which they aimed to formulate a coherent plan for the 
area. What we brought in as researchers was a calculated plan for the two-
day event. After the writing-up and discussion of the results, our 
involvement as researchers more or less stopped (we were hired once more 
by the municipality to help citizens write a proposal to obtain European 
subsidy). The Grensschap continued to exist and had become an almost 
unavoidable ‘partner’ for municipal decision-making. I kept informed of its 
activities and concerns through their frequent newsletter. Also, I did ten in-
depth interviews with members of the Grensschap, municipal officials and 
the alderman involved. I taped these interviews, fully transcribed them and 
sent the reports to the respondents for them to correct them if they wanted 
so. In a meeting between the alderman and the members of the 
Grensschap, organized after the interviews, I outlined my findings and 
asked for their reactions. While for me the meeting was one of the steps in 
my research, for them it was a moment to evaluate with the aldermen how 
things were going, and to voice their criticism on some points. I taped this 
meeting as well and the summary of it was spread among the participants 
and included in the above-mentioned newsletter. 
 
Loonsche Land, Efteling 
The research context in relation to the Efteling theme park was very 
different from that of the other two. The Efteling process was much more 
‘closed’ than the other projects in the sense that involving neighbouring 
citizens or other groups that were involved with the area was not an 
ambition of the funder. Instead, a distinguishing feature of this case was 
the newly established agreement between nature organizations and the 
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Efteling, materialized in a ‘convenant’. Whereas for a long time they had 
been ‘fighting’ each other, even in court, about the construction of houses 
for recreation on unexploited terrain, they had now come together to 
formulate a win-win solution. To assist them in finding solutions, they 
hired researchers to elaborate a plan. My role as a project leader was 
restricted to leading the multidisciplinary research cooperation. Initially, I 
proposed to establish a much more intensive cooperation with the various 
signers of the covenant and to find a way to link up with neighbouring 
citizens as well. Cooperation with the signers was organized by the Efteling 
in the form of regular meetings between the signers and a somewhat 
broader “sounding board group” (klankbordgroep). ‘The Efteling’ kept 
process management in their own hands. Anticipating that the case would 
become of interest for my PhD study, I kept a diary of what happened and 
collected reports of meetings and other relevant documents. 
 
In my experience, one disadvantage of being personally involved in the 
cases, especially in the Biesland case, was that events happening at the 
time of writing tended to appear ‘bigger’ than they would have been if I had 
been writing about a period that was over. In these circumstances, it was 
important for me to take notes about such events, and about my own 
feelings. This enabled me to reflect on these experiences after the projects 
themselves had been finalized (with the exception of the Biesland case, 
since that project is still ongoing). The quiet workspace with the “Social 
Spatial Analysis” group at Wageningen University was another 
indispensable condition. There, I was able to distance myself (physically as 
well) and reflect on what I had been ‘immersed in’ during the projects.  
 
Roughly two types of activity can be distinguished in the entire research 
project. They can also be distinguished as phases, with different degrees of 
overlap in the three cases. 
1.  A phase of being involved in the projects which later became the ‘cases’ 
in this research. This phase is characterized by active engagement in 
networking to connect citizens, policy officials and researchers, trying to 
get people involved, organizing and holding meetings, formulating 
problems and identifying solutions, constantly reworking these problem 
formulations and solutions and working them out for practical 
application. The wishes of the funders of the research were important in 
this phase, even if ‘a’ funder often appeared to have many faces. 
Collaboration came about with funders with whom there was a positive 
chemistry. 
2.  A phase of reflecting on these projects. This phase involves critically 
reading data such as minutes of meetings, e-mails, diary, conducting 
additional interviews and discussing findings with involved stake-
holders. In this reflective phase I attempted to put some order into the 
Chapter 3  
52 
findings from the above-mentioned projects. This involved reading 
theoretical work, albeit on a modest scale, in the expectation that it 
would enable me to get more out of the cases. Indeed, I was prompted to 
take another look at what happened, and to reinterpret and compare 
what I saw in the light of the insights I had read about. 
 
I consider the two types of activities as very different. When I look back on 
my research period, the main challenge was to combine these two types of 
activities, to switch between the modes of ‘hectic and engaged’ and ‘calm 
and reflective’. That was not always easy. 
 
The two types of activity can be distinguished schematically as follows: 
 
Type of activities 1: Solving concrete 
problems in contract-research projects, 
Action Research characteristics 
Type of activities 2: reflection on contract-
research projects by means of sensitizing 
concepts 
Type of questions: responding to concrete 
problems or concrete design tasks in 
specific (spatial) areas.  
Type of questions: wishing to understand 
more about how things work, of the 'how 
of power'.  
Hectic environment, many ad-hoc 
activities 
Quiet environment, ‘peace’ required 
Relatively easy to find non-university 
resources  
Relatively difficult to find non-university 
resources 
In the ‘mud of policy practice’ From a somewhat greater 'distance' 
In a multidisciplinary team From a social science angle 
Anthropologist in the field and project 
leader 
Anthropologist in the field and trying to 
interpret what happened in terms of my 
questions from a somewhat greater 
distance 
 
The first type of activity has similarities with ‘action research’ (see section 
3.4 for an elaboration). The second type of activities is more akin to the 
techniques of what is known as ‘interpretative research’ (see section 3.5 for 
an elaboration). I feel that my presence and active involvement in the first 
type of activity enabled me to reflect better on what happened than I could 
have done had I been an outsider, even though, as said, I sometimes found 
it very difficult to withdraw from my hectic involvement in the contract 
research activities. This is probably something that contract researchers 
have to live with. 
 
The duration of these phases was different in the three cases. The Biesland 
project grew in the course of the years, so that each year we had to find 
resources for continuing work on the project – not too easy, in the case of 
the Ministry. The Efteling project, on the other hand, was a one-off project 
which spanned little more than a year. In this case the local initiative had 
come into being before the ‘research’ project started, in the form of a 
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covenant. The Grensschap project was also a short-term project, taking less 
than a year, the heart of which was a two-day interactive event. In relation 
to the Grensschap I focused on what happened during and after that 
interactive event and went back to the area to do interviewing and organize 
a group-discussion. Schematically: 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Biesland        
        
Efteling        
        
Grensschap        
        
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of two types of research activities 
 
Where the lines of square dots stop, the activities in the field did not stop, 
in most cases, whereas my role as a contract researcher did. 
 
3.4 Interpretive inquiry 
Interpretive policy analysis covers a wide range of research approaches of 
which action research is one (Yanow 2003). In my opinion, action research 
is interpretive by definition, which means that it focuses on the meanings 
given to a situation by the actors involved, including researchers (as actors 
and stakeholders). Thus, my approach is based on the idea that both are 
involved in meaning making. Moreover, there is, in the interface between 
them, what Giddens calls a ‘double hermeneutic':  
 
“the intersection of two frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of social 
science, the meaningful social world as constituted by lay actors and the 
metalanguages invented by social scientists; there is a constant ‘slippage’ from 
one to the other involved in the practice of the social sciences” (Giddens 1984: 
374). 
 
‘Interpretive research’, and interpretive policy analysis in particular, is a 
widely acknowledged research approach which emphasizes meaning-
making. On interpretive methods, Yanow states: 
 
“(Interpretive methods) are based on the presupposition that we live in a social 
world characterized by the possibilities of multiple interpretations. In this world 
First type of activity: Action
Second type of activity: Reflection by means of sensitizing concepts 
Interactive event ‘organized from above’
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there are no “brute data” whose meaning is beyond dispute. Dispassionate, 
rigorous science is possible – but not the neutral, objective science stipulated by 
traditional analytic methods (as represented by the scientific method). As living 
requires sensemaking, and sensemaking entails interpretations, so too does 
policy analysis” (Yanow 2000:5). 
 
Thus, social science is not a ‘mirror’ of the social world but constitutes 
human interpretations of that social world. These interpretations may (at 
least, if not formulated in such abstract terms that only a small part of a 
scientific community understands them), subsequently trigger social debate 
(Yanow 2000).  
 
In the following sections, I will be more specific about the research criteria 
which I consider important and relevant for the interpretive type of work 
carried out here. For, as Yanow (2003) wrote: 
 
“The criticism of these (interpretative, MB) methods as lacking reliability and 
validity evaluates them according to criteria grounded in positivist ontological 
and epistemological presuppositions. Interpretative methods hold to their own 
criteria of trustworthiness and dependability, an argument made extensively in 
Erlandson et al.” (Yanow 2003: 241). 
  
In the next section I will first explain how action research was interpreted 
in the present research. In section 3.6 I will say a bit more about the 
criteria mentioned by Yanow above. 
3.5 Action Research 
Standard textbooks on qualitative research offer various data gathering 
methods. The five ways to gather data that we were offered as graduate 
students, for instance in the handbook for beginning researchers by Ilja 
Maso (1989), included the gathering of documents, distanced observation, 
experiment, interview and participatory observation. Although the present 
study made use of several of these techniques, none of them describes 
exactly what was done. Perhaps participatory observation comes close, 
except that, as Maso indicates, researchers following this method are 
supposed to stay as invisible as possible, and not influence the daily 
practices of the observed. This is obviously not what was done in the 
periods of field immersion in my research. We were even paid to exert an 
influence! 
 
The activities performed in the contract research projects discussed in this 
study bear most resemblance to ‘Action Research’. It is important to note 
that not all contract research projects are of that nature; on the contrary, 
much of the research done at our institute does not build on the idea that 
 Methodological Acount 
 55 
‘knowledge’ is to be seen as something that can be brought in by various 
actors, and in the first instance by local stakeholders. Action Research is 
described as follows by Greenwood and Levin (2003): 
 
1.  Action research is inquiry in which participants and researchers cogenerate 
knowledge through collaborative communicative processes in which all 
participants’ contributions are taken seriously. The meanings constructed in 
the inquiry process lead to social action, or these reflections on action lead to 
the construction of new meanings; 
2.  Action research treats the diversity of experience and capacities within the 
local group as an opportunity for the enrichment of the research/ action 
process; 
3.  Action research produces valid research results; 
4.  Action research is context centred; it aims to solve real-life problems in 
context” (Greenwood and Levin in Denzin and Lincoln 2003: 149). 
 
There is an ever growing body of literature on research methodologies 
which are more oriented towards an active, involved role of the researcher. 
‘Action research’ is perhaps the most well-known. It fits well with what was 
done in two of the three projects involved in this research: Biesland and 
Grensschap, both projects which focused on immediate, practical problem-
solving (Groot 2003) and aimed to connect theory and practice (Greenwood 
and Levin 2003). The social psychologist Lewin was among the first 
promoters of Action Research. Lewin’s statement that the social world can 
only be understood by trying to change it is often cited in the Action 
Research literature. In addition to being practical and solution-oriented, 
Action Research is characterized by collaboration between researchers and 
practitioners, working in groups and an emphasis on learning in an 
iterative process. 
 
These are also the qualities of the research work in ‘the first phase’ of the 
three projects (while I was still involved ‘hands on’). The following table 
illustrates the action-research character of the three projects in a more 
systematic way. 
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FIRST PHASE Biesland Grensschap Loonsche Land 
Practical problem-
solving 
Find new way to 
integrate 
agriculture, nature, 
water management 
and recreation 
purposes 
Strengthen the 
‘open’ area in 
between 
Maastricht, 
Lanaken en Riemst 
by involving local 
people 
Solve conflict by 
designing a plan 
which is endorsed 
by both the theme 
park and nature 
organizations 
Working in groups, 
cogeneration of 
knowledge 
Plan is made in 
workshops, working 
groups, monitoring 
and evaluation 
approach is also 
designed by local 
stakeholders. 
‘Interactive event’ is 
designed in such a 
way as to promote 
the establishment of 
groups which bring 
in their own 
knowledge. Regional 
actors organize 
themselves and 
‘cogenerate 
knowledge’ in follow-
up process with very 
limited involvement 
of the researchers. 
Plan is made by 
team of researchers 
on the basis of 
expressed wishes in 
covenant between 
theme park and 
nature organiza-
tions, and indivi-
dual interviews 
with various organi-
zations involved. 
Work in groups of 
researchers and 
regional actors is 
limited to a work-
shop organized by 
the theme park. 
Learning in 
iterative process 
Continuous 
adaptation of plans, 
common strate-
gizing, trying things 
out. This approach is 
also built in to the 
setup of monitoring 
process. 
Regional actors 
organize their own 
learning process 
after the interactive 
event. 
- 
Not an explicit 
process 
Connect theory and 
practice 
Theoretical 
assumption of the 
‘Farming for 
Nature’ philosophy 
is changed on the 
basis of require-
ments that appear 
from practice. 
Theoretical assump-
tions behind setup of 
the interactive event 
are changed on the 
basis of event, repor-
ted and brought in 
differently in the 
next interactive 
event (in Zwolle). 
- 
 
The second type of activity, which was more directly related to the 
development of this thesis, was primarily one of reflection on the first 
phase. At this point I used the sensitizing concepts presented in the 
previous chapter to get to a better understanding of what happened. 
However, I also tried to insert ingredients from the action research 
philosophy. In the Biesland case, my own interpretations of the 
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mechanisms at work were discussed with key stakeholders, although 
without using the abstract terminology of the theories that had ‘sensitized’ 
me to certain connections. I used the outcomes in turn to improve the 
analysis. In the Grensschap case, after the round of interviews, I organized 
a discussion with the Grensschap and the alderman. This led to greater 
transparency about the experiences in the past collaboration. The 
participants also made some agreements on how to deal with each other in 
the future, including issues of communication (there had been some 
disagreement on how the process was organized and on how this had been 
communicated about). However, practice-theory interaction and 
‘cogeneration’ of knowledge (second and fourth row) were limited in this 
second phase. I consider this as a very interesting possible next step: to 
establish learning communities with actors involved in the three cases, to 
see if the mechanisms and conditions influencing space for policy 
innovation that were identified in this thesis could become the topic of more 
intensive learning modules for all the stakeholders, including the 
researchers. The policy arrangements approach could be part of those 
modules in order to improve practice-theory interaction. 
3.6 In the name of ‘trustworthiness’: criteria and 
techniques  
If criteria such as validity, quantifiability, objectivity, reliability and 
generalizability, which are generally applied in the positivist research 
tradition to judge the trustworthiness of a research, hardly apply to the 
kind of interpretative study carried out here, then what are relevant 
criteria8? 
 
Guba and Lincoln have dealt extensively with the question of quality 
criteria in constructivist social scientific research, which they initially 
referred to as ‘naturalistic inquiry’ (Erlandson et al. 1993). They drew up a 
much-quoted list of alternative criteria and techniques for establishing 
trustworthiness. Instead of internal and external validity (which refer to 
causal relationships, within the study sample and beyond), reliability 
(which means that one gets the same results if the study is repeated) and 
objectivity (which means that human ‘biases’ are annulled), Guba and 
Lincoln propose respectively credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability as relevant criteria for establishing whether what they call 
naturalistic or constructivist research is trustworthy (Lincoln and Guba 
1985, Lincoln and Guba 2003). Although I was not able to meet these 
                                                        
8  Schwartz-Shea has generated an elaborate overview of criteria discerned by various 
authors in relation to interpretive inquiry (2004). 
Chapter 3  
58 
criteria at every stage, I would like to say a bit more about them here, and 
relate them to the techniques used in this study to achieve an acceptable 
level of trustworthiness.  
 
In brief, the credibility criterion is geared to having the findings approved 
by the stakeholders involved. Transferability can be established by 
generating hypotheses (the closest one can get to generalizations) and 
finding out in practice whether these fit in different contexts (Guba and 
Lincoln: “the degree of similarity between sending and receiving contexts”). 
Dependability means that when replication of the study leads to different 
results, this does not necessarily point at unreliability, but rather at 
changed or different circumstances. Therefore, the dependability criterion 
means taking changed circumstances into consideration. Confirmability is 
meant to assure that the findings represent more than “figments of the 
imagination” (Guba and Lincoln 1989: 243). To achieve a high level of 
confirmability, events that are independent of the researcher need to be 
included in the analysis.  
 
Guba and Lincoln then operationalize the four criteria by means of a list of 
eleven research techniques: prolonged engagement, persistent observation, 
triangulation, peer debriefing, negative case analysis, referential adequacy, 
member checks, thick description, dependability audit (including audit 
trail) and reflexive journal. These techniques are well elaborated by 
Erlandson et al. (1993). A summary will suffice here. Thus, prolonged 
engagement means that the researcher stays in contact over an extended 
period of time with the situation that is the topic of study. This helps the 
researcher to build trust and get to know the culture. Prolonged 
engagement also enables a researcher to distinguish which events in a case 
are exceptional and which occur more often. While prolonged engagement 
contributes to the scope of a study, persistent observation contributes to the 
depth. It means that details are explored to the extent that it becomes clear 
whether earlier hypotheses about how things work should be altered or 
refined in order to do justice to practice. Prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation were very important in this research, especially 
when it encountered subtle and ‘below the surface’ power processes. The 
techniques implied that I stayed close to what actually happened and 
thereby learned from and in actual situations. In the Biesland and 
Grensschap cases I was able to exploit these techniques better than in the 
Efteling case. Triangulation is a well-known technique in the social 
sciences implying that various sources of data and/or methods are used. 
Thus, participatory observation, informal talks, secondary sources and 
interviews were combined to improve our understanding of a situation. 
Peer debriefing means asking professionals who are not familiar with the 
cases but do know about the issues in general terms to reflect on methods, 
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interpretations of what happened and preliminary conclusions. This step 
partly still needs to be taken for the benefit of the findings of this research. 
Negative case analysis involves the elaboration of conflicting 
interpretations. When I assumed that a particular process played a 
significant role in the confrontation between government policy and local 
initiatives, and one stakeholder maintained that another process or 
phenomenon was being overlooked, then this is taken up in the analysis. 
Referential adequacy meant that materials were used which provided 
insight in the context of a case. Keeping up with newsletters about the 
policy domain, for instance, kept me in touch with how far and in what way 
the three cases were picked up by policy makers as relevant for their policy 
practices. Member checking was conducted to allow stakeholders to test 
conclusions about findings. This can be done in various ways: by presenting 
findings, by sending them the report (or parts of it), in interviews and in 
informal conversations. Thick description means that the reader is offered 
in-depth insight into what actually happened in a certain context. Based on 
prolonged engagement and persistent observation, the abstraction level of 
such descriptions is low. Part of the chapters four, five and six consist of 
such ‘thick descriptions’. As Erlandson et al. put it:  
 
“While in the context, it is important to stop and look, listen, smell, and feel the 
surroundings and interaction. When reading a description, one should be able to 
get a feel for what it is like to actually be in the context” (1993: 146).  
 
The dependability audit and confirmability audit, which both form part of 
an ‘audit trail’’, entail an ordered documentation of raw data, interpretive 
steps, methodological choices and other notes on the research process. This 
allows a potential auditor to determine trustworthiness. A reflexive journal 
is one element in an audit trail, in which the researcher keeps track of him- 
or herself.  
 
I made use of these techniques to varying degrees. However, I felt it was 
important to mention them all because they represent an ‘ideal picture’ of 
what a research should be like, and provide an excellent starting point for 
much research work. As indicated in the above, most of the techniques were 
used in this research. I would like to single out peer debriefing and the 
audit trail as techniques to which I would like to pay more attention in the 
future. There are of course reasons for the less scholarly approach I 
applied. In an environment where research budgets are tight and with the 
pressure of high ‘productivity-standards’ (percentage of time which needs to 
be spent on externally financed projects), a technique such as ‘audits’ by 
peers is only possible if there is sufficient budget to have peers invest time 
in the project. The same holds for the audit trail. While I was still ‘hands-
on’ in the projects, time was always short. At the end of the day, priority 
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had to be given to the delivery of ‘products’ before tight deadlines and to 
project administration – which were requirements imposed by the financing 
bodies and the research institute, while the kind of ‘audit trails’ or peer 
reviews that I am referring to were not an official requirement. If we take 
the ambition to learn from contract-research projects seriously, then it 
would also be a major step forward to invest more in techniques such as 
these, and either convince the funder of the research of the importance of 
doing so, or invest more research and development money in it on behalf of 
the research institute. I therefore also see this study as one step in a long 
process and it is my ambition to acquire the means and support to apply 
these techniques more thoroughly than has so far been done in the context 
of this specific research.  
 
And of course, this work is part of an open-ended process. I therefore agree 
with the following statement by Lincoln and Guba: 
 
“We wish to call attention to the fact that naturalistic criteria of trustworthiness 
are open-ended; they can never be satisfied to such an extent that the 
trustworthiness of the inquiry could be labeled as unassailable. (…) [Unlike 
conventional inquiry: MB] naturalistic inquiry operates as an open system; no 
amount of member checking, triangulations, persistent observation, auditing, or 
whatever can ever compel; it can at best persuade” (1985: 329). 
 
Now this is what I would like the reader to assess – whether the analysis 
persuades him/her sufficiently to enter into debate about the issues raised.  
 
3.7 Progressive refinement of sensitizing concepts by 
action and reflection 
In the above, two phases were distinguished: a phase of solving concrete 
problems in contract research projects and a phase of reflection in which 
there was a greater distance from the contract research projects. The 
approaches of Action Research and of interpretive inquiry were described 
as they respectively characterized the two phases (to a greater or lesser 
extent). Then research criteria that match with the chosen approach were 
described, as well as the techniques by which these criteria were to be met.  
 
Doing interpretive inquiry by means of a combination of action research, 
discourse analysis and the use of the techniques of naturalistic inquiry is a 
fruitful way to progressively refine sensitizing concepts. In my situation, 
the phase of ‘field immersion’, which I characterized as action research, 
provided for close contact with the empirical world. As Blumer stated: 
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“Theory is of value in empirical science only to the extent to which it connects 
fruitfully with the empirical world. Concepts are the means, and the only means, 
of establishing such connection, for it is the concept that points to the empirical 
instances about which a theoretical proposal is made” (Blumer 1954: 4). 
 
The interpretive phase allowed for reflection on the manifestations of the 
concepts used in practice. By doing this kind of research I could refine the 
concepts, or complement them if empirical examination required it. The 
results of this will be presented after the case chapters. Action and 
reflection ideally take place in a constant loop. Of course, findings should be 
recorded at intervals, providing a moment of consolidation, after which 
others can take up the job again in the next research project. As 
highlighted in the above, I found working in this way rather difficult at 
times because it requires a switch between two rather different ‘states of 
mind’. Still, I am convinced that it is a useful way to achieve a successful 
refinement of sensitizing concepts. The main obstacle that I experienced 
was the completely different nature of the action types of activity on the 
one hand and the reflection types of activity on the other hand. This 
problem could partly be tackled by enhancing the scope for peer review and 
audit trails, of which I made mention in the previous section. Situations in 
which contract research institutes collaborate with universities should 
provide a good context for such methods. Their success will also depend on 
the creativity and seriousness of the researchers and research 
environments involved. 
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Chapter 4: From Biesland to Brussels 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts off in section 4.2 by describing the Biesland Polder, 
located in the West of the Netherlands, with the aid of topographical maps 
and pictures. Section 4.3 outlines the formal policy that was operative when 
an initiative emerged to promote a different policy regarding land 
management and design in that specific territory. Section 4.4 tells my story 
of that initiative and its interaction with existing policy. I will show how 
‘the’ initiative to design and manage the Biesland area on the basis of 
‘nature-oriented farming’ had various sources, how it became a joint 
undertaking by various people and organizations, how it related to existing 
policy at the start and later on, how it required decision-making at various 
levels and what came of it in the end. The story will mainly be told 
chronologically, following the sequence of the main events. In section 4.5, 
the story continues but now in terms of the gradually changing 
relationships between actors, discourses, resources and rules of the game. I 
will then also look for broader structural transformations that played a role 
in the confrontation between the initiative and existing policy. And, as 
announced in chapter two, I will pay special attention to Beck’s thesis 
about sub-politics: that society is increasingly being shaped from below. I 
will go on to define the kind of ‘space for policy innovation’ that evolved 
from the interactions, and to assess the factors emerging from the story 
that have not been accounted for so far in the conceptual framework. This 
chapter will thereby answer the first four questions presented in chapter 
two, with reference to this case. 
1. What was the origin of the initiative and how did it relate to the then 
existing arrangement? (4.5.1) 
2. How do discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest 
themselves over time, in the interaction between initiative and existing 
policy? (4.5.2) 
3. Does the case point to a structural transformation of sub-politicization 
or can other structural transformations be discerned? (4.5.3) 
4. What space for policy innovation emerged in the course of the Biesland 
process? (4.5.4)  
I will conclude with some reflections on the story (in 4.6.1), in order to re-
assess what other dimensions might have influenced the interaction 
between the initiative and the existing arrangement. I will also reflect 
again on my own positionality (4.6.2).  
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Map 3: Polder of Biesland in urbanizing area 
 
Alterra Top10smart 2006 
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Aerial photograph 1: Polder of Biesland 
 
 
4.2 The area  
 
The area around the Biesland polder has changed considerably in just a 
couple of decades. At present, the conurbation of The Hague, Delft, 
Pijnacker-Nootdorp and Zoetermeer almost reaches the polder on all sides. 
On the Delft side, the distinctive blue and yellow of the home furnishing 
store IKEA conspicuously marks the transition between city and polder, 
while on the other side, housing development on the edge of the 
municipality of Pijnacker-Nootdorp is almost visible. Behind the ‘Delftse 
Hout’, a State Forest Service recreational area, the cities of The Hague and 
Delft are encroaching more and more. Meanwhile, the character of the 
remaining area has changed too, with agricultural land use giving way to 
parks and nature areas. [topogr kaarten toen en nu] Times have changed 
for the Biesland Polder itself, too. Whereas in previous decades an area of 
one hundred hectares would have accommodated several farms (about ten 
in the 1980s), just one dairy farm occupies the same area today. As in 
 
‘s-Gravenhage 
© Eurosense BV DKLN-2006 
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former times, the farmland is characterized by long, narrow fields, 
separated by twenty three kilometres of ditches. These ditches and narrow 
fields are typical of the traditional polder landscape in this area. {pictures} 
Unlike most contemporary farmers, who keep their cattle inside winter and 
summer for the sake of efficiency, the Biesland Polder’s organic9 farmer 
keeps his more than one hundred cows grazing outside in the fields. The 
picturesque hamlet of ‘Klein Delfgauw’, which nowadays consists of a 
campsite and hotel, a restaurant, a day care centre, a wingless historical 
windmill, stables and a few houses, divides the Biesland polder into an 
upper and a lower part. The upper polder is located within the municipal 
boundaries of Delft, the lower part in Pijnacker-Nootdorp. The entire area 
forms part of the Province of Zuid-Holland. 
 
4.3 Operative policy: “Every city needs a forest” 
The Biesland area is part of the ‘Green-Blue Streamer’, an S-shaped band 
of rural land and water intended as a provincial version of the national 
Randstad Green Structure (Randstadgroenstructuur): a spatial policy goal 
of preserving a coherent green structure, mainly for recreational use by the 
growing urban population of the Randstad. A national policy document 
described the green structure policy goal as follows: 
 
“The quality of the rural area in the Randstad must improve and be geared to the 
users by realizing forests, recreation, and nature areas”. (Structuurschema 
Groene Ruimte 1995) 
 
The main idea behind the green structure was that of a ‘buffer zone’. Green 
areas would have to protect the open areas between the cities and prevent 
them from gradually fusing together. In and around the Biesland Polder, 
most land was acquired from farmers in the seventies and eighties and was 
partly transformed from meadows into housing estates, and partly from 
meadows into forest or recreational parks. The remaining polder has been 
in the hands of one farmer since 1993. As far as the upper and lower 
Polders of Biesland were concerned, 90 hectares were projected to remain 
agricultural land. Ten hectares were to be acquired for the newly-planned 
Biesland Forest. 
 
Implementation of the Randstad Green Structure resembles the national 
‘Main Ecological Structure’ (MES): 
                                                        
9  In the Netherlands, an ‘organic farmer’ does not use chemical pesticides, artificial 
fertilizers or genetically modified organisms and keeps animals in conditions that are 
as natural as possible. 
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 “However innovative the idea for nature development might have been, and 
however well tuned to the demands of policymakers, institutionally it had strong 
overtones of traditional top-down policy planning. The MES was conceived as a 
‘national policy plan’ and was agreed upon by the national parliament. Having 
gained official policy status, it had to be implemented at the regional level. Local 
communities, however, had difficulty with the superimposition of ‘new nature’ on 
their lived environments” (Hajer in Hajer and Wagenaar 2003: 109). 
 
Broadly speaking, the Randstad Green Structure was administratively 
supported by a coalition of the Ministry of ANF, the four nature organi-
sations10, the Government Service for Land and Water Management (DLG) 
and the Province. Just as with the national MES, the Ministry of ANF 
would decide on land acquisitions. Then, together with the Province they 
would commission the DLG to carry out the decisions. Finally, the 
management of an area would be given to one of the four nature 
organisations. The Randstad Green Structure policy was later linked to the 
‘Green in and around the City’ policy, later known as ‘Recreation around 
the City’ and ‘Green and the City’. Regardless of changing labels, the 
practice of land acquisition formed part of all of these policies. This meant 
that quantitative norms were set for the acquisition of land, which would 
have to be expropriated from farmers and given to nature organizations. 
 
The policies summarized above imply a specific way of looking at the city, 
and, more particularly, at the relationship between agriculture, nature 
(specifically forest) and the city. In the view of governments at various 
levels and of nature organisations, the vicinity of a city or an urban fringe 
justified special attention for the establishment of ‘green structures’: as the 
aforementioned buffer, as recreation area for the city dweller 
(‘uitloopgebied’) and also as a ‘corridor’ for animals and plants. Neutral as 
they may have first sounded, ‘green’ structures were not just ‘green’. They 
were generally interpreted as ‘nature’, ‘forests’ or parks with a strong 
recreational function. The idea was also that land acquisition and renewed 
planning of that land would be necessary. The State Forest Service 
proclaimed in a magazine article that ”every city needs a forest”. Such 
statements were quite common: Forests and parks were expected to meet 
with the approval of city dwellers. Research was quoted as evidence that 
there was a shortage of such areas (see for instance de Vries and Bulens 
2001 for the Dutch Automobile Association ANWB). ‘The city’ was put on 
the scene as an enemy and an ally at the same time: as an enemy when 
‘urban expansion’ was feared, and as an ally when citizen support for the 
parks and forests which would serve as natural buffers against such urban 
expansion was emphasized. Part and parcel of that thinking was the 
conviction that agriculture would not provide a strong buffer, either in 
                                                        
10  Natuurmonumenten, the ‘Landschappen’, Domeinen and the State Forest Service. 
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terms of ecological achievements or in terms of the capacity to fulfil the 
needs of recreational users. In this view, agriculture had no future in these 
urban contexts. In view of the increasing land prices near cities, farmers 
were often accused of speculation for their own financial benefit. Nature 
organisations, on the other hand, were considered to be perfectly capable of 
managing the new parks, forests and nature areas. These organisations 
would often be associated with expressions such as ‘sustainable’ and ‘strong 
enough’, while farmers were expected to fall prey to developers in the end. 
There was yet another, more quantitative motive for the plea for forests or 
parks instead of open landscapes: the former would offer a greater ‘capacity’ 
to accommodate tourists and day-trippers. All in all, in urban settings 
‘nature’ and ‘agriculture’ were considered as conflicting domains and the 
often implicit conclusion was that they should be in separate hands.  
 
While part of the Biesland polder was designated to become forest, there 
was also potential in the area for making use of subsidies available through 
the national regulation for Agrarian Nature Management (SAN), and 
funded by the national government and the European Union. The SAN 
policy was geared to achieving specific ‘nature target types’ in areas 
delineated by the province. A subsidy could be granted for a six-year period 
for measures such as mowing late for the benefit of meadow birds. Such 
contracts had to be renewed every six years. The measures did not require 
a major change in farming philosophy, since they could be combined with 
‘operative’ farm practices, and a farmer did not have to adopt the principles 
of ‘organic farming’ in order to be allowed to participate in the SAN. From 
2002, the combination of the ideas of a new Minister and the difficulties of 
acquiring land led to an increased emphasis on such possibilities for nature 
management by farmers. 
 
Briefly, then, this was the existing policy context in which a new coalition 
was born. The following figure summarizes the partly overlapping green 
structure ‘policy concepts’ which were operative. To the left of the line are 
green structures that do not apply to the Biesland area, and which mainly 
focus on nature values. To the right are the green structures that apply to 
the polder, and which mainly focus on recreation (although, some ‘nature-
target-types’ were also formulated for these areas). 
 
Chapter 4  
70 
Natura 2000
Main Ecological Structure Randstad 
Greenstructure/ 
Green in and 
Around the City/ 
Recreation around
the City/ Green and 
the City
Green Blue 
Slinger
Bieslandse Bos
Ten 
hectares in 
the Polder 
of BieslandFocus on 
nature
Focus on 
recreation
 
 
Figure 5: Hierarchy of green structures: from the local level (trees at the front) up 
to EU level (trees at the back) 
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Figure 6: Overview of main events 
 
Of one farmer who turned his head towards nature and the city 
Right from the start, the farm family at the heart of this story tried to 
secure their future as a farm enterprise. In this sense, they were not very 
different from many other farms in the Netherlands. The usual way of 
doing this was to enlarge the area available for farming and intensify 
production, achieving a higher output at lower costs. The Biesland farm 
family did this successfully, expanding both their area and their herd 
considerably. They went from 35 cows on 17 hectares in 1993 to 130 cows 
on 90 hectares in 2003. By that time, they used 90 out of their 100 hectares 
for agricultural purposes; the other 10 hectares consisted of the home yard, 
roads and landscape elements such as ditches and a marsh area (see also 
the farm’s website www.hoevebiesland.nl). 
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plant a woven fence at the occasion of the 
foundation of the Friends of Biesland 
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in the living room at the farm 
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Children playing at one of the open 
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Signing of declaration of intent, with 
cow Clara bringing in the document 
 
Children at one of the open farm days 
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One day in 1996, the farmer met with officials of the municipality of Delft 
to discuss the possibility of leasing land in the ‘upper polder’. The officials 
advised him to contact a volunteer from a local environmental group (whom 
I will henceforth call ‘nature volunteer’). That volunteer was active in 
various nature-related activities in the city. In these conversations with 
municipal officials, the farmer began to realize that there were limits to the 
kind of farm expansion that he had gone through, especially in this 
urbanizing region. Together with the nature volunteer, he started to 
explore the options for running a farm that would incorporate nature, 
water and recreation objectives, while remaining economically viable. 
Barely aware of the meaning of organic farming a few years earlier, the 
farm family switched to that approach in 1997. The switch to organic 
farming yielded higher prices for the milk produced. The family also 
believed that organic farming fitted well in this urban environment, with 
many eyes always following what happened on the farm. Together with the 
nature volunteer, the farmer made a plan for turning the upper polder into 
an area that combined agricultural land with ‘nature elements’ such as a 
marsh area and wooded grove (‘geriefbosjes’). The plan for the redesigned 
polder was implemented in 2000, and enabled the farm family to lease the 
upper polder land from the municipality of Delft on a long term basis, on 
terms laid down in a lease agreement. Meanwhile, they made optimal use 
of the subsidies for Agrarian Nature Management (SAN), entering into 6-
year contracts for a combined ‘package’ of late mowing, use of fresh 
manure, and proper management of the sides of ditches. However, the 
limited duration of the SAN contracts prompted the farmer to continue to 
look for other possibilities for developing the farm: a six year period was too 
short to be a solid basis for a long-term farm strategy.  
 
In the context of the green structure policies described in the previous 
section, negotiations with the one remaining farmer in the area had been 
going on for several years. The subject of the negotiations was 
approximately ten hectares of the farmland, targeted for acquisition for the 
realization of the ‘Bieslandse bos’ (the Biesland forest). The farmer’s 
response to these attempts was to form another alliance with the volunteer. 
At several meetings they tried to convince the responsible officials of the 
various involved organizations (ANF, the Government Service for Land and 
Water Management, the State Forest Service and the Province) that higher 
nature values could be achieved by integrating nature on the entire farm, 
rather than setting aside ten hectares that would be owned and managed 
by the State Forest Service. Besides, they maintained that the farmland 
could already offer city dwellers an attractive, quiet and open landscape. In 
2001 a new plan (planwijziging Bieslandse bos) from the province and state 
organizations was expected to solve the deadlock by replacing forest with 
marshes (open water, reeds, undergrowth and flowering grassland). This 
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plan drew the indignation of the farmer and the nature volunteer because 
it failed to answer their request to abandon the plans to purchase the land. 
State agencies persisted in their claims to the right to buy land and put 
these in the hands of nature organisations. And the farmer and the 
volunteer persisted in their resistance to a plan that would further 
diminish the amount of farmland in the area. Instead, they wanted to show 
that farmland could be equally valuable for nature. 
 
Expanding the coalition 
One day in autumn 2001 the farmer met with a journalist who happened to 
know a bit about the ideas of researchers on improving the relationship 
between farming and nature management. These ideas matched those of 
the farmer and the volunteer, so the farmer kept the journalist’s contact 
details. From what he had heard from the journalist, the farmer realized 
that if the vision were really to be put into practice and become part of 
mainstream policy, it would mean that he could also apply more far-
reaching nature measures in the lower polder, and be paid for them. 
Sufficient financial compensation would allow him to choose even more 
radically for a farming system providing agricultural products and nature 
values and the value of an attractive landscape for citizens. That winter, 
the farmer contacted the researchers – who happened to be searching for 
areas where they could put their ideas into practice. There seemed to be a 
good match between their ideas and both parties hoped that a new alliance 
could force a breakthrough. The researchers believed that practice-based 
experience would be more effective than a report in convincing 
policymakers of the value of their alternative vision. Besides, that 
experience would also give them the opportunity to refine the ideas. 
 
What the farmer, the volunteer and the researchers shared 
What the farmer, some nature volunteers and the researchers had in 
common was the ambition to reconcile nature objectives with agricultural 
enterprise. They also attributed an important role to agriculture in relation 
to the neighbouring cities and the need for recreation. Similar to the ‘forest 
and park promoters’ mentioned in the above, they looked at the city as a 
potential ally in the protection of the agricultural landscape. The farmer 
often said that it was his principle not to fight against the city or nature, 
but to look for positive opportunities to continue with the farm together 
with these. They believed that if the role of farmers in the landscape were 
properly rewarded, they, like the nature organizations, could form a 
counterweight to urban expansion. They emphasized the positive 
experiences that farmland could offer people.  
 
A key ingredient brought in from the researchers’ side was the zero-input 
principle. What they called a ‘nature-oriented farmer’ would not import or 
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export any fertilizer or fodder (i.e. no minerals) to or from the farm. This 
would go further than organic farming. It meant, for instance, that the 
farmer would start producing the fodder himself. In many cases, the cattle 
breed would need to be slowly adjusted by cross-breeding so as to be able to 
digest the fodder. In the researchers’ eyes, the concept of ‘nature target 
types’ was a contradiction in terms: unpredictability was considered the 
very essence of nature. Instead, nature values were looked upon as the 
possible consequence of the creation of certain conditions: rather than 
targeting specific ‘nature types’, we have to leave it to nature itself to 
determine the exact outcomes. An additional point of departure was that 
farmers themselves could best decide which parts of the land were most 
appropriate for which types of land use. The zero-input principle and the 
conservation of a structure of landscape elements were the only restricting 
requirements. Within this scope, the farmer and his associates needed to 
make choices about which kinds of fodder crops to use, how to deal with 
new natural sources of fertilizer such as mud from the ditches, and how to 
make use of the land.  
 
Changing a farming system into a ‘zero input’ system would be long-term 
and expensive and would lead to a halving of the income from milk 
production. Because of this loss of income combined with the costs of 
changing cattle breed and buying new machinery, the innovation could not 
be implemented without financial compensation. Moreover, most of the 
changes would be irreversible and therefore needed a long-term financial 
perspective. With their limited time span of 6-year contracts, the current 
policies were not geared to this kind of in-depth transformation. Therefore, 
a crucial element of the idea was that both various regional (municipalities, 
province, water board, private parties) and national parties would have to 
make a one-off investment in a fund. Computations were made by 
researchers to show that such a fund would require an even lower 
investment than would be required in the scope of existing policy for the 
acquisition of land to be managed by nature organizations. The assumption 
was that the fund would generate interest for a long time, out of which the 
participating farmers would be paid. A regional foundation would be 
involved in the monitoring, sanctioning and decision-making about new 
applicants. It was expected that a regional foundation and a sustainable 
fund would be more reliable than the 6-year subsidies of the Programme 
Beheer. The landscape structure and the zero-input principle would be 
included in a special juridical arrangement: private-law agreements in the 
form of servitudes with a qualitative liability and perpetual clause, with no 
time-limit. This type of contract would have to guarantee that the 
measures would be connected to the land and not to the person. Thus, the 
farmers’ successor would be liable to apply the same nature-oriented 
measures and would be entitled to an income in exchange for it. The fund, 
Chapter 4  
76 
the contracts and the foundation had to guarantee the sustainability of the 
approach.  
 
The farmer, the volunteer and the researchers took ample time to discuss 
the meaning of these ideas. Their ideas matched well and in their 
discussions the ideas gradually became more concrete and applied to the 
local situation. Unaware of the hurdles that would follow, they all realized 
that if they were to be successful, their collaboration should be continued. 
 
The following scheme summarizes the differences mentioned so far between 
the initiative and the existing policies. The first four differences are more 
substantive, the last four organizational. It immediately becomes clear, 
however, that substantive and organizational aspects are related. For 
example, the ownership of land (a resource) seems at first sight to be an 
organizational affair, but is just as closely related to the contents of the 
ideas in which nature is appropriated by the ‘nature sector’ and dissociated 
from agriculture.  
 
Operative national policy Initiative 
Forest, parks, nature areas in the hands 
of nature organisations which were 
considered strong enough to protect the 
open landscape against urbanization 
Agriculture as another potential ally of 
the city dweller, in the protection of the 
open landscape against urbanization 
Nature organizations are best-equipped to 
safeguard nature target types on what 
should be their land, especially those 
belonging to ‘real nature’ 
Farmers are well able to safeguard 
nature on their land, especially those 
related to the historic cultural 
landscapes 
Agriculture and Nature separate: nature 
measures on the farm are a supplement to 
common, intensive farming practices 
Agriculture and Nature integrated: 
farming practices and nature 
management go hand in hand. 
Create Nature target types Create conditions in which natural 
values are likely to develop 
6 Year contracts: 
- politicians should not reign beyond the 
period that they were elected for and be 
accountable for what they have decided 
and invested in 
Long term – contracts: 
- nature needs time to develop 
- transformation of the farming system 
is irreversible 
- a fund generates more income when it 
is long term 
Yearly subsidies One-off investment (a large sum once)  
National government/ EU subsidize 
agrarian nature management 
Regional parties, national government/ 
EU pay part of the income of farmers, in 
exchange for nature management 
Public-law contracts: contract connected to 
the person 
Private-law contract: servitude 
connected to the land 
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In sum, it was not just the ideas on what the polder should look like and on 
how it should physically be managed that differed from the policies 
described in the foregoing section. The ideas on social and administrative 
organization differed too. In view of these differences, the discretionary 
space of the ‘street-level-bureaucrats’ was not sufficient to carry on with the 
initiative; its implementation would require a change of rules and a new 
division of resources. Also, as the story in the next section will illustrate, 
the confrontation soon drew attention from the higher echelons, including 
that of the Minister, who made use of his own ‘discretionary space’ to 
support the initiative. 
 
The initial search for support from the Ministry  
In the beginning ‘Farming for Nature’ was ‘only an idea’ about ways of 
securing the future of small-scale agricultural landscapes. It was then 
developed into a ‘strategic expertise development project’ of the research 
institute Alterra. This status of the project implied that no organisation 
had commissioned the research. In contrast to most projects carried out by 
this privatized institute, there would be no funders imposing specific 
requirements on the contents of this project. After it had ended, the project 
was followed by a year of writing memos on the relationship with operative 
policy objectives, of making promotion material and of meetings with policy 
officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (ANF). 
‘Research’ activities in that year focussed on the search for support from 
the Ministry of ANF, so that it would become involved in the project on a 
more intensive basis and start to finance it from other research budgets. 
Arguments were sought to show that the idea would be a good way to 
realize the Ministry’s existing policy ambitions. 
 
As we have seen, before the Biesland farmer and the researchers got to 
know each other, steps had already been taken to put the idea on the policy 
agenda of the Ministry of ANF. An official of the Regional Directorate 
‘East’, who was a friend of one of the researchers, embraced the idea and 
wrote various policy documents to promote it. He saw himself as one of the 
‘fathers of the idea’. In July 2001, this official and the researchers managed 
to meet the State Secretary, the highest responsible official at the Ministry 
at the time. Her reaction was far from enthusiastic, and she expressed her 
worries about earlier media exposure of Farming for Nature. Her concerns 
focused on the researchers’ claim that by means of a fund, more nature 
objectives could be achieved at less expense. The researchers had 
emphasized that the costs of the current policy of buying land for the 
realisation of the ‘Main Ecological Structure’ were higher than the costs of 
establishing a fund from which farmers would be paid for the realisation 
and management of nature values, on what would remain the farmer’s own 
land. The timing of this claim was very unfortunate for the State Secretary, 
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who had just spoken in Parliament to defend her need for a bigger budget 
to acquire land for ‘nature development’. In this context, she preferred not 
to present ‘Farming for Nature’ as a cheaper alternative to the policy which 
she had just defended so forcefully. Opinions at the Ministry were 
ambivalent. Policy documents that were discussed in Parliament did make 
mention of the vision as an ‘extra method to realise policy objectives’ (draft- 
‘plattelandsbrief’, and there was a letter to the Parliament about the 
operative policy for agricultural nature management ‘Programma Beheer’, 
3 July 2001). 
 
A new Minister’s promises result in deeper involvement of the Ministry  
A change of leadership at the Ministry of ANF was a key factor in the 
acquisition of pilot status. While the aforementioned State Secretary was a 
member of the Social Democratic Party, the new Minister belonged to the 
Christian Democratic Party. The former had prioritized the realization of 
the Main Ecological Structure (MES). Since agriculture was seen more as a 
competitor of the MES than as a potential partner, ‘Farming for Nature’ did 
not fit within the social democrat ambition and it was therefore not 
surprising that the presiding state secretary did not favour the approach11. 
The Christian Democratic party, on the other hand, traditionally had 
strong ties with the agricultural sector. The Minister, a farmer himself, 
introduced the new policy of achieving more nature objectives on farms by a 
move ‘from land acquisition to management’ (‘van aankoop naar beheer’). 
Part of the money earmarked for land acquisition was transferred to 
agrarian nature management in the Programma Beheer. Farming for 
Nature matched well with this change of policy. The political tide seemed to 
have turned in favour of the idea. 
 
Secondly, in his previous post, the Minister had been general chair of the 
research institute and university where the researchers were employed. 
During that time he had formed part of a reading committee that had 
positively recommended the idea when it was still in its infancy. When the 
regional activities to make a region-specific ‘Farming for Nature-plan’ for 
the polder had already started, a meeting with the new Minister resulted in 
formal acknowledgement of two initiatives (Biesland and Twickel) as pilot 
projects. On several subsequent occasions, the Minister challenged regional 
parties to reserve financial means for the project, just as he had done. 
 
                                                        
11  At a later stage, members of the Social Democrat Party actively started to promote 
decision making regarding the project, for instance by asking questions to the 
Minister about the project, alongside with members of the Christian Democrats, the 
Socialist Party and ‘Green Left’. 
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Thirdly, this initiative seemed to be consistent with policy development in 
relation to ‘green services’. Both policy makers and the initiators considered 
this policy development as a possible stepping-stone to more support from 
within the policy-making bodies. Although the status of the ‘Farming for 
Nature’ pilots was initially unclear, they were gradually taken up in the 
‘Green Services’ policy development process, which provided them with an 
official framework. The ‘Green Services’ concept stemmed from a policy 
document ‘Structuur Schema Groene Ruimte 2 (2001), and from an advice 
of the advisory council for rural areas (RLG 2002). The concept of ‘green 
services’ was a response to the increasing awareness that a system of 
subsidies to farmers like those included in the ‘Programma Beheer’ would 
not be viable in the long run, because of free market regulations of the 
European Union and the World Trade Organization. New partnerships 
were therefore stimulated, and private actors who were not subject to free 
market regulations were to invest in nature and landscape measures (RLG 
2002) because it would become increasingly difficult for state actors to do 
so. The term ‘Green Services’ made it explicit that farmers were offering a 
‘service’ that should –naturally – be paid for, rather than subsidized. The 
plan was that a Green Services policy would at first run alongside the 
implementation of the ‘Programma Beheer’, and would eventually be 
integrated. However, in a letter to the Parliament12 (July 2003), the 
Minister did not mention the two Farming for Nature projects as official 
‘explorations’ of the Green Services policy, while two other (government-
initiated) projects were included. Biesland and Twickel did form part of a 
draft of the letter, but had later been removed by the department of Legal 
Affairs of the Ministry. This department had serious doubts about the 
implementation of the projects and did not want to arouse expectations 
about them. In July 2004 a second letter to Parliament informed the 
parliamentarians that six exploratory ‘green services’ had been selected to 
contribute to further policy development. This time the two Farming for 
Nature pilots were included. In the end the initiative gained a stronger 
position on the agenda as an ‘exploration’ in the context of new policy 
development. Still, officials of the Ministry continued to emphasize that the 
present policy was successful and that ‘Farming for Nature’ would therefore 
not in any way supplant that policy.  
 
Briefly, there were several reasons why the Ministry of ANF became deeply 
involved in the process. As indicated, the first reason was the Ministry’s 
financial involvement in both the research process and the implementation 
of the measures (the contribution to the fund). ‘Green services’ became the 
framework within which officials could work on the matter. For his part, 
                                                        
12  July 7 2003: http://www.minlnv.nl/infomart/parlemnt/2003/par03223.htm 
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the Minister promised early in the process to finance half of the plans13, 
provided that the other half would be financed by regional parties. This did 
not guarantee support from middle-level officials however. They objected 
when they were reminded of the promise, especially when ‘half’ turned out 
to be a higher amount than foreseen. Middle level officials continued to say 
that there was an option in existing policy that would boil down to the same 
thing: subsidy-regulation nature management. This implied however that 
the land would be designated as nature, and this legal conversion would be 
definitive. As the Ministry’s own website says about such conversions: “it is 
not possible to use the land for agriculture again at a later stage”. Yet the 
whole point for the participating farmer was that he wanted to be able to 
combine agriculture and nature management. A permanent designation as 
nature area would miss that mark. 
 
A second reason for the Ministry’s involvement was the emphasis placed by 
the Minister on European approval for implementation of the idea. This 
gave the regional initiative a European dimension. The Ministry of ANF14 
itself would have to organise the procedure to submit requests for so-called 
‘state support’ to the European Commission, a procedure to make sure that 
support given to farmers by governments would not distort free competition 
amongst European farmers. A third reason was that the initiative had 
gained the support of top Ministry officials (including the minister) and at 
field level (the officials of the Regional Directorates). Also, parliament 
started to get involved and to ask questions about progress. First I will 
describe how a coalition was gradually growing at the regional level. 
 
Becoming organized at regional level: a growing coalition 
Not long after the meetings between the journalist, the farmer and the the 
researchers, a ‘project group’ was formed by regional policymakers 
(province, municipalities, and water board) and a representative of the 
Western regional directorate of the national Ministry of ANF. The project 
group consisted of the officials of the various government bodies involved 
(the province, the two municipalities Delft and Pijnacker-Nootdorp, the 
water board and the ‘stadsgewest’ (urban district) of Haaglanden), the 
farmer, the volunteer, and two of the researchers. The project group began 
to hold regular meetings from the autumn of 2002. At first they met every 
six to eight weeks, depending on the state of affairs; after a few years the 
                                                        
13  Later, during the negotiations on the exact contribution of the Ministry, this 
pronouncement was called into question by officials of the Ministry. Hadn’t the 
Minister said: “the Ministry can not ‘stay behind’ when regional parties reach 
agreement on financing the project”, rather than being specific about its share in the 
financing? 
14  Officially, provinces may also submit requests for approval of support to agriculture 
to the European Commission, through the Ministry of Domestic Affairs. 
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frequency of the meetings diminished. The project group meetings were 
mostly prepared by two researchers and the official from the province. They 
also organized various activities on the farm to involve a wider range of 
people and to establish a ‘monitoring and evaluation system’ intended to 
provide a learning approach for the researchers to develop and implement 
together with ‘lay’ experts from the region. 
 
While the initiative had not yet obtained a clear position on the various 
policy agendas, the province and the research department of the Ministry of 
ANF15 were willing to finance the project. After a year the involved officials 
had gathered sufficient support from members of the executive bodies.  
 
In the summer of 2003, it was clear what those who had organized 
themselves around the Polder wanted. Researchers, farmer, volunteers and 
regional officials had worked together on the publication of a colourful book 
summarizing the ideas. The book was produced in workshops in which 
researchers, officials and people from the region worked in small groups, 
often at the farm family’s kitchen table.  
 
A year after the formation of the project group, a steering committee of 
regional administrators was formed in order to establish a link between the 
activities in the polder and political decision-making in the region. In the 
Netherlands, forming such a steering committee is standard practice in 
projects of this kind. From this point on, the project group would draw up 
the agenda for meetings of the steering committee, which would take 
decisions about allocation of resources, administration of the initiative and 
other matters which they would sometimes have to defend to the 
representative bodies. The steering committee met for the first time in 
September 2003. Successful lobbying led to the provincial executive 
hesitantly agreeing to chair this group (although he did not initially want 
to call it a ‘steering committee’ because he wished to emphasize the 
temporary nature of the undertaking). Aldermen of the municipalities of 
Pijnacker-Nootdorp, Delft and The Hague participated in the steering 
committee, as well as an executive of the Waterboard and of the urban 
region (‘stadsgewest’) of Haaglanden, and the Director of the National 
Green Fund, the organization that would ‘manage’ the fund and make sure 
                                                        
15  At this time, the Ministry’s financial involvement in the research was independent of 
the involvement of the relevant policy officials. This was made possible by the way 
the research was embedded in the Ministry, with different contact persons for policy-
related matters and for research-related matters. Later the link between 
policymaking and research became stronger. It would be worthwhile to investigate 
the implications of this change. In what situations did the link increase or decrease 
the policy relevancy of research? Did it lessen or improve the chances of obtaining 
research budgets for ideas that diverged from operational policy?  
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that the farmer would receive his compensation. The Ministry of ANF did 
not participate in the steering committee. Meetings focused on the 
acquisition of financial resources in the region and the political procedures 
this required, ways of persuading the Ministry of ANF to work faster and 
with more conviction, and organizational concerns such as the contracts 
which needed to be agreed on to establish a legal basis for the payments to 
the farmer. At the end of 2005, the first precondition of the Minister, 
namely that half of the required amount would have to be furnished by 
regional parties, was fulfilled. 
 
The aldermen involved and other members of the executive bodies at 
provincial, urban region and waterboard levels did not want the 
undertaking to become a purely regional affair. They were of the opinion 
that rural areas belonged to a national policy domain that the Ministry of 
ANF had traditionally financed. If ‘the region’ were to achieve national 
policy ambitions in the area, even though by different means than projected 
in the SAN of the Programma Beheer, why then should ANF reduce its 
payments? Besides, they argued, expenditure for the SAN would be 
annulled if the new measures were implemented. Payment for the new 
measures might well take the place of these. They claimed that their 
support for the project was already a new type of investment for them and 
thus they expected the Ministry to contribute as well. 
 
The Biesland pilot received considerable attention, even from other 
countries, and there were frequent visits to the farm by all kinds of groups, 
including academics, senior citizens, officials, other farmers and school 
children. The activities that the farmer undertook in the name of Farming 
for Nature were paid for from the research budgets, enabling him to hire 
contract workers to do the work on his farm on the days when he was doing 
his share of ‘research work’ for the project. Even though it was difficult at 
times, the coalition was relatively successful in gaining access to resources 
such as research budgets.  
 
A principle shared by the people most closely involved in the project was 
that it was vital for success to make sure that as many people as possible 
experienced the polder. Those who had been sceptical at first would start to 
refer to the project in terms of ‘we’ once they had visited the area a few 
times. Well aware of these mechanisms, the initiators tried to invite people 
who didn’t have strong links with the area to come and see it, and listen to 
the farmer’s story. That was a successful strategy. It was often an eye-
opener for the visitors, most of whom were amazed to find such a quiet, 
‘rural’ enclave in the middle of a heavily urbanized area. The farmer’s 
personal capacities were important here. Due to his networking capacity, 
strategic thinking (and actions!) and communicative abilities he became 
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quite a celebrity, with frequent exposure on television and in other media. 
This attracted a lot of attention and hardly a week went by without a group 
of interested people visiting his farm. 
 
Legal objections at provincial level – overruled by the steering committee 
The farmer, the researchers, the project group (and the provincial official in 
particular), and the steering committee took the lead in pushing for 
progress. The steering committee succeeded in reserving most of the 
required regional part of the budget. Despite these ‘successes’, legal 
objections were raised by a provincial legal expert who had been 
approached at a later stage in the process by the provincial official in the 
project group. The provincial jurist stated that neither a regional 
foundation nor one-off investments in a fund that was to render an income 
over a long period, were possible. The provincial project group member had 
often ‘crossed swords’ with this legal expert, who told her that he was 
convinced that the plan would fail because it was not in accordance with 
the rules. Despite this situation, the provincial official kept working on the 
project with undiminished determination.  
 
At one of the steering committee meetings, the legal objections were 
‘overruled’. The legal expert was given the assignment to work out a 
workable, simple way to realize their ideas. The steering committee 
members insisted that a fund and a regional foundation would have to form 
part of that solution. They were of the opinion that the financial 
mechanism of a fund was more attractive because their investments now 
would accrue interest in the long term. They agreed that a regional 
foundation was less bureaucratic and closer to the citizen than a formal 
public arrangement. The legal expert persisted in his views, but to no avail 
at this point. In the meantime, the process continued. The steering 
committee pressed the Ministry to decide quickly on its contribution and to 
move fast in Brussels. 
 
Help from an unexpected quarter: the birth of the Friends of Biesland 
An event which broadened societal support was the founding of the ‘Friends 
of Biesland’. A local service club got wind of the initiative when the 
voluntary ‘Working group Green’ took them to work on the farm. That was 
during the spring of 2003. The working group would usually organize ‘work 
days’ on the land of the State Forest Service, but this time they decided to 
go and help the farmer to lay hedges. This was no coincidence: the 
provincial official was an active member of the working group. In the 
meantime she had become enthusiastic about the Farming for Nature idea 
and thought up all sorts of ways of putting it into practice, including 
mobilizing the service club. She was undeterred by the fact that the 
provincial executive let her know that if he were asked again, he would 
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probably not commit himself to the ideas because of the many hurdles 
involved.  
 
After the working day with the service club, the provincial official and the 
farmer were invited to present the ideas to a larger group of its members. 
These members became inspired and to help the initiative, they organised a 
fundraising dinner together with local entrepreneurs and politicians. In 
autumn 2004 the ‘Friends of Biesland’ were officially founded, so that other 
people from the region could join the service club members in supporting 
the project. (picture) The Friends were invited to nominate a representative 
to the project group and the steering committee. Membership gradually 
broadened to include members from outside the Service Club. Chairman-
ship was handed over to a non-Service Club member as well. In the 
summer of 2007, the Friends had 230 paying members and 35 business 
members. The Friends received a subsidy from the province to hire a part-
time employee to organize activities. In terms of contents, the Friends’ 
activities in the Polder went beyond the promotion of the Farming for 
Nature ideas, as they organized all kinds of activities: working days, 
excursions, open days, activities for children, business events. By running 
these activities in addition to those of the farmer himself, the Friends help 
to strengthen the Biesland’s position in the urban environment. The friends 
also offered their help with policy influencing on several occasions, 
facilitating access to key persons, especially politicians or other higher 
public officials. After some time, the Friends were invited by the provincial 
executive to participate in the Steering committee. There was agreement in 
the Steering committee that the Friends, because of their wide local 
embedment, would have to be part of the regional foundation that would 
control the project during implementation. 
 
Continuing controversy about the land for the Randstadgroenstructuur 
While working on this process, several attempts were made to involve the 
State Forest Service, the owner and ‘manager’ of the neighbouring park and 
nature areas, in the Farming for Nature project. These attempts were 
successful in some respect: suggestions from the project were accepted, for 
example to change the vegetation on the edge of a bordering forest, so that 
a natural gradient would develop between the farmland and the forestland. 
On the other hand, the State Forest Service persisted in claiming the ten 
hectares for nature development. They did not agree with the farmer and 
the volunteer who said that they could create much more nature on the 
entire farm than the State Forest Service could on ten hectares, if they 
were given the chance to do so. The Service did not want to participate in 
meetings on the development of a monitoring and evaluation system, 
because this would take too much of the time formally allocated to them to 
manage ‘their areas’. Explicit reference was made to the formal task of the 
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organization to manage specific nature areas, and to the ‘already limited 
budgets’ available for this, and it was not considered feasible to spend too 
much time on a project that would not be on their land. One middle-level 
official in the State Forest Service called the concentration on their own 
land ‘a necessity to make ends meet’ (‘brood op de plank’). Besides, the 
Service made a point of being recognizable as a ‘nature manager’. When the 
farmer suggested that he was also able to manage the marshes, this was 
rejected because, according to the State Forest Service, it would no longer 
be clear to the outsider what was nature-land and what was farmland. For 
his part, the farmer said that he wanted the marsh area to be one of his 
“PR-elements”.  
 
All in all, this meant that the State Forest Service dissociated itself from 
the project, and chose not to take part in the Biesland agreement. This was 
not entirely without consequences. After the official foundation of the 
Friends of Biesland, the occasion on which a symbolic woven fence 
(‘vlechtheg’) was planted, the State Forest Service accidentally cut the 
young plants during their yearly round of maintenance activities. Had the 
service participated in the hedge planting this accident would probably not 
have happened. 
  
Meanwhile at field level, relations between the farmer and the field 
personnel of the service were generally good. In the end, an ingenious land 
swap was agreed upon which satisfied both the farmer and those 
responsible for the realization of the Randstad Greenstructure. 
 
Different motives for joining 
A good economic perspective for the farm was an important driving force 
and a precondition for the farm family to engage with the idea of Farming 
for Nature. That economic motivation did not prevent support for the 
initiative from growing. Mainly as a result of good communication by the 
farmer and the involvement of the Friends of Biesland, it became further 
embedded in society. The specific details of zero-input farming were the 
technical heart of the idea. But it was the area itself and the authentic way 
in which the farm family operated and communicated about their work, 
combined with the enthusiasm of other people such as the Friends and 
regional members of the executives (the aldermen and the other members 
of the steering committee) that made other people enthousiastic as well. 
Participants were bound together, not by one particular ‘detail’ such as the 
zero-input norm, but by the broad scope of the undertaking.  
 
Even if the people involved in the Biesland initiative shared the broad 
objective of strengthening the open, agricultural landscape by facilitating 
new forms of nature management on the farm, their motives for committing 
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themselves to the initiative were diverse. Some emphasized the need to 
counter a trend that could be observed near most cities: a replacement of 
farmland by built-up areas for housing, commerce or infrastructure. Others 
saw an additional threat in the large scale replacement of farmland by 
nature and/or recreational areas, and the accompanying steady 
disappearance of farms. Still others stressed the meadow birds or plant 
species in the polder that they had monitored for a long time, or the 
‘openness’ of the polder that city dwellers should be able to experience. One 
birdwatcher was specifically concerned about the forage possibilities for 
spoonbills, a particular marsh bird. The owner of a nearby campsite saw 
benefits for the attractiveness of the campsite. Members of the Friends of 
Biesland would stand up for the area for various reasons and perhaps most 
of all because of its openness in the urban context. Finally, the farmer and 
his family wished to continue farming in this area, as most of their 
extended family still lives in the vicinity. Perhaps there is only one word 
that captures all these motives: ‘Biesland’, the name of the area itself. In 
contrast to the sectoral approach of government policy, the Biesland 
initiative mobilized wider involvement by focusing on an area, rather than 
a sector. 
 
Persistent hurdles 
When the region had assembled their share of the required budget, it was 
the Ministry’s turn to fulfil the Minister´s promise to provide the other half 
of the funding. It did not seem to be so easy, however. Even though the 
Minister himself was positive and the officials in charge of contacts with 
the region tried to promote fast decision making, procedural hurdles 
remained which appeared difficult to overcome. 
 
There was a certain resistance to the project at the middle level in the 
Ministry, which was explained by three different officials in different words 
but with a similar meaning: 
“the project was ‘not invented here’ ” 
“the project is going too fast” (loopt voor de troepen uit) 
“the officials did not develop the ideas themselves”. 
 
In terms of contents, several ‘middle’ level - officials continued to cast doubt 
on the expected nature values, on the real costs in comparison with existing 
policy, on the feasibility of monitoring results if no clear nature targets 
were formulated in advance, and finally on the possibility of creating a 
long-term fund in the context of the so-called ‘comptabiliteitswet’ (a law 
geared to ensuring the accountability of any organization or project 
receiving state grants).  
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To concede to the Ministry’s wish to predict outcomes in terms of nature 
target types, the Ministry’s ‘Expert centre’16 was called in by the 
researchers and an ANF-official to assess the expected effects in terms of 
nature target types. The outcome was positive, but did not dispel worries 
about farmers’ capabilities to manage nature, especially in the long run. 
The second question about the costs appeared even harder to tackle. In 
terms of financial investment, the present policy and the initiative could 
hardly be compared because the points of departure were so different. What 
was the value, for instance, of a marsh area and its nature species, as 
compared with the gradient of a meadowland ending in the grassy side of a 
ditch? Another point of discussion was the conflict between the Ministry’s 
wish to control outcomes, on the one hand, and the Biesland vision’s 
approach of creating conditions which could give rise to various, 
unpredictable outcomes, on the other hand. 
 
The problems with the long-term character of the proposals were perhaps 
the most persistent. The officials’ emphasis on having an exit-option, 
explained one official, was inextricably linked to the formal representative 
system in which politicians were elected for a period of four to five years. 
Elected representatives were not allowed to ‘reign past the period which 
they were elected for’, he said. Putting money into a fund which would then 
be used for years to come would be contradictory to this democratic 
principle. There was a way out by using a construction which was already 
used in other domains, such as the Restoration Fund. If the National 
Greenfund took care of the financial management, the money would 
continue to be part of the national budget. That would not jeopardize the 
principle that governments were not legally authorized to reserve money 
for a long time period and gain interest from that money in the meantime. 
From the point of view of the initiative, making one-off investments in a 
fund to pay for nature-oriented farming was compared with one-off 
investments in the construction of a road, which was also to be maintained 
over a long period of time, and hardly reversible. Apart from comments by 
the one official, however, ‘democracy’ was hardly an ‘issue’. The fund was 
an issue, but not the underlying principles. Other relevant questions, such 
as ‘is this a desirable way to sustain farming in the vicinity of cities’ were 
not picked up for discussion. On the contrary, the fear was regularly 
expressed that farms that would otherwise have disappeared were ‘kept 
alive’ with nature subsidies. The disappearance of non-viable farms went 
unquestioned, and there was no support for the idea that such farms should 
be kept going by government payments for nature- or landscape 
management.  
 
                                                        
16  The Expert centre later became part of the ‘Directorate Knowledge’ 
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Practically, the problem was solved when the Investment Budget for Rural 
Areas (ILG) was implemented, after years of preparation. This budget was 
meant to bring together several sectoral policies’ financial resources, so 
that it would become easier to coordinate and integrate various sectoral 
policies. The ILG was to be implemented by the provinces and financially 
managed by the National Green Fund. Like the Green Services policy 
development had accommodated the Biesland initiative in 2003, the ILG 
provided an ‘existing policy’ stepping-stone to solve the financial hurdle, 
even though the timeframe for the Ministries’ contribution would be 
restricted to seven years.  
 
At one point, the researchers organized a meeting at the Ministry to debate 
dilemmas like the democratic quality of a fund-construction and the ‘value’ 
of nature and to compare the ‘conditions’ philosophy with the ‘nature target 
types’ philosophy. Although it had some support and was chaired by a 
Ministry official, attendance was low and there was no follow-up. The same 
questions about targeted nature types, costs and controllability came up 
again at the meeting. However, they were not treated as dilemmas but as 
questions that had absolute answers which could be found by objective 
research. 
 
In the meantime there was also admiration for the level of local 
involvement. An official asked: is it not possible to generate the same 
amount of local support, financially, for the ‘Programma Beheer’ (SAN and 
SN)? The researchers were asked not to resist the operative policy but to 
present the pilots as a way to implement the existing policy or as an 
‘addition’ to it. At the same time, there was pessimism about the scope for 
implementing the initiative:  
 
“There is a tension between the enthusiasm of the people who are involved with 
the initiative at regional level, and the procedural possibilities to really 
implement the initiative. Expectations should be managed more carefully. 
Otherwise the Ministry could end up being seen as the bogeyman” (personal 
communication with an official of the Nature Directorate). 
 
The whole Farming for Nature exercise had become a highly bureaucratic 
undertaking which was far from the lives of the people in the region. People 
who were involved in the project in one way or another, or had participated 
in any of the workshops, were kept informed of the state of affairs by means 
of a regional newsletter. It was sometimes hard to find topics for the 
newsletter that were not highly bureaucratic. Yet the project group and the 
researchers wanted to keep everybody informed about what was going on. 
Later, a general website was launched and anybody could subscribe to an e-
newsletter prepared by the researchers. 
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In the annual ‘open days’ (taking a weekend), between one and two 
thousand people visited the farm. On several occasions, the farmer told the 
visitors about the plans in his own words. He did not use the term ‘Farming 
for Nature’ very often, but told a lively story about the achievements so far 
and his future plans. What the people knew about was the area and the 
farm, not ‘Farming for Nature’ in the abstract. Most of the visitors were 
unaware of the procedural discussions taking place between the bureaus 
and directorates of the Ministry and the European Commission. All they 
knew was that the whole enterprise was ‘held up’ in Brussels. The role of 
the internal market discourse and the way it maintained a rather strict 
separation between nature and farming, was not a topic of deliberation.  
 
In the meantime, the members of the project group anticipated a positive 
decision by the European Commission by preparing the necessary contracts 
(the troublesome conversations between the provincial official and her 
‘legal’ colleague continued), discussing and preparing a ‘monitoring and 
evaluation system’ with various people from the area (results were 
summarized in three reports ‘Stories of Biesland’ (Buizer et al. 2004, 
Ekamper et al. 2006, Westerink et al. 2007); and by discussing other policy 
matters with the waterboard and the DLG (Government Service for Land 
and Water Management), mainly about the design of the area and the 
consequences for the above-mentioned plans of buying part of the land for 
the realization of the ‘Randstadgroenstructuur’. 
 
Political lifeline  
At the regional level, the involvement of elected representatives was 
limited though continuous throughout the process. The councils of 
Pijnacker-Nootdorp and Delft supported the aldermen’s wish to reserve 
money for the project. On invitation, the farmer and researcher presented 
the ideas twice in the relevant committee of the municipal council of 
Pijnacker-Nootdorp. At the provincial level, no representatives were 
involved. The relative absence of politicians at the regional level continued 
to bother the farmer, the provincial official and the researchers. If the 
members of the steering committee did not inform them, how would they 
get them on board? Occasionally, the representatives would visit the farm, 
for instance on the open days. These opportunities to inform them were 
seized with both hands, and special VIP meetings were organized during 
the open days by the Friends. So far, insufficient involvement of 
representatives was not a problem for the project. It ‘survived’ the 
municipal elections of 2006, when three members of the steering committee 
were replaced. 
 
The fact that the initiative gradually did start to be an issue at the 
Ministry had a lot to do with the role of parliamentarians at national level. 
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At a critical moment in the process, shortly after the Minister’s letter to 
Parliament of July 2003 (which did not explicitly mention the pilots 
Farming for Nature because of the legal expert’s intervention), the Director 
General of the Ministry of ANF informed the chairman of the ‘Friends of 
Biesland’ that it would be good if the Parliament asked questions through 
official channels. The chairman subsequently called a researcher to ask 
which parliamentarians were informed about Farming for Nature. Some of 
these parliamentarians were asked to apply pressure by asking questions, 
and soon afterwards they did so. The parliamentary questions helped to set 
the machinery in motion. By taking these steps, the higher official 
connected the formal representative system to the regional initiative, and 
thereby mobilized bureaucracy. On several occasions, the officials at the 
Nature directorate expressed their uneasiness about the involvement of 
Members of Parliament – they felt they were put under pressure to put into 
motion a process which they were doubtful about. The farmer was called by 
one of them, who thought that the farmer was behind the parliamentary 
questions, to say that this was not a proper way to deal with the situation. 
From this moment onwards, political representatives would keep an eye on 
what was going on. 
 
The toughest hurdle: “Brussels” 
The second requirement of the Minister, the approval of the European 
Commission, left its mark on the entire undertaking, not just in terms of 
time required to receive approval, but also in terms of the eventual contents 
of the plans. 
 
First of all, it is important to note that the rural policies of the European 
Union, with the shift from product-related subsidies towards subsidies for 
agricultural practices that enhance nature, landscape and environment, 
appeared to match well with the ideas of farming for nature. In terms of 
nitrates for instance, which had been a problem for the Netherlands in 
relation to the European norm of 170 kg per hectare, the zero-input system 
entailed a reduction to far less than 170 kg per hectare in Biesland. In view 
of the European ‘rural’ and environmental policy discourses, acceptance of 
the initiative could hardly pose a problem in the end, the initiators thought. 
 
It was not as easy as that, however. These policies hardly played a role in 
the arguments that followed. Arguments were mainly about state support 
to farmers. In order to obtain approval, the initiative had to comply with 
the European Commission’s policy of preventing unfair state support to 
farmers, which would place the latter in an advantageous position as 
compared with other farmers in Europe. To prevent distorted competition, 
compensation would only be allowed for the ‘loss of income’ that would be 
the result of the measures taken for nature and landscape. In Brussels 
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these were called ‘environmental measures’. It was quite clear that the 
farmer would lose a considerable part of his income due to the zero-input 
principle, which would force him to reduce the size of his herd to about half 
of what it was in the organic system. To compute the exact loss of income 
sounded easier than it was: ‘Loss’ in comparison with what kinds of farm? 
In Brussels the term ‘reference farms’ was used: these were regular farms 
from within the region that complied with the European environmental 
standards. What would happen if the ‘reference farms’ came off badly in a 
few years time? Would that not also be the end for the nature-oriented 
farm? In the rapidly urbanizing region of the Biesland farm, it seemed 
likely that farms would continue to disappear. Farmers were already 
hardly able to keep their heads above water by means of conventional, 
intensive types of farming. This was due to the ‘natural handicaps’ in the 
landscape (high water level, dense pattern of ditches) and the lack of 
possibilities to expand the farm in the vicinity of the city, which made land 
scarce and expensive. And what if the general European environmental 
standards were raised? Would that also mean that part of the payment for 
Farming for Nature would be annulled? An alternative way to survive was 
to combine farming with other income-generating activities, such as a 
campsite, restaurants, day care for children or the elderly, etcetera. In 
contrast to these activities, it was difficult to find a paying ‘market’ for far-
reaching on-farm nature conservation and development, which did not 
generate secure and sufficient income under the operative policy. Clearly, 
therefore, to combine farming and nature management throughout the 
farm enterprise remained a difficult challenge. 
 
Despite the problems of calculating the amount of the payments on the 
basis of ‘loss of income’ in comparison with reference farms, the initiators 
chose to give in to this requirement. Besides, the alternative computation 
basis previously thought out by the researchers, namely to base it on the 
price of land, also appeared to have disadvantages. The ‘loss of income’ 
requirement had been presented by the European Commission and the 
Ministry of ANF as a non-negotiable. 
 
The initiators chose to make use of a complex computation model that had 
also been used to underpin the state support test for the existing policy 
Programma Beheer (SAN and SN), the operative Dutch policy for agrarian 
nature management. The model’s purpose was to compute ‘loss of income’ 
resulting from farm practices geared to achieving nature targets, because 
for the European Commission, only a computation of ‘loss of income’ as 
compared with ‘reference farms’ would legitimize payments for changed 
farm practices. Chances of success in applying for state support were 
estimated to be higher if the amount of compensation was underpinned on 
the basis of the model, which was already known in Brussels. So again, the 
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materials of existing policy were used to realize a breakthrough. There 
were frequent contacts between the person responsible for the technical 
basis of the model calculations (an official of the DLG) and the provincial 
official, the farmer, and the researchers. The DLG official supported the 
ideas and took time to try to explain the negotiation process to those with 
less insight into the complex technical calculations, such as the provincial 
official, the farmer and the researchers. His most-repeated argument to 
assure progress was that he could apply the model in many different ways. 
In terms of the amount of the justified compensation, he said he could 
always get what he wanted out of the computations. He repeated this 
viewpoint in various meetings, including at the European Commission. 
Meanwhile, he was the only person who knew enough about the complex 
model to engage in the discussions with the European Commission, so if he 
was out of the country the negotiations would have to be suspended. He 
himself was concerned about that situation and expressed his moral 
objections. There was a risk, he said, that there would be nobody within his 
service who could understand the computations in five years time, when he 
himself would probably retire. Who would make sure, he asked at one of 
the meetings, that there would not be a dramatic fall in income at that 
time?  
 
Discussions about these issues took place far from the Polder, even though 
occasionally the farmers, officials of ANF, the provincial official and 
researchers would meet to discuss progress and the legal expert at the 
Ministry made an effort to communicate results of the meetings in Brussels 
to the representatives of the province and to the researchers. While there 
was open communication at this level, decision-making had now fallen into 
the hands of European Commission officials and the legal experts of the 
Ministry. In a way, they had the future of the project in their hands. The 
computations and legal formulations which formed part of their language 
were hardly understood by others. In January 2005, the official request for 
state support was submitted for the first time.  
 
One and a half years later, in July 2006, more than two years after the 
legal experts of the Ministry of ANF started work on the ‘dossier’, and more 
than four years after the start of the activities in the Polder and 
involvement of policy officials from the Ministry, the European Commission 
granted approval (but see the section on ‘a changed plan’ for the restrictions 
that accompanied this approval). All the parties involved, including the 
Ministry, were quick to bring out press releases, pointing at the success 
that they had achieved in Brussels.  
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A changed plan 
In the end, approval for the measures was accompanied by restrictions. 
Two of these have already been mentioned: the computation basis for the 
amount of the compensatory payments (loss of income rather than the price 
of the land), and the duration of the fund. In the end, ‘Brussels’ granted 
approval for only ten years, four more years than in the operative policy. 
When Farming for Nature was embedded in the ILG, financial commitment 
was ‘cut’ into terms of seven years. But neither a timespace of ten, nor one 
of seven years was in line with the ideas behind the initiative: a longer time 
span was needed in view of 1) the irreversibility of the transformation of 
the farming system (which farmers would not opt for without a long-term 
perspective of financial compensation); 2) the time required for nature to 
develop; and 3) the mechanism of the fund which had to guarantee income 
from interests. A shorter-term arrangement would require a relatively 
higher input to guarantee the required return on investment. The 
European Commission also decided that there would have to be an 
evaluation after five years to assess whether the compensatory payments 
would still reflect the difference in income between the nature-oriented 
farm and the ‘reference farms’. For the farmer who would adjust his 
farming system so drastically and irreversibly, this limitation of the 
approval to ten years, and the evaluation after five years was a big 
concession. What if the ‘reference farms’ proved unable to keep up their 
incomes? 
 
A third setback was the decision not to allow the proposed payments for 
preserving existing landscape elements. The European Commission 
assumed the latter to be already protected by restrictive rules in the field of 
spatial planning and so payment for these was not allowed, even if the 
gradual but steady disappearance of ditches, small groups of trees or 
wooded banks was hardly a secret. 
Fourthly, the set-up involving a regional foundation was not approved. 
According to the legal experts, the foundation was given too many powers. 
This would make it effectively a ‘ZBO’ (Autonomous Administrative Body), 
which they considered undesirable. Their reasons for this remained hazy.  
 
Part of the contents of the final decision of the European Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/agriculture-2005/n058-
05.pdf) illustrates the way in which the initiators on the one hand and the 
legal and European officials on the other talked at cross-purposes. The 
decision included an overview of ‘Management packages’ under the 
Programma Beheer, complete with projected percentages of land per 
package. A management package is a SAN-term; it contains a list of the 
nature objectives to be achieved, the characteristics of the terrain and 
management prescriptions. Deciding which percentage of the land would 
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become meadow, hayfield or wheat field presupposed exact prior knowledge 
of the proportions of types of land the zero-input system would require. Yet, 
in the philosophy of the zero-input system, such knowledge could only be 
developed in the course of the new way of farming. Only after some time 
would it become clear how many hectares of wheat field for instance would 
be required to keep the cows healthy, and even then the situation would 
probably be continuously changing. So the decision to ‘approve’ the 
Farming for Nature measures included elements which were in 
contradiction with its’ basic principles. As had happened on several 
previous occasions, the formulation was changed to fit with existing policy, 
this time by the officials of the European Commission. 
 
Perseverance required 
This ‘procedural’ side of the process required tremendous perseverance by 
the people involved, especially those who had been involved from the 
beginning onwards. The procedural discussions mainly took place a long 
way from the Polder. Meanwhile, the farmer anticipated approval by 
adjusting his farm strategy, but he also followed other roads to improve the 
position of his farm. For instance, he started to sell organic meat on the 
farm, and to promote his product via his own website. He also collaborated 
with a tea and lunchroom in the city centre of Delft to sell and promote his 
meat. The website of the Friends provided the same information. While the 
farm family needed to be patient, these extra activities made them less 
dependent on the outcome of the entire process. Officials from the 
Municipality, and particularly from the Province, realized they couldn’t 
stop the train, and they didn’t always feel as comfortable about this as they 
had in the early days. Less perseverance was required from most of the 
ANF personnel: due to frequent personnel transfers, most of them were 
only involved in the project for a short period of time. In the end, the 
previously mentioned official of the Regional Directorate East (who felt ‘a 
father’ of the idea) appeared to be the only ‘constant factor’ in the Ministry 
over the years. All the other officials changed desks in the course of the 
process, sometimes more than once per year. For one directorate, six 
officials in succession had to be taught the ropes in the space of five years. 
The ‘stayers’, such as most members of the project group and the steering 
committee, were concerned that interest would ‘ebb away’. The promised 
funding needed to be reserved, politicians, changing aldermen and other 
politically appointed administrators needed to be informed and sometimes 
convinced, the farmer needed to remain positive (which was not a problem 
due to his character) and the local people who had committed themselves to 
activities needed to be kept ‘on board’ for as long as it took to get the 
approval from the European Commission. Without interruption, the 
Friends of Biesland continued their activities and focused on other things, 
such as the future design of parts of the polder, the renovation of an old 
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barn or the education of school children. For the researchers, the 
acquisition of budgets for the research activities continued to be a laborious 
undertaking each year, since the multi-disciplinary expertise required had 
to be financed through several different research programs. They had to 
respond to the doubts expressed about the amount of money requested, not 
just by the Ministry but also by the program leaders in the research 
institutes.  
 
Two pilots, full stop 
Perhaps the most important restriction was that approval was only valid 
for the two ‘pilot areas’17. The farming for nature approach had initially 
been intended for inclusion in the “Catalogue of Green and Blue Services”. 
Provinces had taken the lead in creating the Catalogue with a view to 
streamlining and coordinating application procedures for state support. It 
consisted of maximum allowed compensations for specific nature and 
landscape measures. It would make it easier for funding governments to 
compose their own set of allowable measures, for which they no longer had 
to pass the state support procedure because the Catalogue as a whole 
would already have been submitted for approval in Brussels. Moreover, 
apart from the Programma Beheer, the measures were to be applied 
outside the Main Ecological Structure. They would therefore also require 
additional, non-state financing because areas outside the Main Ecological 
Structure were considered as the responsibility of regional government and 
non-government institutions. For some time, the perspective of being 
included in the Catalogue offered opportunities for wider implementation. 
However, the Farming for Nature approach was left out of the catalogue, a 
decision which excluded other farmers or areas from implementing the 
approach. Similar initiatives would have to go through the same lengthy 
European procedure – if they got the chance at all. Thus, while the 
Catalogue met the streamlining purposes of the initiating provinces, it also 
served as a restrictive frame. Initiatives that did not fit within the 
Catalogue would have to try to get it adjusted during its (projected) annual 
evaluation, and if they did not succeed, the Ministry would not any longer 
make a special effort to submit separate proposals.  
 
Closer inspection of the catalogue shows, as said, that it was mainly 
composed of elements of the measures that were already part of operative 
policy. Its innovative character lay mainly in the overview of allowed 
measures (rather than predefined packages of measures), the possibility for 
                                                        
17  A few months later it appeared that the approval for Twickel was not valid. The 
dairy farm computations still had to be adapted to match with sheep farms. Late 
autumn 2008 approval for Twickel was granted as well. 
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funding agencies to compose their own set of possible measures, and its 
application outside the Main Ecological Structure.  
 
Party 
On the day of the provincial elections in March 2007, a party was 
nevertheless organized in the Polder to celebrate the fact that a project 
could be implemented at last. More than 150 people gathered in a party 
tent at the farm yard. A big window at the front of the tent offered a view of 
the cows in the barn. They had been placed on piles of hay to make them 
visible to the entire audience. A lot of the people who had been involved in 
one way or another were present. The newly-appointed Minister made a 
supportive speech (her maiden speech!) in which she emphasized the 
positive relationship between city and countryside and the opportunities for 
urban children to learn a bit about farming practices and the origin of their 
food. This was another illustration of how the undertaking was placed in a 
new light by the new Minister. Her predecessor would probably have 
emphasized his ‘from acquisition to management’ priority. From the 
Minister’s weblog (March 9th): 
 
There is good cooperation in Delfgauw as well. Here I opened the initiative 
‘Farming for Nature’. The farmer and his wife farm in a natural way, initiated by 
a big group of urban dwellers and their administrators. Urban dwellers are 
friends of the ‘Biesland’ farm. Children can obtain a farming diploma if they show 
that they can milk a cow, feed a calf or lay straw. It would be great if next year I 
met a group of youngsters in Delft and Rotterdam, wearing a t-shirt with the text 
‘I am proud to be a farmer’. As I have already written, cities and ANF have a lot 
to offer to each other.  
 
Officially, the celebration was about the regional-national collaboration 
that had made a new type of farming possible, and the European 
Commission’s approval of it. Few of the people present knew how the plan 
had been changed to get it through the bureaucracies. As far as they were 
concerned, they might have been celebrating the implementation of the 
blend of ideas created in 2002. Nor did many of them have any idea of the 
scope and intensity of the activities that had been necessary to reach the 
implementation stage, compared to the scope of the provisional approval of 
the measures (one farmer in one polder). These are of course subjective 
matters, but the point here is that neither the meaning of the changes nor 
the relation between effort and result were explicitly discussed at any 
point. 
 
 From Biesland to Brussels 
 97 
4.5 Interpretation 
4.5.1 Origin of the initiative in the context of existing policy  
 
This section addresses my first research question about the origin of the 
initiative and how it related to the then existing policy. 
 
In section 4.3, I described how the initiative evolved from two sources. In 
the first place, the initiative originated in the activities of a nature 
volunteer and a farmer in the ‘Biesland upper polder’. Officials of the 
municipality of Delft stimulated the two to make a nature-friendly plan for 
the upper polder. On this condition, the farmer was allowed to lease the 
land from the municipality. The farmer and the volunteer also collaborated 
to prevent acquisition of part of the farmland (in the lower polder) for 
nature development by the State Forest Service. The second source of the 
initiative was the vision of ‘Farming for Nature’, which had grown from a 
‘strategic expertise’ development project at a research institute. Both these 
initiatives had strong institutional anchors: the first in struggle about land 
acquisition and in a fruitful collaboration with a municipality, the second in 
a stable research environment with strong historical links with the 
Ministry of ANF. It is important to be aware of these ‘institutional roots’, 
because actors with less prior ‘institutional knowledge’ may have been less 
knowledgeable about the possibilities for introducing their ideas into the 
various policy-making processes. The initiators in this case knew in 
advance that they would have to operate at various levels, if only to acquire 
the necessary funds. That knowledge did not deter them from trying to 
realize their ambitions, even though they also knew that these diverged 
strongly from operative policies, in terms of both contents and organization.  
 
In terms of the international context of what was happening in the polder, 
world market agreements between governments were becoming 
increasingly influential, as was the role of European rules in preventing 
state-caused distortion of competition. However, the initiators were not at 
first very conscious of the possible influence of these wider trends on their 
plans. The actors involved certainly did not think of the possibility that the 
fate of their ideas for this specific area (which was not part of a European 
‘greenstructure’), would eventually have to be decided in Brussels – and 
then, not on the basis of its consequences for nature, but on the basis of the 
risk it entailed of distorting competition in an agricultural market. 
 
In more abstract terms: this social action came about under structural 
conditions of which the actors involved were only partially aware. They 
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were not aware of the consequences of the free market philosophy. 
However, they did have experience of the other structural condition that 
influenced the development of their ideas: the sectoral approach to both 
agriculture and nature in mainstream policy, which had previously made it 
hard for them to connect the two in the way they wanted to. State 
ambitions to acquire land for forest development had even given rise to 
conflict and an impasse. 
4.5.2 Discourse, actors, rules and resources 
This section deals with the second question: How do discourse, actors, 
resources and rules of the game manifest themselves over time, in the 
interaction between initiative and existing policy? 
 
Three discourses 
The foregoing told the story of a situation that can be described in terms of 
discourses that are dynamic yet clearly discernable. Three discourses can 
be discerned, involving three partly overlapping coalitions. In the first place 
there were two different discourses that reinforced each other. The first of 
these discourses departed from the idea of separating real nature or 
recreation nature from agriculture and cities. Greenstructures would have 
to be created to safeguard nature, and to function as a ‘buffer’ against 
urbanization. The idea of make-ability of nature was linguistically captured 
in a term like ‘structure’ and ‘nature target types’. These terms implied 
practices such as acquisition of farmland and the transformation of these 
into ‘parks’ or forests. Even though the policy domain had changed a bit in 
recent years so that farmers were more often considered as potential 
‘nature managers’ for specific types of nature, the main characteristics of 
this strongly institutionalized discourse did not change. It was employed at 
various levels of government. I call it the ‘greenstructure discourse’.  
 
There was a second, at first sight rather different discourse in play in 
relation to the initiative. I call it the ‘internal market discourse’, and its 
roots were mainly at world and European level. The degree to which this 
discourse was institutionalized is clear from the foregoing story itself: an 
initiative involving one hundred hectares that had support from the local 
level to the parliamentary and Ministerial levels required a procedure 
taking over two and a half years (including preparations at the Ministry in 
the Netherlands) to get the approval of the European Commission. The 
internal market discourse insisted that state-supported market distortion 
should be prevented. Violations of the internal market principle were so 
frequent that the European Commission was very wary of attempts by 
governments to support ‘their’ agricultural sector in an indirect way. The 
Biesland initiative was a victim of this wariness, even though the actors 
could not at first imagine how their initiative could cause unfair 
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competition if the livestock and income from dairy farming were to be 
halved as a consequence of the proposed measures. Moreover, another 
‘rural development’ discourse at European level, emphasizing environ-
mental measures taken by farmers, suggested that the initiative matched 
well with European policy. This discourse did not manifest itself in the 
process, however. It was the internal market discourse and its 
accompanying procedures that ‘ruled the game’. 
 
Within this context of strongly institutionalized discourses18, the Biesland 
initiative represented a third discourse that was geared to integrating 
agriculture and nature across the board on the farm. The discourse implied 
a belief that farming and nature objectives could be integrated, and form 
the basis for an attractive landscape in an urban environment, to be 
managed by farmers. In this latter view, nature could not be ‘controlled’ by 
setting targets, but would be preserved and well-managed if the right 
conditions were created. Also, nature, landscape, water management and 
an attractive recreational environment were considered as assets that 
farmers could earn an income with, even if these ‘assets’ were very different 
from the farm products that they marketed at national, European or world 
level. In this view, it would depend on regional recognition whether 
sufficient support and resources could be mobilized to pay farmers for these 
‘services’. ‘Biesland’ integrated the various ways in which meaning was 
attributed to the area. I therefore call this the ‘Biesland discourse’ or the 
‘Farming for Nature’ discourse. The coalition that came into being in 
relation to this broader Biesland discourse could be described as a looser, 
networked form of political mobilization that connected the farmer, nature 
volunteers, researchers, politicians and policy makers at the regional level. 
Despite a growing coalition supporting the initiative, the Biesland, or 
Farming for Nature discourse had considerably weaker institutional 
anchors than the other two in terms of rules upholding it and resources 
allocated to it.  
 
These, then, were the discourses in play. It was not the contents of the 
policy vocabularies themselves that seemed to put up barriers. Indeed, the 
case exemplifies how they could coexist. Through the attached rules and 
resources however, the first two discourses both put up barriers to 
governments paying farmers for their efforts for nature, landscape, water 
or other public functions, in spite of the presence of a broad supportive 
coalition. The internal market discourse entailed that payments were only 
allowed to the extent that the national government that wanted the 
                                                        
18  I have already explained how ‘existing policy’ was not static itself – two examples of 
how ‘existing policy’ changed are the emphasis on ‘from acquisition to management’ 
and the elaboration of the ‘green services’ concept. 
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measures was able to prove that the level of payments did not create unfair 
competition with other farmers. Proving this was a complex matter, 
however, mainly because a far-reaching integration of agricultural and 
nature-oriented activities at farm level, which would more or less halve 
income from farming, had not been raised at the European decision-making 
level before the Biesland case, at least not by the Dutch government. So far, 
the measures that were approved of could be carried out in addition to 
mainstream business-activities. The entire way of thinking among the 
officials and ‘calculators’ dealing with the matter was oriented towards 
complementary measures, not integration. Because of this difference, the 
potential innovation had to go through a complex process of modelling and 
calculating. 
 
In the greenstructure discourse, in its turn, farmers were only recognized 
as nature-managers to a limited extent. Basically, there were two options: 
the farmers could apply limited nature activities on the fringe of their farm, 
or they could choose to transform their farm into ‘nature’, but then it would 
not be a ‘farm’ anymore. The latter option implied that commercial farming 
activities were ruled out and that the land would have to be designated as 
‘nature’ in the municipal land use plans. For farmers willing to continue 
farming in a ‘nature-oriented way’, this was not an option as they would 
still earn half of their income by selling their farm products. Just like the 
internal market discourse, the parameters of this discourse hampered a far-
reaching integration of agriculture and nature at farm level. 
 
In sum, the Biesland case showed that despite the gradual change in 
operative policy discourse and a related change in policy vocabulary, a 
drastic integration of farm and nature-oriented practices was still a long 
way off. 
 
In the process, there were moments when the existing arrangements 
opened up for the initiative, and moments when they closed again. The case 
study revealed these moments, which are summarized in the following. 
 
For the farmer and his allies one such ‘opening’ that improved their 
chances of realizing their ideas was the involvement of the researchers. 
Together, they got access to the Ministry and were able to generate regional 
support. A second opening was the positive reaction of the Minister himself, 
for whom the combination of farming and nature matched well with his 
new policy ‘from land acquisition towards management’ (by farmers). The 
pilot status and the link with the Green Services policy development were 
additional ‘openings’ that promised a future for the initiatives on a larger 
scale than Biesland and Twickel. Within the region, the support of 
‘Friends’, officials, and members of the Steering committee provided 
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openings, too. At times, the farmer also created openings through specific 
actions such as personally contacting a high-level ANF official who could in 
turn mobilize the member of the Provincial Executive who was hesitant 
about participating. Political support from members of the Parliament 
further increased the pressure on the Ministry to look for ways to 
implement the ideas.  
 
Looking again at these openings from the perspective of discourse, 
coalitions, resources and rules, different types of openings can be discerned.  
- a discursive opening in the Minister’s new approach ‘from acquisition 
towards management’ and the ‘Green Services’; 
- an opening due to growth or use of the coalition: the farmer and the 
nature volunteer, the researchers, the Minister, the regional coalition at 
municipal and supra-municipal level, and the involvement of a wider 
group of citizens through the ‘Friends’; 
 
These two were conspicuous transformations. On the ‘resources’ side, there 
were also episodes that facilitated the alternative ideas  
- research budget was acquired from ANF and the province; there was 
regional commitment to establishing a fund; there was collaboration with 
the Green Fund to make the fund possible; legitimacy was gained by the 
activities of the ‘Friends of Biesland’. 
 
Most of these were existing resources that were successfully mobilized to 
support the regional vision, while some of them were new, such as 
legitimacy gained through the friends.  
The combination of these three types of opening – discursive shifts, the 
formation of a new coalition and the mobilization of resources – enabled the 
actors to exert a certain degree of power. They were able, for instance, to 
obtain access to important decision-makers such as the Minister and the 
European Commission.  
 
The openings seemed almost to create the perfect conditions to ‘move 
mountains in the nerve centres’ of government, in Beck’s words (Beck 1994: 
23). But, as the story demonstrates, what happened was something else. 
 
When it came to rules (formal and informal norms, laws to regulate 
behaviour), and standard ways in which resources were allocated, the ideas 
met with barriers that were difficult to overcome. In fact, during the period 
that I experienced and studied what happened in Biesland, actors were not 
able to create significant changes in the ways in which rules set the limits 
of their behaviour, or to significantly influence the way in which resources 
were distributed. So, the plan for the Biesland Forest was not changed after 
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all, and the approval of the EU was limited to the one area19. The 
undertaking remained an ‘exception to the rule’. 
One of the innovative dimensions of the initiative was that it connected a 
great many people and organizations, and encompassed their diverse ways 
of looking at the landscape. The organizational structure of the Ministry 
and the way things were generally looked at there did not match this 
many-sidedness, however. When the Ministry decided that the directorate 
for Nature would be the key directorate to deal with and pay for the 
initiative, the relatively narrowly defined rules and procedures on nature 
policy started to dominate progress in the project. From then, discussions 
between the initiators and ANF were dominated by the questions ‘will the 
nature target types be realized’, ‘at what cost?’ and ‘why not use the 
existing policy?’ The focus was on the sector that the middle-level officials 
were formally responsible for; questions and issues outside their sectoral 
brief were not raised.  
 
At this middle level of the bureaucracy, which appeared to be crucial to the 
success of the project, a process of ‘narrowing’ took place, with discussions 
dominated by a procedural or instrumental discourse related to the more 
macro-discourses that I have labelled greenstructure discourse and internal 
market discourse. The main issues were how the initiative related to 
existing rules and if and how resources were going to be spent on them. 
Strict rules reigned in both the nature and the internal market domains. 
Both were characterized by clearly defined, scientifically established norms: 
nature target types and numbers of hectares and loss of income. Thus, the 
initiative ran into a ‘sectoral’ policy bias and a ‘procedural’ bias. 
 
A picture emerges of two separate worlds. One world at the state and 
European policy level in which procedural arguments stood centre stage 
and in which the initial ideas were gradually reframed in order to match 
better with standard procedures, and another world at the concrete level of 
the farm and the area. Here, various activities made the ideas more and 
more part of a number of people’s daily lives. Middle-level officials were the 
‘voice’ of the rules that the initiative gradually complied with. In most 
cases, the middle-level officials had little or no experience of the area. For 
the initiators, it was hard to ‘get through to them’, and they only managed 
to talk to them on a few occasions.  
 
Structuring and Stabilization 
The fact that a coalition emerged in relation to an upcoming discourse did 
not mean that it was institutionalized. In terms of the ‘structuring’-concept 
                                                        
19  Approval for the measures at the Twickel country estate was granted in November 
2007. 
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that was presented in chapter two, meaning the development of “a certain 
degree of order in the social domain” (Peper 1972), there were clear 
examples: 
• the regular pattern of meetings of the project group and a steering 
committee,  
• the organization of the Friends of Biesland,  
• the various websites that gave expression to the ideas and  
• the sessions to establish ‘interactive’ monitoring and evaluation.  
 
These structuring activities give the impression of an arrangement in-the-
making. The discourse and the level of organization of the discourse 
coalition at the Biesland level could coexist with existing policy discourse 
and coalitions. The Biesland discourse and coalition even coalesced with 
recent changes in state policy, such as the Green Services policy 
development and the policy ‘from acquisition to management’. However, 
when the second dimension of institutionalization processes, stabilization, 
is considered, another picture emerges. The arrangement in-the-making is 
hampered by rules and resources connected to the nature or 
‘greenstructure’ discourse. As a result, the continuation or preservation of 
the initiative is uncertain. For the time being, the ‘arrangement’ remains a 
regional affair and is restricted to a time limit; it is impossible to predict 
whether this will change. The existing arrangement included several 
obstacles to the institutionalization of the initiative, leading to an 
imbalance or incongruence between structuring and stabilization. 
 
Becoming a lookalike 
In reaction to this situation, as the story reveals, the initiative gradually 
changed to become more of a lookalike of operative policy. Although the 
principle of being paid for the zero-input farming system was preserved in 
the end, the initiative was distinctly less innovative once it had gone 
through the confrontation with existing policy. The restriction of the 
‘approval’ to Biesland (and Twickel a year and a half later) was perhaps the 
most important restriction. When we analyse the differences and the 
results of the confrontation between policy and the initiative, the following 
scheme emerges. 
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Operative policy Initiative Outcome of confrontation 
“Green” should be in the hands 
of nature organisations. These 
only are strong enough to protect 
open landscapes against 
urbanization. This policy 
changed somewhat with the 
strategy ‘from acquisition 
towards management’. 
Agriculture is also a potential ally 
of the city dweller, in the 
protection of the open landscape. 
Both discourses and related 
discourse coalitions coexist 
Nature organizations best-
equipped to safeguard ‘real 
nature’ on what should be their 
land. (Changed somewhat with 
strategy ‘from acquisition 
towards management’) 
Farmers are well able to safeguard 
nature on their own land, 
especially nature values related to 
historic cultural landscapes 
Both discourses and related 
discourse coalitions coexist  
Agriculture and nature separate: 
nature measures on the farm are 
a supplement to common, 
intensive farming practices 
Agriculture and nature integrated 
across the board on the farm. 
Farming and nature management 
go hand in hand by means of ‘zero-
input-farming system’. 
Both discourses and related 
discourse coalitions coexist, but for 
the time being European Union 
and ANF rules prevent wider 
implementation than in one area. 
Create nature target types Create conditions Initiative uses nature target types 
to convince policy makers 
Six-year contracts: 
- politicians should not reign 
beyond the period that they were 
elected for 
- it should be possible to hold 
politicians accountable for what 
they have invested in 
Long term – contracts: 
- nature needs time to develop 
- change farming system 
irreversible 
- fund generates more income 
when it is long term 
Initiators have no choice but to 
comply with the formal rule of the 
game that contracts cannot be 
made for a period longer than 7 
years  
Subsidies, farmers apply for 
measures every six years 
Investment (large lump sum) into 
fund, pay farmers an income from 
interests (rather than a subsidy) 
Fund is created when it can be 
combined with the new ILG policy, 
meaning that grants from various 
public sources can be combined in 
one fund, but it is not a long term 
fund (see above). 
National government/ EU 
subsidize agrarian nature 
management 
Regional parties, national 
government/ EU pay part of the 
income of farmers 
Regional parties contribute as 
well: more providers of resources 
‘Management contract’ 
connected to the person, for 
limited period of time 
‘Servitude’ contract connected to 
the land, for a long period of time. 
‘Qualitative liability’ contract 
connected to the land, for a long 
period of time 
Existing policy bodies should be 
responsible and accountable for 
implementation 
Regional foundation ‘close to the 
people’ should be responsible and 
accountable for implementation 
Rules prevent the founding of 
regional foundation with 
competences  
Democracy requires allowing the 
changing of decisions on expiry 
of the mandate of democratically 
elected persons. 
Democracy sometimes implies the 
making of long-term decisions; 
landscape is, in that sense, not 
different from roads.  
Democratic dimension is not 
debated. Two types of measures: 
long-term rule is established to 
safeguard nature, short-term 
security about finances. Rules 
equivocal.  
Base amount of compensation on 
EU-policy: amount of 
compensation should be related 
to “loss of income” in comparison 
with “reference farms”. 
Base amount of compensation on 
price of land, or base it on the 
amounts that would make the 
nature-oriented farm financially 
competitive to alternatives. 
Adaptation of initiative in 
direction of European rule about 
allocation of resources: loss of 
income. 
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The overview shows once more that, in the end, the new discourse and 
coalition could coexist with existing policy discourses and coalitions.  
The new discourse did not spread into mainstream policies however. In the 
end, the measures are only allowed in Biesland, one farm of 100 hectares. 
When we look at the organizational dimension, the initiative gradually had 
to be adapted to the rules and resources of the existing policy in order to be 
realized. This is clear from the short-term nature of the fund and of the 
financial compensation, the limited role of the regional foundation, and the 
translation of objectives to nature target types. Also, operative policy 
continued to focus on land acquisition – even on the limited scale of the 
polder itself acquisition targets were not adjusted to the new situation in 
which the farmer himself was going to realize a lot more nature values. The 
risk involved in the short-term nature of the financial compensation had to 
be accepted by the farmer. The governments, on the other hand, reduced 
their risk by requiring long-term contracts with a qualitative liability to 
manage the farm on the basis of a zero-input system. At the start of the 
initiative, nobody had foreseen this incongruence between rights (the short-
term financial compensation) and liabilities (maintain the zero-input 
system in the long run). Thereby, governments provided themselves with 
an exit option as regards their payments, but did not link it to an exit 
option for the farmer. It was beyond the scope of this study to investigate 
whether other farmers than the Biesland farmer will enter into such an 
agreement. The Biesland farmer signed the contracts mainly because he is 
an optimistic person. He said: 
  
“I have rock-solid confidence that this will be continued. Time will overtake this. 
The renewed approval in ten years time will be a formality. What I would find 
more difficult, is if it remains a possibility for this farm enterprise only”. 
 
The farmer trusted to his capacity and that of his allies to show convincing 
results. He also had high expectations of the political and societal support 
he had, which had grown so much that it seemed very unlikely to fail the 
farmer or the area in the years to come – although only time can tell.  
 
4.5.3 Structural transformations; depoliticization rather than sub-
politicization 
In chapter two I presented Ulrich Beck’s sub-politicization thesis, which 
formed the basis for my third question: Does the case point at a structural 
transformation of sub-politicization or could other structural transfor-
mations be discerned? 
 
I expected sub-politicization to be a relevant structural transformation that 
would probably play a role in my cases. For the Biesland case tells a story 
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of an attempt, perhaps not to ‘shape society’, but to ‘shape policy’ in such a 
way that a regional idea could be implemented, starting in one farmer’s 
polder. The idea was implemented – albeit in a considerably modified form 
– in the polder itself, but did not have wider policy implications. The 
initiative faced considerable difficulties and could not by any stretch of the 
imagination be said to have ‘moved mountains in the nerve centres of 
development’. Neither could a decrease in the central rule approach be 
observed. Rather, the initiative became entangled in decision-making at 
many levels. At the European level, where an internal market discourse 
prevailed, the initiators themselves did not participate in the deliberations 
taking place between the national Ministry and the European Commission. 
In the end, the remote deliberations in Brussels put limits on possibilities 
to renew the existing arrangement, which remained unaltered. 
 
The difficulties at European level were accompanied by continuing 
resistance at the Dutch Ministry of ANF. There, resistance concerned 
doubts about the (long-term) possibilities for farmers to achieve nature 
target types, the costs in comparison with operative policy for nature 
management by farmers, and compatibility with laws (‘comptabliteitswet) 
that prevented governments from making one-off investments in a fund 
and handing over some authority to a regional foundation. This is 
important to note in the context of the structural process of 
Europeanization and the accompanying dominance of the internal market 
discourse, because in spite of its different nature, the latter seemed to 
strengthen the objections raised at national level. In the end, it was the 
European Commission that was referred to as the actor which dictated that 
agreements had to be restricted to ten years, that existing landscape 
elements were not to be paid for unless they were designated as nature in 
municipal zoning schemes (which was a huge psychological barrier and 
hardly doable for farmers), that the measures had to be restricted to the 
polder and that the regional foundation was not authorized. The European 
decision even contained a specification of the nature target types that 
needed to be achieved in numbers of hectares, an issue that was previously 
usually decided by the National Nature directorate of ANF. All of this 
tallied with the objections raised by the Ministry of ANF, discussed above. 
So, even if ‘Brussels’ appeared in the end to be the main antagonist of the 
local ideas, the home-grown objections of the middle-level-officials had 
thrown up some serious hurdles along the way as well. 
 
The difficulties contrast with the support offered from many different sides: 
in the region people got organized in the ‘Friends of Biesland’ and started to 
mobilize resources; political agreement was reached among aldermen and 
other administrators; researchers and farmer joined forces; some members 
of parliament followed the process and took action when it was needed; the 
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national green fund supported the project with expertise and financial 
support. The minister also gave his support to the initiative by recognizing 
it as a pilot project and by promising to provide half of the fund. On the 
basis of this observation, another hypothesis about a structural 
transformation can be formulated; namely that Europeanization was 
accompanied by regionalization.  
 
In the context of the sub-politics thesis, it is important to note that 
discussions taking place at European level (between the national Ministry 
and experts of the European Commission) on what would be regionally 
possible focused on procedural matters, not on underlying principles, 
‘dominant discourses’ or worldviews. Thus, the way in which a real 
integration of nature and agriculture objectives was hampered by the 
internal market discourse, for instance, was not a topic for debate. When 
the process came closer to decision making, discussions took place further 
from the polder, at the offices of the legal experts or in Brussels. These 
discussions went over the heads of the local people involved, the many 
policy officials, and even the researchers. Now these ‘Biesland experiences’ 
may suggest an alternative thesis to that of sub-politicization, namely that 
in complex multi-level decision-making situations, there is a process of 
depoliticization going on. 
 
In sum, the Biesland case is not a manifestation of sub-politicization. 
Instead, the case gives rise to the hypothesis that there are parallel 
processes of Europeanization and regionalization at work. When farming is 
involved, the European discourse prevails. Opportunities to innovate are 
limited to those that fit within the internal market discourse. Government 
paying for nature management by farmers does not fit within that 
discourse. The deliberations take place at a distance from the area and 
without the participation of regional stakeholders. They are, moreover, of a 
highly procedural character. This provides grounds for speaking of a 
process of depoliticization. 
 
4.5.4 Space for policy innovation: selective elasticity 
This section will answer my question: what space for policy innovation 
emerged in the course of the Biesland process? 
 
In terms of coalitions, the above account shows that one can not speak of 
organizations as unified entities. Coalitions cut across the various 
organizations involved. The project had allies and critics in all 
organizations. Although discourses could reasonably be distinguished, a 
specific discourse was not what bound the actors together. Individuals 
could associate themselves with different discourses at the same time. Also, 
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while ‘Farming for Nature’ was the label to indicate the importance 
attached to a reunion of farming and nature, some actors were ‘allied’ to the 
initiative for other reasons, such as keeping the Biesland landscape open.  
 
There appeared to be an incongruence between the development and 
coexistence of various terms of the discourse and discourse coalitions on the 
one hand (dynamic), and continued existence of resources and rules of the 
game on the other hand (stability). Remarkably, the actual contents of 
what was at stake (in terms of values, interests, opinions) faded into the 
background and the procedural issues gradually became more important. 
The latter were often directed at keeping the arrangement as it was. As one 
official of a regional directorate said:  
 
“it seems that in this case laws and regulations are dominating what is possible, 
rather than facilitation of the implementation of politically agreed objectives”. 
 
Looking purely at the terms of the discourse and the attached coalitions, 
and ignoring the ways in which resources and rules of the game were 
related to them, one can observe a gradual ‘opening up’ of the policy debate. 
This discursive ‘space’ meant that the Farming for Nature initiative could 
play a role both in policy debates and in the Biesland area. It facilitated the 
transformation of policy making into a broader political effort in which 
various actors could participate. But when this discursive openness is 
approached from a perspective that looks at discourse in connection with 
practices such as the use of rules and the distribution of resources, the 
discursive openness appears to be rather superficial. The fact that ‘Farming 
for Nature’ was drawn into the sectoral corners of nature policy and unfair 
competition and subsequently had to adopt the language of ‘nature target 
types’ and of ‘loss of income’ shows that the formal policy discourses on 
nature and the internal market were still dominant, even if not to the 
extent that the ideas were entirely excluded from the policy debate. 
Ironically, the fact that total exclusion from the policy debate did not occur 
was also due to the many dimensions of the vision.  
 
So the picture of relative ‘easy’ coexistence of discourses changes when one 
takes a closer look at the policy arrangement, including resources and rules 
of the game. Studying ‘terms of the discourse’ and their coalitions without 
analysing the practices which went along with these terms of the discourse 
did not tell us much about the actual fate of proposals for policy innovation.  
  
Taking the multi-level character of the decision-making process into 
account, the picture becomes even more complex, as rules of the game were 
not congruent at these various levels. The regional ambition to reward 
farmers more for their role in nature and landscape management was not 
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in line with the European rule of the game that subjects such ambitions to 
lengthy procedures in order to limit risks of unfair competition, even if 
various EU policy documents promoted such a new role for farmers. This 
illustrates how in this case the multi-level character of the policy domain 
stood in the way of a local policy initiative20. 
 
In sum, space for policy innovation in this case was limited to discursive 
space that was not accompanied by a reconsideration of rules and 
resources. The latter proved to be rather static, and for this reason the 
initiative was restricted to one area. So far, the payments for the zero-input 
farming system have not become an option for other areas and as far as 
other elements of the initiative were concerned, existing policy has been 
reproduced rather than changed. 
 
In terms of Archer’s scheme: 
 
Structural Conditioning Social Interaction Structural Elaboration 
Dominant idea is that 
realization of nature is to be 
done mainly by nature 
organizations. Rules and 
resources are geared to achieve 
that objective. 
Attempts to challenge the 
dominant vision – formation 
of new coalitions, new ideas 
for the area. 
Approval of the ideas but 
only in a radically 
changed form, which is a 
lookalike of policy as it 
was before social 
interaction took place. 
 
4.6 The relational dimension and my own positionality 
4.6.1 The relational dimension 
The story showed how socio-psychological and relational factors such as 
perseverance, trust, empathy and flexibility contributed considerably to the 
atmosphere among the initiators and their endurance. A relationship based 
on mutual trust grew up between the ‘Friends of Biesland’ and the 
researchers, who shared their personal feelings with each other. They 
brainstormed about how the Friends and ‘Farming for Nature’ were 
related, how they differed, and how the two could convey their messages in 
a coherent way. The provincial official and the farmer participated in those 
discussions. In the course of the process, a relationship of mutual trust had 
also grown between the latter. An example that was not included in the 
                                                        
20  In this context we should also refer to the examples of local groups making direct use 
of European legislation to resist government decisions, such as the construction of a 
road in areas designated for nature under the Habitats directive, or in areas where 
rare plant- or animal species can be found. Further research is needed to assess to 
what extent and in what ways the ‘multi-level’ character of policymaking hampers or 
promotes a renewal of policy arrangements. 
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story may illustrate this. One evening the provincial official had to defend a 
policy of reducing subsidies to a room full of farmers. The Biesland farmer 
stood up and forcefully voiced his criticism of the new policy. The morning 
after the heated discussion, the farmer called the official. They talked for 
over an hour about the meeting (and the farmer apologized for his 
aggressive questions), and about the ‘open days’ that he and the ‘Friends of 
Biesland’ were going to organize at his farm. The incident at the 
information evening had done no harm to their cooperation. The provincial 
official offered to help on both ‘open days’ (in a weekend). They could only 
deal with each other like this because they had experiences that bound 
them together. Each knew what the other was up to. In a comparable way, 
trust grew with the officials of the regional directorates of ANF. Their 
presence during the meetings and their growing role as intermediaries 
between the Polder and the policy-making level created a feeling that ‘the 
Ministry’ was also moving to make things work. This was much harder in 
the case of people who were not present at the meetings but still had a say 
in decision-making about the future of the project. 
It was also to establish these ‘real contacts’ between people that the project 
focused so much on creating these ‘meeting moments’. The practice of 
meeting in the Polder can be presented as ‘rules of the game’, as a sort of 
‘strategic’ tool to make the plan work, but it was much more than that. It 
generated a situation in which people could openly communicate and reach 
each other at an emotional level.  
 
At the ‘formal’ occasions at which a lot of people would come to the farm, 
ways were invented to turn these occasions into memorable events. For 
example, the cows are present at the location at which the events were 
organized, and one cow brings in the papers that need to be signed. 
 
These are details that are not necessarily noticed when looking from the 
perspectives of discourse, actors, resources or rules of the game. Also, the 
direct relevance of these details for how the interaction between initiative 
and established policy evolved is difficult to assess. However, they had an 
impact and people continued to refer to them for a long time. The parties at 
the farm yard, with the cows visible ‘on location’, were also a symbol of the 
polder. They seemed to say: this is not an ordinary formality at which 
papers need to be signed; this formality has to do with the future of the 
farm. The cows were an expression of this. It is difficult, however, to 
connect them to one of the four dimensions. They were an actor-
characteristic: an expression of the creativity of the organizers of the party. 
They were also a symbol, forming part of the farming and nature discourse. 
And they were a resource for introducing an element of humour into the 
formal setting, as well as an expression of the regional coalitions’ rule of the 
game that people should be able to experience the area. 
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In view of the above I think it would be useful to add a dimension. The 
relational dimension refers to the socio-psychological characteristics of 
actors that influence their behaviour in specific contexts. It also refers to 
the use of symbols by means of which people wish to give expression to 
their values. The relational dimension also draws explicit attention to how 
people build up trust, anger, friendship, etcetera. Those emotions play a 
role in confrontations between local initiatives and existing policy, and I 
feel they deserve explicit attention in addition to the four dimensions of 
discourse, coalitions, rules and resources. 
 
4.6.2 Positioning the researcher 
A second aspect of the relational dimension is the position of the analyst. I 
realize that this story is involuntarily coloured by my own position and 
perspective as ‘co-owner’ of the Farming for Nature idea. I wish here to 
reflect on that position somewhat more critically than I have so far. In the 
capacity of ‘involved researcher’, I emphasized, for instance, the time it took 
before the European Commission granted its approval. From the 
perspective of the European Commission, however, it was reasonable and 
in line with the operative rules to see to it that excessive compensatory 
payments for nature management by farmers should be prevented. Since 
my focus was on how that philosophy and rule influenced the future of a 
regional initiative, that part of the story did not get any attention. 
Similarly, the rapid turnover of personnel at the Ministry of ANF was 
perhaps frustrating for us as researchers and people involved from the 
region, whereas for the Ministry it was a way to prevent officials from 
developing too strong personal ties with certain policy domains and to 
promote the broadening of experience among personnel. Because of my 
personal involvement, the story may also be coloured at times by some of 
my own feelings, although I tried to avoid this. I do not want to hide 
however that I felt frustrated at times and relieved at others. That was 
‘part of the deal’ – being so close to actual practice brought an in-depth 
insight into the how of power, but it also brought occasional sleepless 
nights. I am of the opinion that those feelings matter in action research. 
But it is also the responsibility of a reflective practitioner to be open about 
his or her positionality and to reflect on it. That does not make the project 
less scientific, but puts the story and the interpretation into perspective for 
the reader. 
 
It is for these reasons that I wish to share my feelings during the time of 
the provisional ‘end of the project’, which was in fact the real beginning of 
the zero-input system in the Polder of Biesland. At the party in Spring 
2007, someone came up to me and said: “this can only be done here”. It gave 
expression to something that had been troubling my conscience for a while. 
Chapter 4  
112 
The time between initiative and approval had been so long, the time and 
energy invested in the area had been so much, and the amount of money 
invested in research and other activities had been more than many farmers 
could dream of. Of course, I say to myself, there are immeasurable results: 
the general attention for the area and its openness will make it very 
difficult for anybody to allocate it for housing, for instance. I would require 
a separate research to find out about all the direct and indirect effects of 
the efforts. But the entire ‘discussion’ with Brussels, the official 
preparations, the many hurdles, the investments: how should these be 
looked at when “this can only be done here”? At this point, these questions 
express how I feel about the undertaking, and I hope to be in a position 
soon to raise the questions:  
• what does this experience mean for us? 
• what should be done next?  
• how can the issues that remained hidden, such as the dominance of the 
‘European’ internal market discourse and it influence on options in a 
polder, be politicized again? 
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Chapter 5: Transcending boundaries at the Dutch-
Belgian border 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about the ‘Grensschap Albertkanaal’, or the ‘Grensschap’ for 
short, a cross-border area in the South of the Netherlands and the North-
East of Belgium. The area, which obtained its name only in 2003, will be 
described in section 5.2, mainly by use of maps and pictures. Section 5.3 
summarizes operative policy on the area. The policy density with respect to 
the Grensschap area was considerably less than in the Biesland case, at 
least in terms of ‘green’ policies. Rather, the development of such policy was 
an objective of the city administration when they organized and engaged in 
an ‘interactive event’. Section 5.4 tells my story of this event and of how it 
caused citizens and officials from both sides of the Belgian-Dutch border to 
get organized and make attempts to influence decision-making. This group 
called themselves the Grensschap, too. Section 5.5 contains again an 
interpretation of the story by means of the research questions: 
1. What was the origin of the initiative, in this case the Grensschap, and 
how did it relate to then existing arrangements? 
2. How did discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest 
themselves over time, in the interaction between the initiative and 
existing policy? 
3. Does the case point to a structural transformation of sub-politicization 
or can other structural transformations be discerned? 
4. What space for policy innovation emerged in the course of the 
Grensschap-process? 
Section 5.6 works out other dimensions or conditions (besides discourse, 
actors, resources and rules coming up during the research) which 
influenced the interplay of the local ideas and government policy, and the 
positionality of the researcher. 
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Map 4: The Grensschap area 
 
 
 
 
 
Map by the Grensschap 
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Aerial photograph 2: The Grensschap 
© Eurosense BV DKLN-2006 
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5.2 The area 
The Western urban fringe of Maastricht, or (from a less city-centric 
perspective) the area around the ‘Albertkanaal’ in between the municipality 
of Maastricht and the Belgian municipalities Riemst and Lanaken 
(respectively c. 120.000, 16.000 and 25.000 inhabitants in 2006), is 
multifaceted. The ‘Kanaalzone’ as it was usually called because of the 
straight, steep-sided canal going through the area, consists of hundreds of 
hectares of arable farms, loam quarries, rolling hills, ‘hollow sandy roads’, a 
golf course, and several places with a view of industry and housing (either 
new housing development, three storey maisonettes from the seventies, or 
apartment blocks). The Albertkanaal itself is located on the Belgium side of 
the border. There is a pulp and paper factory on the canal on the Lanaken 
side, and a narrow strip of Belgian territory on the other side with a factory 
that produces filters for cigarettes. Four windmills were built on this strip 
of land in 2005. To the north of the area is the ‘Zouwdal’ (Zouw valley), a 
160-hectare valley, 60 hectares of which are projected to be turned into 
housing and industry (Lanakerveld). At the center is the ‘Hezerwaterbasin’ 
and to the South-East the ‘Vroenhovenbasin’. 
 
5.3 Operative policy: economic opportunities beat the 
drum 
 
Unlike other areas around Maastricht, until a few years ago, the landscape 
qualities of the ‘kanaalzone’ as a whole had not received much attention 
from the urban administrations, except for individual projects such as the 
renewal of the Dousberg recreation park or the development of the 
‘Lanakerveld’ industrial site on the Dutch side, and the further 
development of the ‘Europark’ industrial zone on the Belgian side. In that 
sense, the area was different from areas such as Jekerdal and Sint 
Pietersberg in the South, which were both internationally recognized as 
Natura 2000 sites for their nature values, or a ‘Belvedere’-area in the 
Northwest of Maastricht, which had obtained special status due to its 
potential for housing and enterprise development in a green environment. 
Perhaps because of the kanaalzone’s location on a frontier, and because of 
the kinds of activities taking place there, the area was not defined in 
municipal policies as particularly ‘special’ in terms of nature or cultural 
values. Instead, it was viewed as a potential area for expansion of industry 
or housing. Both Dutch and Belgian provinces approached the area mainly 
as one with potential for industrial development. In view of these plans, 
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Maastricht’s oft-cited slogan that it wished to be a “compact city in a vast, 
open landscape” was not especially convincing.  
 
‘Green in and around the City’, which was already mentioned in the 
previous chapter, was a fairly new national policy domain that the Dutch 
Ministry of ANF wished to work out mainly in collaboration with the 30 
largest cities in the Netherlands (the G30). The Ministry saw these cities as 
additional sources of funding for ‘green’ policy. Maastricht was one of these 
cities. In the context of this policy development, officials of the Ministry of 
ANF had established contacts with officials of the municipality. Most of 
their expenditure in the period 2000 – 2004 was on acquisition and design 
of land, planting of new forest and the layout of new recreational routes. 
These expenses were mainly incurred on the Eastern side of the city of 
Maastricht, however. In view of national cuts in budgets for ‘green in and 
around the city’, Maastricht was looking for other financial means, such as 
European funds.  
5.4 A story 
Trying to get hold of a no man’s land 
The Maastricht city administration became concerned about the 
Grensschap-area when there was a steady increase in land claims in this 
area. Almost from the time of his installation in 2002, the alderman 
responsible for nature and environment approached this area as the 
‘missing link’ in the ‘green ring’ around Maastricht. A ‘Green Left’ politician 
and former activist from ‘Milieudefensie’ (a Dutch environmental 
organization), he wanted to make the green ring complete. In a policy 
document, he stated: 
 
 “the area between the Albertkanaal and the Dutch-Belgian border is in danger of 
becoming a no-man’s-land, torn into pieces up to the city border because of the 
realization of urban functions” (Collegenota 14/10/2003). 
 
The area was subject to extensive and rapid change. A recreational park 
was under construction at the Dousberg, linked to the existing swimming 
pool; the activities of the loam industry were being intensified; and, in 
addition to the industries that were already present in the area, expansion 
of housing and industrial areas was foreseen on both sides of the border. 
Meanwhile the farmers were looking for ways to safeguard the future of 
their farms in an insecure market. 
 
Meanwhile, elsewhere in the Netherlands… 
Meanwhile, researchers at Alterra research institute were thinking of ways 
to promote public discussions about the future of open land in between 
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cities. These areas were claimed by many parties for many purposes. In the 
urbanizing landscape of the Netherlands, these landscapes were 
increasingly subject to policy making by various government and private 
actors. They often reached beyond the boundaries of one municipality and 
sometimes even of one province. If nothing was done to conserve open 
spaces between cities, these cities were likely to be ‘glued’ to one another, 
increasing the distance between urban populations and nature and rural 
areas. There was no guarantee that uncoordinated building activities would 
form an attractive landscape that would leave room for leisure, nature and 
farming activities. The researchers feared that without a collaborative 
effort by the surrounding cities to establish the qualities of these areas as a 
point of departure, they would eventually fall victim to the accumulated 
planning practices of individual cities. A relay baton was adopted as a 
symbol for the exchange among urbanizing regions of lessons and 
experiences about dealing with these problems. There was another motive 
for looking for a different approach as well. The researchers believed that 
citizens were perfectly capable of thinking at a level beyond that of a ‘park 
or a square in a neighbourhood’, beyond their own backyards, and for the 
benefit of regional policy development. The conviction that something 
needed to be done to promote the input of citizens’ knowledge and ideas had 
been strengthened by their experience in another urbanizing area of the 
Netherlands, where the future planning of an area had seemed to be the 
result of interaction between a steering committee of aldermen of four 
municipalities, and a bureau of landscape architects and process managers, 
taking place at a distance from ‘ordinary citizens’. Only on a few occasions 
were professional representatives of environmental groups invited to bring 
in their views. To the researchers, it seemed as if the only role of council 
members was to nod in agreement when the plans were presented to them. 
This was the extent of citizen participation, and the role of non-
professionals was as limited as that of the political representatives in the 
municipal councils. Also, the researchers found it frustrating that they 
were hired to make a ‘green’ plan while there was little interaction with the 
bureaus doing the planning work on ‘traffic’, or ‘spatial planning’. They 
wanted the various dimensions of the planning effort to be linked with each 
other. On the basis of this experience and of what they had seen elsewhere 
from a greater distance, the researchers ‘created’ an approach which they 
named the ‘Estafette City-Countryside’ (stad-land), or ‘Estafette21’ for short. 
Based on the two motives mentioned above, the approach was meant to 
catalyze more intensive exchange of learning experiences between 
urbanizing regions about ways in which city and countryside could be 
better tuned to each other, and to promote partnership between citizens, 
municipalities and various other government bodies such as province and 
                                                        
21 Estafette = relay  
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water board. This would enable ‘the public’ to participate in decision-
making about these areas in more direct ways than through the represen-
tative system – a form of sub-politicization in fact. The expectation was also 
that they could come to better decision-making together. To start with, the 
researchers formulated methodological steps and ‘lessons’ which they 
expected to be of use for the organization of participatory decision-making 
processes about the relationship between ‘city and countryside’ at the 
regional level.  
 
Their idea was that further development of these steps and lessons could 
become a collective, progressive learning endeavour, so that a ‘method’ 
could be refined and elaborated, and enriched by examples from various 
urbanizing contexts. A website would have to facilitate that learning 
process (www.sturingstadland.nl). Because the Ministry of ANF was 
traditionally the main funder of the research institute and had also co-
financed the above mentioned project, the ideas were presented to officials 
of the Ministry of ANF in a regular meeting of the advisory board of the 
funding program. This advisory board was composed of officials responsible 
for the ‘Green in and around the City’ policy.  
 
A concurrence of circumstances 
As a result of the above mentioned meeting, two officials from the 
‘Southern’ regional directorate of the Ministry of ANF saw opportunities in 
the idea of an ‘Estafette’, which they saw as a potential instrument for 
putting their policy on ‘Green in and Around the City’ more strongly on 
municipalities’ agendas. So even though sub-politicization was not their 
motive for linking up with the idea, they picked up the Estafette on account 
of their own policy practices. They then intermediated to connect the 
ambitions of the Maastricht alderman and his officials on the one hand and 
the ideas of the researchers on the other hand. That is when the ‘Estafette’ 
really started.  
 
Backed up by the offer to pay half of the expenses for an Estafette project, 
the officials found a ready partner for applying the Estafette approach in 
the Municipality of Maastricht (a year later Maastricht handed over the 
relay baton to Zwolle). Initial contact about the possibility of participation 
in the Estafette took place between the ANF, Maastricht officials and the 
researchers at the end of 2002. After some initial hesitations, the 
Maastricht officials saw opportunities as well and one of the researchers 
was invited to present the ideas to the mentioned alderman. The ideas 
matched well with his aspirations and he approved of the project proposal. 
In a series of preparatory meetings between municipal and ANF officials 
and the researchers, the way to organize the Estafette began to take shape. 
The alderman, an advocate of a greater involvement of citizens in policy-
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making, indicated which organizations and neighbourhood platforms he 
wished to see represented. The municipal officials contacted their Belgian 
colleagues to discuss the possibility of an ‘interactive event’. The latter 
expressed their readiness as well, and indicated which citizens could be 
involved. On the Belgian side, the village councils and an environmental 
council were invited to participate by letter. For practical reasons of budget 
and time constraints, a two-day event was planned in June 2003 at a 
beautiful location: Vaeshartelt castle. Just over fifty people participated. 
Not all invited groups were present, but in general attendance was as 
planned. For the municipalities, the event was a rather new undertaking 
because citizens were involved at such an early point in the policy-making 
process – namely before any policy had been prepared. An official said 
about this: 
 
“That was quite a risk. The people could have said: ‘don’t you know then what 
you want yourself’? They could have become really angry: ‘what are we doing 
here, actually?’ But it was a success, because the structure and the goals of the 
two days were clear”.  
 
For the alderman, the absence of ready-made policy proposals was exactly 
what he wanted.  
 
“If people think of something, or put it on paper, then it becomes their baby. Then 
you want to protect that baby. Every impulse from outside is reacted to with 
distrust. It is your own plan. That is why I want officials to communicate with 
citizens when there is no plan yet”. 
 
Months before the event, the alderman presented the forthcoming 
interactive event to the mayor and the other aldermen in the municipal 
executive. They decided that the outcome of this could not overrule any 
earlier decision made by them and the council, that it should contribute to 
the specification of existing policies and that it should not lead to additional 
spatial claims (meeting of the executive of 11 February 2003, and minutes 
Project Group 13 February 2003).  
 
The most important preconditions that were imposed on the event and its 
follow-up were perhaps the ‘vlekkenkaarten’, literally translated as 
“patches on maps” which stood for building volumes that were already 
agreed on and which only needed elaboration at that point.  
 
Two special days at the castle 
Rather than trying to inject the process with ‘formal scientific knowledge’ 
the researchers facilitated a two-day event at which participants were first 
invited to share their own knowledge and experiences.  
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The programme of the two days consisted of four ‘blocks’. The first block 
was geared to sharing ideas about the area, and to experiencing it together. 
During an excursion on foot, the participants told each other what they 
knew about the area. That was an eye-opener for many of them. They were 
surprised about the vast amount of knowledge about the area available 
among them - about the cultural history of the area, art, archaeology, 
agriculture, nature, water, or about past urban plans. Participants were 
asked to take pictures of desirable and undesirable qualities. Later, 
participants referred to the excursion as an important source of their 
initiative to organize themselves in the ‘Grensschap’.  
 
The second part was used to get ‘inspiration’ from others from outside the 
area and identify possible development orientations. The alderman 
expressed his desire to ‘finish’ the green ring around Maastricht, and that 
he wished everybody to be involved in the process of making a plan to 
realize that. He also communicated the ‘message’ of the Municipal 
Executive (Mayor and other aldermen), that decisions that had already 
been agreed in the council, could not be changed again. The third block was 
oriented to the ‘how’ in terms of required coalitions and other 
organizational matters. The fourth block aimed to make specific agree-
ments on future collaboration. Various agreements were made. Participants 
representing a neighbourhood emphasized that they wished to 
communicate the results of the event to their neighbourhood councils, if 
these were active ones. Most of the other agreements were about the 
continuation of discussions about the area.  
 
The field visits and the pictures taken during these visits, the 
presentations by outsiders (for instance urban planners and a city-farmer), 
the maps and pictures spontaneously brought in by the participants and 
the activities in small groups all combined to create an open atmosphere. 
Most of the participants had taken two days off from their work to be able 
to participate. All the activities were reported in a booklet that summarized 
the results of the event (Van den Top et al. 2003). 
 
Most importantly, the event led to a new organization of citizens and 
officials: ‘the Grensschap Albertkanaal’, in short ‘the Grensschap’. The first 
activity of the Grensschap was the preparation of an Interregproposal, an 
idea that had come up during the event. The idea was pursued despite the 
warnings of the mayor of Riemst, who emphasized that preparations for 
European projects were mostly costly, lengthy, and administratively 
complex. The alderman of Maastricht realized that officials needed time to 
get on with the process, and that officials from other sectors than ‘green’ 
needed to be involved more intensively. Besides, during the two days, 
awareness had grown that farmers were important for the area. For the 
Transcending boundaries at the Dutch Belgian Border 
 
 123 
first time, Maastricht officials had to engage in policy-making about 
agriculture. That required a reallocation of budgets and input of personnel; 
a change of routine that nobody had foreseen before the event. Unsure of 
the future, follow-up meetings were planned to prepare the Interreg-
proposal. At this point, all that remained for the researchers to do was to 
prepare the report on the event. After that they would disappear from the 
stage and leave future activities in hands of the people in the region. 
 
The ‘Grensschap’  
The Grensschap Albertkanaal was the name that some of the active 
participants of the Estafette gave to the area because of the key role of the 
boundary (grens means boundary, ‘schap’ refers to a community or 
organization). They delineated the area themselves, based on their in-depth 
knowledge of it. They also used the name Grensschap Albertkanaal for 
themselves as an organization. In their own words: 
 
“The exact delineation of this unique, old landscape is shaped by the ‘Kempisch 
Plateau’ in the North, by the outskirts of Maastricht in the East, by the 
catchment boundary (‘waterscheidingskam’) between the Schelde and Maasbasin 
in the West, and by the Interreg project areas Jekerdal and Sint Pietersberg, 
with the Sint Pieter fortress, in the South. The name is a neologism, with 
associations with terms such as county (‘graafschap’), landscape (‘landschap’) and 
neighbourhood (‘nabuurschap’). Where the old county of Vroenhoven was unified 
in the person of the count, the Grensschap is unified by its borders and its 
citizens, organizations and governments on both sides of the border, which care 
for the area. The name denotes the organization as well as the area” (Grensschap 
Albertkanaal 2004). 
 
They made their own maps of the area and created an elaborate database of 
maps and other information on the internet (http://home.tiscali.nl/grensschap, 
maps). 
 
They worded their vision as follows: 
 
“The rural area between the Western fringe of Maastricht and the Eastern fringe 
of the Flemish Lanaken, Bilzen and Riemst accommodates valuable landscape, 
nature and cultural historical elements. Most of these valuable elements, 
however, are no longer visible in the landscape. Where they are still visible, they 
have lost their significance for a majority of visitors. The Grensschap 
Albertkanaal aims to reveal again the different layers in the landscape, so that 
they can be experienced again. Three dimensions each give their own significance 
and value to the landscape; 
- geology, archaeology and cultural history; 
- nature, landscape and water; and 
- the relationship between city and countryside. 
Where these dimensions come together, a fourth dimension comes into being: 
which focuses on coordination and cooperation” (Grensschap Albertkanaal 2004). 
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The group soon became very active. It consisted of people who lived in the 
Western neighbourhoods of Maastricht, owned a farm in the Grensschap area, 
or lived in one of the Belgian municipalities. It met its first success when it 
won the ‘environment prize’ of the German city of Aachen in September 2003, 
even though it was not a German initiative. The Grensschap became the 
centre of attention and was praised for its positive role in the establishment of 
cross-border collaboration. There were regular meetings and field-excursions, a 
website was launched (http://home.tiscali.nl/grensschap) and an e-newsletter 
MaLaRiA (referring to Maastricht, Lanaken, Riemst) was sent out roughly 
every two weeks with announcements of meetings and relevant articles in the 
media. An artist member of the group designed an emblem, which was printed 
on a badge. The most important strategy of the group was to use their 
expertise to influence policy. They wanted to be a ‘platform of expertise’. 
Critical statements were rare, on the website or in other written material of 
the group. Rather, their energy was directed at giving insight into 
archaeological values, the water systems, and the ways by which small-scale 
agriculture could support an open, cultural landscape and nature. Also, they 
wished to conserve the fields with farms, meadows and hedges of historical 
value, to restore the causeways (‘zouwen’), lynchets (‘graften’) and sunken 
lanes (‘holle wegen’), to conserve the specific “border character” of the area and 
to show the role of the war in local history. Their philosophy was that if 
knowledge about these special characteristics were more widespread, it would 
provide an automatic counterweight to economic considerations (which gave 
rise to initiatives to find more lucrative destinations for parts of the area). 
 
People brought in their perspectives during the frequent field excursions or 
at the meetings of the Grensschap. For them, their knowledge became a 
resource to draw upon in order to exert an influence on policy making. The 
officials were impressed by the things that these people knew, and by the 
time they were willing to invest. Knowledge which had previously remained 
hidden was opened up for use in the policy-making process. In various 
anecdotes, the Grensschappers proudly emphasized how their expertise 
was a powerful resource. For instance, they were proud to provide maps 
which did not end at the Dutch or Belgian border, especially so because the 
municipality did not have such maps. Another example of how they 
distinguished themselves by means of their knowledge of the specificities of 
the area was the reaction to the choices of a famous Dutch architect, who 
made a design for a housing project at the Dousberg. The architect used the 
towers and city wall of the Tuscan town of San Gimignano as a reference 
for his design. One member of the Grensschap: 
 
“I do not want to discredit his work, but he could have referred to little villages 
on hills very nearby! I would gladly have brought him there.” 
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People were generally positive about the walks and meetings organized by 
the Grensschap, in which both officials and citizens participated, especially 
at the start. Because of the available knowledge, their modest approach 
and their willingness and ability to formulate their wishes in policy 
language, the members of the Grensschap were respected as partners for 
discussion. It is likely that this policy language also inhibited others from 
participating, but the tasks were divided in such a way that those with 
most experience with the policy strategies, networks and language were 
engaged in the tasks related to them. Words like liveability (‘beleef-
baarheid)’, layers in the landscape (‘lagen in het landschap’), meaning 
making (‘betekenisgeving’) were used (see elaborate citations in the 
foregoing). These words can be found more often in policy documents and 
scientific accounts than in the daily vocabulary of an average visitor to the 
Grensschap. This goes to show that the Grensschap did not just know much 
about the area, but also about ways to translate that knowledge into policy 
vocabulary.  
The idea of the area as a ‘no man’s land’ was not just a slogan of the 
alderman’s, but was important to the members of the Grensschap as well. 
It was not that they themselves experienced the area as a no man’s land, 
but it was in this respect that they were critical of Maastricht’s policy in 
the past: 
 
“Maastricht looked at itself primarily as a city. As a consequence, her western 
fringe was neglected or was looked at as an easy location for urban expansion” 
(the website). 
 
When speaking of policy, the area was described as a ‘blind spot’. The 
positive qualities of the area that had been overlooked by the expansive 
approach should be given more weight, the group said. They emphasized 
that they could achieve more by combining their expertise than by 
protesting against all kinds of plans. The values of the area, according to 
the members of the Grensschap, did not rule out building development, but 
should offer a restrictive frame for such developments. They also 
emphasized links between their ideas about the area and existing 
government policies. Thus, they wrote that their ideas provided a more in-
depth elaboration of the way the area functioned as an ‘ecological 
passageway’: an idea taken up in the Nature and Environment plan of 
Maastricht. They also made a link with the ‘Three countries park’ 
(Drielandenpark), a ‘development perspective’ signed by nine government 
organizations from three countries to enhance cross-border cooperation on 
various topics, and they emphasized the role of the Grensschap-area in the 
European nature network Natura 2000. The participation of officials in the 
Grensschap was helpful in relation to these efforts to connect with existing 
policies. The officials knew of the policies and also of the possibilities to 
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obtain financing for activities developed within the scope of these policies. 
On several occasions, they provided the group with information on where to 
place the emphasis in the proposals, and even more so on what to avoid22. 
One official: 
 
“I put pressure on them to make sure that they did not make a spatial plan. That 
would rub politicians and other planners up the wrong way and then their ideas 
would not be accepted. (…) The big danger is that they will become an action 
group”. 
 
The idea of being a platform of expertise contributed to the possibilities for 
officials to participate. In the Grensschap, there were recurring discussions 
about the nature of the group. Officials sometimes felt uncomfortable. At 
times they felt that they had to promote their municipalities’ policies, 
which they did not always agree with. This tension did not go unnoticed 
and was sometimes the topic of discussion. There was general agreement 
that it would be wise not to behave like an action group, and that they 
should be seen as a group with the capacity to think beyond their own 
backyards. The officials’ participation was also highly valued, and the 
officials had made it quite clear that if it became an action group, this 
would form an insurmountable hurdle for their continued participation.  
  
In the course of the process however, people observed that the participation 
of officials gradually decreased. The composition of the group as a whole 
changed as well. New members entered and members that had participated 
since the Estafette became less active.  
 
All in all, the Grensschappers thought that by emphasizing the qualities of 
the area, by giving the area its name and by linking it to other areas, it 
would cease to be a ‘blind spot’. The formulation of an Interreg proposal and 
subsequent implementation of a project was expected to help achieve that 
objective.  
 
Interreg project 
The possibility to use Interreg to finance a concrete project was put forward 
by an official. Interreg aimed to stimulate cooperation between European 
regions, which seemed to fit well with the cross-border character of the 
Grensschap. In the autumn of 2003, the group started to work on a 
proposal. The most active contributors to the proposal were a dentist, an 
artist, a university teacher and a provincial official, who took a consider-
                                                        
22  The word ‘art’, for instance, according to the involved officials, should be avoided in 
the Interreg proposal. The officials thought that the proposal would be declined if 
there was too much ‘art’ in it. According to them, other sources (than Interreg) would 
have to be drawn upon if art was too much at the core of the proposals.   
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able amount of work out of the hands of officials. They did ‘the job’ of 
writing the proposal in their free time. In line with their philosophy and in 
accordance with the advice of participating officials, they chose to formulate 
projects which they did not expect to be controversial. In any case they did 
not intend to make spatial claims. The focus was on education and 
information to make other people more aware of the qualities of the area, 
both visible and hidden. Various viewing frames or windows 
(“kijkvensters”) would have to inform a wider public of the area’s ‘stories’, 
which told of archaeological findings, landscape elements, natural values 
and/or historical events. When budgets appeared to be smaller than 
initially expected, the municipalities’ idea of spreading information by 
means of a GPS system was dropped from the proposal. The participating 
officials did not want to push ‘their own thing’. What they were 
enthusiastic about was that citizens had, on the basis of their own 
knowledge and efforts, obtained ‘their own budget’ to realize what they 
wanted. At the same time, work had been taken out of their hands. 
 
For more than a year, members of the Grensschap put a lot of time into 
preparing the proposal, and for some of them it was too much. As a 
consequence, they became less active in the Grensschap or gave up their 
involvement altogether. For some it meant that energy was shifted from 
participation in a neighbourhood council to investing energy into the 
Grensschap. In view of the workload, they asked the municipality to 
provide more assistance. For their part, officials of the municipality were 
very happy that the Grensschappers had worked so hard on the proposal. 
 
The members of the Grensschap felt that they needed to carry out concrete 
projects which would enable them to see real results of their efforts. Some 
also saw the implementation of concrete projects as an opportunity to keep 
people involved who were not strong on abstract thinking at a regional 
level. One official suggested that with concrete projects, they could carry 
out useful practical work, without hampering the broader, more abstract 
discussions on the area as a whole. In May 2005, a negative decision by 
Interreg was communicated to the Grensschap however. It was not very 
clear why the proposal was rejected. The activities of the Grensschap 
reached an impasse after this disappointing news. Most respondents 
attributed the impasse to the failure to get the Interreg project proposal 
approved of, but another project gave rise to mixed feelings as well. 
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The Zouw Valley Study 
The ‘Zouw Valley Study’ was one of the successes attributed to the 
Grensschap. There was another side to that coin too, however. The 
alderman who had been involved with the Estafette was also the one who 
commissioned a bureau of landscape architects to carry out the Zouw Valley 
Study. The study was mainly a Dutch affair. While building volumes for 
housing and industry in the Lanakerveld on the edge of the Zouw Valley 
had already been decided on, the Zouw Valley Study was meant to 
elaborate those plans. Conditions in terms of nature, landscape, architec-
tural style etcetera had to be formulated. These would then, it was said, 
form a long-term framework for any activities in the Zouw Valley. Two 
members of the Grensschap were invited to participate in the Study. They 
were added to a group of between fifteen and eighteen professionals, mostly 
officials from the municipality of Maastricht and contracted experts, with 
various disciplinary backgrounds. The members of the Grensschap were 
amazed by the lack of knowledge about the area among these professionals, 
some of whom came from far away places. 
 
That in itself was an awkward situation for the two ‘representatives’. 
 
“There were 20 of us sitting round the table. They’re all there in the boss’s time, 
or office time, and they’re all paid large fees, I don’t know how much. Except for 
two people who are sitting there free of charge. It may sound ungrateful put like 
that, and it is not the money that I care about, but it is a bit crazy after all”. 
 
The chosen two were content with the bureau of landscape architects that 
was hired to organize the study. The bureau incorporated most of the ideas 
of the Grensschap. Even though specific plans for the future of the farmers 
in the area did not become very concrete and elaboration was ‘delegated’ to 
a next phase, the fact that ‘agriculture’ was taken up as one of the themes 
in the Zouw Valley Study and that the Zouw Valley itself would be free 
from building activities, were considered as the merits of the Grensschap. 
The alderman and the officials emphasized this on several occasions. They 
emphasized that all urban plans for the Valley from then on had to be 
judged in terms of the outcome of the Study. 
 
Since it took so little effort to achieve these general objectives, the 
achievement was hardly recognized by other members of the Grensschap 
however. For the Grensschappers not represented in the Zouwdal-study 
group, it remained unclear what the effect of their input had been. One 
respondent:  
 
 “When you have fought for something, you have also achieved something. Now 
we had to explain continuously to the other members of the Grensschap which of 
our ideas had been taken over “.  
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In the end, the members of the Grensschap were divided as to the results of 
the Zouw Valley Study, and were disappointed in how the process had been 
organized. During the study, the width of the open area in the Zouw Valley 
had already been reduced because more houses needed to be built in order 
to make the building activities financially viable. That gave rise to internal 
strife among some members of the Grensschap: those who agreed to give in 
and those who did not because they strongly felt that reducing the open 
space would harm the ecological potential of the area and how it could be 
experienced as an open valley. The latter were a minority, however.  
 
The two participating members of the Grensschap were disappointed about 
the course of events. First, they were grouped under the theme of 
‘agriculture’, whereas they wanted to have a greater say in themes like 
‘housing’, so that they could propose their ideas about how to reckon with 
cultural-historical values in housing development23. One day they had seen 
on the agenda that ‘housing’ had been put just before agriculture. A 
Grensschapper: 
 
“We were, of course, as much interested in housing as in agriculture. But we were 
not allowed to attend the session on housing.”  
 
The most significant confrontation during the process was not about 
matters of substance, but rather about unclear rules of the game, including 
responsibilities and roles. The Grensschap members were particularly 
concerned when they read the following message in the newspaper: 
 
“Maastricht is looking for locations for industry and housing, but the city also 
keeps a green agenda, and tries to protect existing nature values”, says Hazeu 
(the alderman), who has commissioned a study on the future of the Zouwdal. 
“This study will, in the next 20 years, roughly be the guideline for all building 
activities in the bordering areas and neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood, 
represented in the Grensschap Albertkanaal, explicitly had a say in promoting 
the conservation of nature-historic values” (Dagblad de Limburger, 16 May 
2005)”. 
 
They now had two concerns. Firstly, they interpreted the message as 
meaning that the participation of ‘the Grensschap’ was considered to 
replace representation of the neighbourhoods. Secondly, they had 
understood that the study was a substitute for discussions in the 
neighbourhood and municipal councils. If that were true, then they would 
lose the traditional channels for opposing decisions. Replacing this 
traditional type of influence with the ‘new’ collaboration in and by the 
                                                        
23  They emphasized for instance the possibility of integrating historical home meadows 
(‘huisweide’) in the new urban structure.   
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Grensschap was not an acceptable change to the rules of the game for the 
Grensschappers. The analysis of one of the members of the Grensschap: 
 
“Because the design development was not a consultation process, and no reporting 
was done, the decision-making process was hidden. Ideas were tabled, and you 
noticed only later on whether they were implemented or not. Ideas were dropped, and 
you never heard of them again, or you protested against them and they were 
implemented after all. At one point a designer from Germany gave a presentation 
about an urban fringe in a German City (…). The Bureau thought that the idea of 
that fringe matched their scheme and at the next meeting it was a fait accompli. The 
consequence of this, namely that the decision that was made 10 or 20 years ago was 
breached, was not considered. The bureau was thinking in terms of a “zigzag fringe”, 
so the sport fields were done away with. I think it would make sense to put this up for 
discussion. But the decision making was not transparent (…) None of the executive 
was in those design sessions, only officials. (…) In theory, the final decision is made 
by the executive and the municipal council. Politicians have the last word. But in 
practice, things are different. A plan is presented as a totality. There is nobody, at 
least from among the executive, who followed the entire process. The consequences 
were incalculable. So in fact very important decisions were made by officials, and you 
can question the democratic legitimacy of that. 
 
The Zouw Valley Study, which once again had taken a lot of time, was a 
second reason for the waning of the activities of the Grensschap. 
Disagreement about the contents, and perhaps more importantly, lack of 
clarity about rules of the game created concerns about the status of the 
Grensschaps’ participation in the study and what that implied for other 
established participation procedures. 
 
Perseverance required and rewarded  
For some of the members, the energy and time that the Grensschap had 
taken were reason to become less active or even inactive. For one member 
of the Grensschap that I interviewed, the decision by the other members to 
refrain from opposing choices made in the Zouwdal Study was a reason to 
back out. He wanted the Grensschap to resist more forcefully and challenge 
the makers of the plan to visit the area and analyse the foreseen results of 
the plans, as they could be imagined while walking through the area. 
 
While the process had demanded considerable perseverance by the 
members of the Grensschap, especially after their project proposal was 
rejected in spring 2005, a success could be celebrated after all in September 
2006. When the proposal was approved of by the European Union 
(INTERREG) after all, the municipalities Maastricht, Lanaken, Riemst, 
two provinces and a foundation for the conservation of small landscape 
elements also decided to subsidize it. They granted an amount of 580.000 
Euro for the establishment of thirteen informative ‘landmarks’, the design 
of a permanent exposition and the restoration of small landscape elements. 
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Because this time it was taken up in an EU programme that promoted the 
economic development of cross-border regions, the emphasis in the proposal 
shifted somewhat to the added value of the landmarks for the recreation or 
tourism economy. Also the ‘windows’ were replaced by ‘landmarks’ because 
of technical difficulties in realizing the former24. A quote from the ‘Europa 
Werkt’ website: 
 
“The project Landmarks Grensschap Albertkanaal aims to make the existing 
footpaths and cycle paths (…) more attractive for tourists, by creating so-called 
‘landmarks’ at special places in the landscape” (www.europawerkt.eu). 
 
This presentation of the intentions of the Grensschap is clearly much 
narrower than the members’ initial much wider ambitions, with ideas of 
raising awareness of the qualities they perceived in the area, which they 
were convinced should be protected. 
For the members of the Grensschap, however, the approval was reason to 
celebrate, and after a period of smaller-scale activities, a group from 
amongst the members started to invest a considerable amount of time and 
energy in working towards the implementation of the ideas. They were 
aware that such dedication was not an option for everybody. In summer 
2005, before project approval and an even further intensification of 
activities, one of the most active members said: 
 
“The people wishing to give up are the people for whom the investment of time and 
thought has become to high. If you come together on a monthly basis, and there are 
another two to three meetings in that month about various subjects, it’s inevitable 
that some people will drop out (…) I have already mentioned that we are in a difficult 
phase. We have to ask ourselves whether the Grensschap will still exist in three 
years time, and whether it should still exist by that time. Nevertheless I think a lot 
has already happened in terms of networking between the people of the Grensschap 
and many other people and places. This is about ideas that are rooted both here and 
there. So this is something that has already been achieved.” 
 
The activities of the Grensschap were welcomed by the municipal 
administration. The acquisition of extra funds for ‘green’ was one of their 
main objectives and the Grensschap proved to be capable of achieving that 
aim. For the members of the Grensschap, although the ‘acquisition-
activities’ involved a considerable workload, at least they could now 
anticipate concrete results of their work.  
 
This did not deter others from joining in. Every now and then, new 
members would join the group. The theme of the year 2007 was the 
elaboration of the landmarks. The members of the Grensschap did not do 
                                                        
24  Condensation would appear in between the perspex plates that the windows were 
reckoned to be made of.   
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this on their own - A bureau was hired to elaborate the ideas. That, 
according to one active participant, was the only way to be successful. 
 
“They could do things that were too much for us. Realizing the landmarks 
involved a lot of administrative work and coordination with various governments, 
land acquisition and legal arrangements.” 
 
Coordination and administrative work was done by the municipality of 
Maastricht, supervision in terms of contents was the work of the 
Grensschap. The members of the Grensschap wrote the texts for the 
landmarks. When I reminded a respondent, a Belgian official, of the 
impasse that the Grensschap went through in 2005, she said: 
 
“We had ups and downs. Now we are in a positive phase again. We are working very 
hard on the Landmarks. We do have influence, not on decisions about whether or not 
a building initiative is carried out, but on how they are carried out. ” 
 
In Belgium, the Grensschap-members were often asked for advice by the 
municipal administration. These municipalities’ doors were also open 
during evening hours, making it easier for the Grensschap to meet there on 
a regular basis. 
 
In 2007, four and a half years after the Grensschap came into being; it had 
still an active role. It facilitated a convenient type of collaboration for the 
municipalities, mainly because it refrained from action group types of 
activity. With the decline in activity by neighbourhood and village councils, 
it had also become one of the few remaining forms of participation. 
 
 
 
Transcending boundaries at the Dutch Belgian Border 
 
 133 
 
 
* Two examples of landmarks as they will be created in 2008. The Grensschap
commissioned Hans Lemmen (www.hanslemmen.nl) to design the objects. 
The projects will be implemented by  bureau Air-co and Hans Lemmen. 
 
Stone-chair as reversed time-machine: stone remains while surrounding 
landscape changes. 
Reconstruction of Roman trans-border road*
Figure 7: Designs two of the landmarks
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Meeting in the garden of Vaeshartelt Evening walk
Group discussion about qualities of the area
 
Elaborating plans 
Workshop participants bring their 
own material about the area 
Members of the Grensschap during field 
excursion at the event in 2003 
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5.5 Interpretation 
5.5.1 Origin of initiative in the context of the existing policy 
arrangement 
This section summarizes what happened in relation to the first research 
question: What was the origin of the initiative and how did it relate to then 
existing arrangements? 
 
The ‘interactive event’ that led to the formation of the Grensschap was an 
initiative ‘from above’. It had in fact two sources of origin: one at the 
municipality of Maastricht and at an alderman’s office in particular, and 
another one at a research institute. Both the alderman and the researchers 
aimed for a greater role for citizens in decision-making about open areas 
adjacent to and in between cities. Even though the researchers did not call 
what they strove for ‘sub-politicization’, it was in fact a version of that. 
They made attempts to create spaces for decision-making power at other 
sites than the traditional ones. ANF-officials from a regional directorate, 
starting from a different motive, connected the researchers and ‘the 
municipality’. An additional incentive for the municipality to participate in 
the researchers’ idea of an ‘Estafette’ was the finances available from the 
Ministry of ANF for ‘Green in and Around the City’. With the co-financing 
of ANF, they could organize the interactive event that was meant to involve 
citizens in policy development to finish ‘the green ring around Maastricht’. 
For the municipality, the event was a rather new undertaking at the time, 
for two reasons. First, it was directed at citizen involvement in decision-
making about a rather large area. Second, no green policy had been 
developed yet for the area. There were policy arrangements with regard to 
other sectors that had an influence on the area, mainly those regarding 
industrial and housing development and recreation facilities. With respect 
to ‘green’, the existing policy arrangement so far had focused on other parts 
of the city. The event would have to become the overture to a broadening of 
that arrangement to the Grensschap area. Even though the area at that 
time was often labelled ‘a blind spot’ by those focusing on nature, 
agriculture or cultural-historical values, various activities were going on in 
it. With regard to policy domains such as industry, housing development 
and recreation, various plans were ‘in-the-making’ or had already been 
decided on in the Council and the Municipal Executive, mayor and 
aldermen.  
The interactive event described here came to be the occasion at which 
citizens and officials from both sides of the border became enthused about 
the reach and the depth of their combined knowledge about the area. In 
view of their perspective that the significance of the area lay particularly in 
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the presence of a border and the relatedness of the parts of what they 
considered and experienced as a whole, they were concerned about the lack 
of cooperation between the Belgian and Dutch governments so far. This 
concern led them to organize themselves in the Grensschap Albertkanaal. 
That was the origin of an initiative that from then on emphasized the 
members’ in-depth experience of and connection with the area. Their multi-
faceted knowledge became their vehicle for expressing their feeling of 
connectedness to the Grensschap area. By means of their knowledge, and 
especially by joining forces in that realm, they believed they could become a 
factor of influence. 
 
In sum, the structural conditions in which the initiative came about were 
created by the search among various actors for new forms of participation. 
Another condition was the sectoral working approach which caused one 
part of the municipal organisation to be thinking about ‘finishing the green 
ring’ while another was involved in building development in the same area.  
 
5.5.2 Discourse, actors, rules and resources 
This section takes up the second question of the research: How do 
discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest themselves over 
time, in the interaction between initiative and existing policy? 
 
In the previous Biesland-case I described three clearly distinguishable 
discourses. Those discourses could be attributed to either the existing policy 
or to the new initiative. That made it possible in my analysis to start from 
these discourses and subsequently to look for the coalitions that supported 
them, to identify the rules and resources that were connected to the 
identified discourses and the coalitions, and the ways the relations between 
them changed. The Biesland case also illustrated how the initiative moved 
in the direction of existing policy, but this happened only after a first 
confrontation of the two perspectives had taken place. In the Grensschap 
case, specific discourses were more hidden right from the start. One reason 
for this was that it was the deliberate strategy of the members of the 
Grensschap not to explicitly oppose against activities that were decided on 
already; confrontations on issues of content were less actively sought and 
were even avoided. Secondly, the Grensschap used policy vocabulary to get 
their plans approved of. This too made the differences between existing 
policy discourses and discourses related to the new initiative less visible. 
Moreover, existing policies were placed outside the discussion because the 
city administration put them forward as preconditions for any other 
development. For this reason, the Grensschap sometimes even seemed to be 
an ‘extension’ of the municipality’s services, putting a lot of effort into 
acquisition of new money for new projects that would not harm other 
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developments, while these developments were decided on elsewhere and by 
other persons. Interaction between the Grensschap and the municipalities 
took place in the framework of individual projects or activities, such as the 
Zouw Valley study and the Interreg project. It is on the basis of these 
interactions in individual projects, rather than of an explicit confrontation 
of initiative and government policy, that an analysis in the scope of the 
second research question could still be made. This means that in the 
following, the focus will first be on the Grensschap as such, and then on the 
interactions between the Grensschap and existing policy in the form of 
projects. 
 
Grensschap: a governance innovation 
I would call the Grensschap a governance innovation because of its 
composition and territorial focus. A network was formed that consisted of 
officials and citizens. That in itself was an innovation, compared with 
common practice. In principle, their contacts were not occasional but 
structural in character. Another innovative dimension of the network was 
its cross-border orientation and participation: it consisted of people and 
officials from Belgium and the Netherlands.  
 
In terms of the substance of the matter, the Grensschap added a new 
concept to the discussions about the area. Firstly, in the current situation, 
discussions about the area as a whole were rare. Rather, the focus was 
usually on individual projects or interventions in the landscape, such as the 
Dousberg (recreation area) or the Lanakerveld (industry and housing). The 
Grensschap concentrated mainly on a territory – beyond the ‘backyards’ of 
individual citizens or the parks or squares in a neighbourhood. There were 
many reasons for the members of the Grensschap to do this: the cross-
border recreational activities and experience of the landscape, the historical 
events that could not be well understood by focusing on a single spot, the 
water systems that trespassed boundaries, the ecological values of the area 
as a connection between different nature areas – all these are examples 
cited by the members of the Grensschap. The name that they attributed to 
the Grensschap was symbolic of their way of looking and constituted a 
discursive act to draw attention to it. The Grensschap also consistently 
emphasised their vision that building interventions in the area should take 
advantage of and ‘build upon’ key characteristics of the area. The name for 
the area and the group, the badge, the logo on it, the new maps and the 
walks all gave expression to the new discourse that put the Grensschap 
centre stage and gave the city a supporting role, supplanting the more 
standard discourse that looked outwards from the city. 
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The field excursions: discursive acts, resource and rule of the game 
For the members of the Grensschap, the walks were a means to emphasize 
their way of looking. The walks can be seen as discursive acts and a 
resource. As a resource, they used the walks to emphasize their views of the 
area. While looking at the urban environment from within the area, the 
meaning of the discursive notion of the land as a frame or condition for 
urban activities could be put across to a wider public in a lively way. The 
walks were also an excellent means of sharing the resource most 
emphasized by the members of the Grensschap: their multi-faceted 
knowledge. The field excursions matched their wish to stay close to the 
contents, and emphasized their profile as a ‘platform of expertise’ (rather 
than an action group). These practices and claimed identities referred to a 
‘knowledge discourse’ that can also be attributed to the Grensschap. 
 
That a comprehensive assessment of a situation could only be made in the 
field was a key ‘rule of the game’ of the Grensschappers. When that 
informal rule was disregarded, this gave rise to indignation of some of the 
members. The field visits were their sources of inspiration, occasions on 
which they could share their views with others and learn more about the 
area. When they were asked to explain what inspired them to play an 
active role in the Grensschap, they all spoke of their attachment to 
qualities of the area. Through the excursions where they were inspired by 
other members, they started to see things they hadn’t seen before. Actually 
seeing things in the field was a means of breaking through the discursive 
code. The field visits, for instance, caused agriculture to appear on the 
municipal agenda. The maps were also a helpful resource for enabling the 
Grensschappers to emphasize their views, and so were the ‘watching 
frames’ or ‘windows‘ (kijkvensters) that they had proposed in the Interreg 
project. All of these were not just neutral resources. They gave expression 
to the discourse of the Grensschap area as a whole and to its invisible 
qualities, which could only be properly understood by experiencing it from 
the field. 
 
At odds with municipal policy practices 
In the foregoing I described the Grensschap in terms of actor coalitions, 
discourses, resources and rules of the game. In the following I will use the 
same perspective and focus not on the Grensschap as such but on the 
occasions on which the Grensschap intermingled in policy practices that 
were predominantly organized by government bodies. The Zouw Valley 
Study was one such occasion, and one which was illustrative of the ways in 
which the Grensschap’s discourse was at odds with regular practice. First, 
the Zouw Valley Study separated off part of the territory that the 
Grensschap wished to focus on. While it is unrealistic to expect that all the 
activities of the municipalities would all of a sudden be directed at the 
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Grensschap area as a whole, the Zouw Valley Study caused a narrowing of 
focus and diverted the attention of the Grensschappers away from 
policymaking for the entire area. Whereas the Grensschappers approved of 
the choice of the bureau of landscape architects, the process also brought to 
light discursive incongruence. The Zouw Valley study was organized in a 
sectoral way, which did no justice to the orientation of the Grensschap 
towards making the Grensschap landscape into a ‘frame’ for all sorts of 
interventions. So their way of looking at the area did not break through 
into the routines of daily policy practice. There were several occasions on 
which the Grensschap’s options were curtailed in advance. It started before 
the Grensschap was even founded, when the municipal executive of mayor 
and aldermen imposed restrictions on the outcome of the Estafette. The 
members of the Grensschap also imposed such restrictions on themselves, 
when they chose not to make controversial plans.  
 
In other words: the new network brought in a broad, cross-border territorial 
outlook (a new discourse in which experience-based knowledge of ‘the field’ 
was crucial) but it was not able to change practices that were organized in 
accordance with the age-old ‘sectoral discourse’, dominated by building 
volumes or ‘patches on maps’ (vlekkenkaarten). Also, the Dutch-Belgian 
collaboration caused awareness among the members of the Grensschap of 
the different organizational cultures in Belgium and the Netherlands. They 
started to appreciate the ‘open’ character of the Belgian municipal 
organizations. So far, this did not change Dutch practices; the municipal 
buildings remained closed for instance during evenings. 
 
By means of the Interreg project, the members of the Grensschap were able 
to bring the new discourse into practice on a project basis. The endeavour 
did not change the rules, but it did bring thirteen designed ‘landmarks’ in 
the area, all of which gave expression to their vision on the area. Three 
years after formulation of the project, it was approved in 2006. Before that, 
the hard work and the disappointment when the proposal was initially 
rejected almost led to a premature end of the Grensschap. Their success 
was equivocal. On the one hand they were able to create thirteen (symbolic) 
places in the landscape. At these places, people were invited to look at the 
landscape through the ‘lens’ of the Grensschap. The long term effect of this 
may prove significant, though hard to assess at this point, when the 
‘windows’ still have to be built. On the other hand, the members of the 
Grensschap had also submitted themselves to the constraints of a time-
consuming project, which became too much for some of the members, and 
also prevented them from spending time on other projects. 
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Rules of the game 
For the Grensschappers, being a ‘platform of expertise’ meant that prior 
political choices, such as to realize a certain building volume, were not 
contested, for such an approach was considered as an undesirable action-
group type of participation. In the view of the Grensschappers, functioning 
as a platform of expertise was an additional way to exert influence. If they 
felt they needed to contest something, they wanted to do so outside the new 
form of collaboration. Therefore, they were not pleased when they got the 
impression that they would be barred from traditional ways to ‘participate’. 
Participation of the Grensschap in the Zouw Valley Study in particular 
showed that it was important to provide clarity from the outset about the 
status of all parts of the participatory process.  
 
Thus, there is a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ practices. The 
Grensschap experience gives rise to the hypothesis that the traditional 
forms of participation should not be replaced by the new ones. For the 
moment that a concern was raised that the city administration wanted to 
replace the old practices with the new ones, the members of the Grensschap 
resisted. They wished to keep the possibility of the traditional policy 
procedures, for themselves and for others whom they felt they could never 
fully represent. So the two practices should continue to coexist.  
 
Structuring and stabilization 
After the Estafette, a process of structuring came into being. People 
organized themselves, met frequently, appointed a chairman from amongst 
them, and communicated with ‘the outside world’ through a website. In 
addition to the lasting ‘remains’ in the landscape in the form of the thirteen 
‘watching frames’ or landmarks, the Grensschap continued to be invited to 
provide input for the elaboration of plans such as the golf course and the 
housing estates. 
 
In terms of the scheme sequence, Structural Conditioning ? Social 
Interaction ? Structural Elaboration, that I referred to in chapter two 
(Archer), the case demonstrates how structural conditioning and social 
interaction takes place, but in terms of structural elaboration, no 
conclusion can be drawn yet about possible delayed effects (Pestman’s term: 
2001). 
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Structural Conditioning Social Interaction Structural Elaboration 
Existing arrangement: no 
overall policy for the area, 
various expansive 
activities in an area that 
has no name. Citizens 
resist individual plans in 
an ‘action group-like’ way. 
Emergence of Grensschap 
discourse and coalition. 
Interactions in Zouwdal 
Study and Interreg 
project. Grensschap tries 
to change existing 
situation by focussing on 
the area as a whole, by 
avoiding conflict and by 
showing the special 
history and ‘hidden 
qualities’ of the area. 
Grensschap continues to 
be a partner in policy-
making of various kinds of 
projects. Realization of 
project may also bring 
delayed effects, to be 
investigated in a few years 
time. Little change of 
rules and resources. 
 
5.5.3 Structural transformations; depoliticization 
In this section, the third question of the research will be addressed: Does 
the case point at sub-politicization, or could other structural transfor-
mations be discerned? In Beck’s more eloquent words: Could the 
Grensschap ‘move mountains’ in the nerve centres of development? The 
first and most important thing to say about this is that options had been 
narrowed before the process even started. To stick to the metaphor: 
mountains had been declared ‘no go areas’. On top of the conditional 
restrictions which were imposed by the municipal executive, the members 
of the Grensschap themselves chose not to try to move mountains (even 
although one of the planned landmarks was in fact a new hill!), but to try to 
promote the qualities of the area by bringing in their common expertise, 
which was based on their frequent encounters in the area. They explicitly 
wanted to avoid controversy. 
 
Since there are no absolute criteria to determine whether or not one can 
speak of sub-politicization, I can analyse directions and formulate 
hypotheses on that basis. The Grensschap and its activities can perhaps be 
perceived as a local manifestation of the trend of sub-politicization in terms 
of ‘building community’ and innovation of networks. The Grensschap 
consolidated a new way of looking at a specific territory. In terms of 
eventual effects however, it could only do what it was given the space to do. 
This is why I hesitate to speak of sub-politicization. Perhaps in a few years 
time the cultural-symbolic work done by the Grensschap by means of the 
‘watching frames’ (later called landmarks) will be effective in changing 
peoples perspective on the area – which may then also influence policy. It 
may well be an implicit way of spreading a message by making people form 
an opinion about something that they had not seen in a certain way before. 
This outcome can not be predicted, however. Meanwhile, because of a lack 
of substantial influence, the procedures of the traditional representative 
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system were still counted on as the channel through which to influence 
politics. So the members of the Grensschap wished to keep that ‘exit option’ 
open in case the ‘new’ form of collaboration did not render sufficient results. 
Some of them were already using their membership of a political party and 
the formal possibilities to react to policy plans to influence decision making. 
In other words, the cases in this study so far point at an additional locus of 
politics which may add to the more traditional loci of politics rather than 
replace them – even if there were tendencies towards this. Also, I think 
that the lifespan of the ‘new’ arenas in comparison with traditional arenas 
deserves more attention in future research, as well as the long-term 
influence of cultural work such as the “windows”. 
 
The possible exclusionary effects of being a platform of expertise should be 
a topic of future concern as well. Indeed, one man who often opposed the 
decisions of the municipality and used the formal procedures to make his 
opinion heard, was doubtful about future membership of the group. As long 
as their discussions were about knowledge or facts there was no danger. 
The man knew a lot about the water systems of the area. As soon as 
discussions were about controversial opinions, the man was a risk of being 
identified as an ‘action group type’. ‘Platform of expertise’ was in fact a 
discursive notion which imposed limits on the contents of discussions and – 
as this example of one individual goes to show – also on membership of the 
group.  
 
In sum, the present case shows imposed and self-imposed restrictions on 
the work and influence of the Grensschap. The Grensschap had a role 
within the boundaries of what was determined as uncontroversial, whether 
by the city administration or by the members of the Grensschap 
themselves. It would be going too far, then, to speak of sub-politicization 
tout court. At least three conditions were imposed on the process which 
invalidate the sub-politicization-thesis for this case: 
1. The imposition of preliminary preconditions by the City Administration, 
that were kept out of the discussion; 
2. The strategy of imposing restrictions on addressing controversial issues 
by the Grensschap itself, thereby excluding people who wanted to ‘go 
further’; 
3. The wish not to replace traditional procedures with ‘new forms of 
collaboration’. 
These conditions bring to light a remarkable ambiguity, for a tendency 
towards sub-politicization may be paired with depoliticization. The three 
conditions restricted the extent to which influence was exerted ‘from below’, 
but it is still hard to ignore the degree to which the Grensschap could 
realize some of its ideas, with possibly longer-term, less easily measurable 
implications. This conclusion means that processes that seem to point at a 
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trend of sub-politicization, for instance through the foundation of a new 
coalition with new ideas about a specific territory, should be carefully 
watched for depoliticizing inclinations coupled to that trend.  
 
5.5.4 Space for policy innovation  
 
“Society is diverse in ways that come into play directly in the policymaking 
process. Policymaking begins from these diverse roots and community is as often 
the outcome as the origin of policymaking.” (Laws and Rein in Hajer and 
Wagenaar 2003: 172). 
 
This section addresses the fourth question about what space for policy 
innovation emerged in the course of the process. My conclusions here follow 
naturally from the above line of argument. First I will ‘make up the balance 
sheet’ in terms of the innovative features of the Grensschap described in 
the foregoing:  
1. Its emphasis on the qualities of the area as a whole, which should be a 
basis for urbanization, rather than the other way around: this caused 
the area to reach agendas not only as an ‘easy location for urban 
expansion’, but also increasingly because of its intrinsic qualities 
related to its openness and its cultural, historical and nature values; 
agriculture emerged on the municipal agenda. In short: seeing the land 
not as the fringe of the city but as a centre which should be a frame for 
urbanization. 
2. Its cross-border collaboration between citizens and officials, the way it 
approached their knowledge as a powerful resource, 
3. The ‘cultural work’ by means of which the Grensschappers attempted to 
change the views of a wider public. Part of this work was the realization 
of a cross-border educative project that gave expression to the ideas of 
the Grensschap (later it was formulated in terms of improved chances 
for tourism in order to obtain subsidies). This project may have longer-
term socio-cultural influence. 
 
Despite these innovative features, in the relation with existing policy it 
would again be a step too far to speak of space for policy innovation. There 
was no real policy innovation. Firstly, as is clear by now, limits were 
imposed in an early stage on what the Grensschap could have an influence 
on. Before the Estafette, the alderman involved was restrained by his 
colleague-aldermen, who put a check on ideas differing from existing plans. 
By doing this, building volumes in specific locations were placed outside the 
discussion or ‘participation process’ beforehand. These were brought in as a 
‘given’. The key decision-makers about these givens were not participants 
in the game being played, either. The Grensschappers adhered to an 
integrated discourse, or, in their own words, a holistic view of the area. 
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However, their ideas on industry and housing were not given a chance to 
penetrate sectoral decision-making about housing and industrial 
development. Space for policy innovation was permitted only within the 
confines of those policies. Secondly, the members of the Grensschap 
themselves made a point of proposing policy change only to the extent that 
it could be accommodated by existing policy. Thirdly, even though there 
were discursive changes, these were not accompanied by changes of 
practice (the Zouwdal Study, which was about the Zouwdal only, involved 
mainly professionals, did not address the area as a whole, and was divided 
into sectoral fields of attention). Fourthly, the focus came to lie on projects 
rather than policy. These took a lot of time at the expense of time available 
for broader policy-making activities. 
 
The case shows that offering citizens opportunities to have a say about 
developments in an area requires a change of bureaucratic routines. 
Frequent encounters, often ‘in the field’ and after working hours, demand 
different working schedules for officials. Participatory work also requires 
‘listening abilities’ instead of presentation skills. In one of his subsequent 
initiatives, the alderman tried to change some routines. He said: 
 
“Our first product in the Caberg-Malpertuis project was a process document. It 
contains rules of the game on how to deal with each other. Here we have 
established agreements on things such as listening to each other with respect, 
and on working hours of officials’. 
 
Results like these also form a part of space for policy innovation and 
constitute a delayed effect of experiences such as those with the 
Grensschap. In this example, a rule of the game was changed that made it 
possible for officials and citizens to meet more often and listen to each 
other. 
 
In short, the Maastricht case was about the emergence of a new coalition 
and new discursive notions. However, existing flows of resources and rules 
of the game supported another, economic discourse that curtailed space for 
policy innovation right from the start. In the end, even the project that the 
Grensschap had formulated to realize a concrete expression of their ideas in 
the field had to be translated into economic terms in order to get approval. 
Important decisions were made in other domains, by actors who were able 
to set their conditions in advance of any influence by the members of the 
Grensschap. The Grensschap was hardly able to communicate with the 
coalition related to that policy arrangement, which continued to be far more 
influential. The stakes of developers and the sectors responsible for the 
economy of the region, were represented in the process that the Grensschap 
went through in the form of the preconditions (rules of the game) that the 
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municipal executive imposed on the dialogue with and within the 
Grensschap. Thus they became influential, but absent actors, representing 
an influential, but depoliticized issue. New discourses and actor coalitions 
could come into being but resources and rules of the game remained largely 
connected to an existing policy arrangement that was dealing with the 
same area, but performing on another stage. The future will have to show 
whether the new network and the ‘windows’ in particular could become a 
powerful resource that could mobilize other people to exert political 
pressure to safeguard the values that the Grensschap had placed on 
agendas. 
5.6 The relational dimension and my own positionality 
5.6.1 The relational dimension 
 
“emotions should not be suppressed or ‘explained away, but we should try to get 
to grips with them” (Van Stokkom 2002: 383). (Translation by MB) 
 
The Maastricht case unveils other aspects, besides discourse, actors, 
resources and rules, that played a role in the interaction between initiative 
and existing policy. Examples are the fact that the people were able to start 
building up trust and familiarity with each other at the ‘Estafette-event’, 
and the admiration and respect they felt towards each other when they 
shared their knowledge about the area during the field excursions. Another 
example is the admiration for the leaders of the group expressed by a 
majority of the respondents. The leaders’ network capabilities and good 
understanding of political and administrative affairs were mentioned in 
several interviews25 I would say there is more than ‘resources’ at stake 
here. Of course, the knowledge and understanding of political and 
administrative affairs is a resource. But the admiration expressed by 
respondents refers to something else – an emotion that can not be ‘accessed’ 
or allocated. It is more about the ‘chemistry’ between people. Feel for the 
game, endurance, trust, respect, anger: all these are emotions that played a 
role in the process of getting organized and interacting with existing policy. 
They represent something more personal on the one hand and there is often 
a social-relational side to them as well. In the Grensschap story, the 
alderman paid attention to the relational dimension when he emphasized 
that his officials should not develop their plans in advance of interaction 
with citizens (because “the plans would then already become their babies”). 
Personal traits such as these, which may be referred to as identification, 
                                                        
25  Compare Van Stokkom, 2002: 362-386 and 2003: 153 – 165: Van Stokkom focuses on 
informal aspects of interactive policy making, notably affective and charismatic 
aspects. 
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feelings of ownership, or competence, are located at a deeper psychological 
level. Both the psychological and the relational are levels which deserve 
more attention if the objective is to understand more of the relationship 
between local initiatives and existing policy. The  concepts that I focused on 
in my study so far do not seem to do sufficient explicit justice to them.  
 
Without these relational capacities, the members of the Grensschap would 
probably not have organized themselves, or not have lasted long. Some 
authors call these attributes ‘human resources’ (Healey 2006) or ‘human 
capital’ (Innes and Booher 2003). I prefer to place them in a separate 
category to distinguish them from institutionalized ‘resources’. They are 
different from the resources which were described so far in relation to 
policy arrangements, such as the availability of financial resources or of 
knowledge. They are positioned at an interpersonal or relational level. In 
the interaction between a policy arrangement and local initiatives, they are 
important conditions. In the Grensschap case, the formation of the 
Grensschap and its performance were certainly not the result of these 
relational capacities only, but on the other hand it is likely that little would 
have happened after the Estafette event if participants had not ‘clicked’, or 
if no-one had taken the lead in follow-up activities. The Grensschap case 
suggests that before any enduring influence on government policy can be 
exerted, positive experiences in the relational domain need to be present 
first. But these can only emerge when opportunities are created to really 
meet. The Estafette was such an occasion, but the area and the many field 
visits and the collaborative work on the Interreg proposal were examples as 
well. This suggests that these relational capacities can be resuscitated by 
an institutionalized ‘rule of the game’ that implies the creation of 
opportunities to meet each other, preferably in a specific area that creates a 
common feeling of connection to that area. In view of this, it also becomes 
clear why a practical matter such as a possible discrepancy between the 
‘working hours’ of a group such as the Grensschap and those of officials, 
and the opening hours of municipal buildings, should be discussed and 
acted upon. 
 
We have not yet mentioned the role of coincidence: that which could not be 
planned in advance, such as the almost simultaneous occurrence of a) the 
chemistry between people during the Estafette event, due to which the 
Grensschap came into being; b) the active participation of a provincial 
official who happened to know a lot of subsidy channels; and c) the ‘green’ 
alderman from Maastricht, who actively promoted a more active citizenry. 
Coincidences and the way these were used seemed to play a role in relation 
to the socio-relational dimension. Some people were better able to ‘smell’ 
opportunities to get where they wanted to go. 
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In conclusion, one theoretical framework is often not enough to get to grips 
with complex situations such as the ones I studied. For example, the above 
points at the additional relevance of social-psychological theories. 
 
5.6.2 Positionality 
Rather than substantive ideas, ideas on how to design an interactive event 
were the starting point of our involvement as researchers in the Maastricht 
case. Our idea was that the event would have to be the start of a decision-
making process in which local knowledge and ideas would become the 
cornerstone of plans. Thus, in Maastricht it was the researchers’ intention 
to facilitate in starting up a dialogue between official policy makers and 
citizens, and then leave the follow-up process in the hands of local actors. 
This short-term involvement was rather different from our position in 
Biesland, where we played a more long-term role. There, we had for 
instance mediated decision-making at national and European level in 
particular. In Biesland, we had also been much more part of the initiative 
than in the Grensschap case. As far as the Grensschap was concerned, we 
were commissioned to support in writing a proposal for European funding 
of the ideas, but our role remained restricted to that. The situation also had 
to do with the ‘privatized’ position of the research institute. Activities of the 
researchers were always directly linked to the availability of funding, and 
indirectly to our own efforts made to acquire such funding. In Biesland, we 
had been far more active in this respect than in relation to the 
Grensschap26. 
 
Our restricted role in the Grensschap case implied risks. How could we 
know that the initiative was not just another event for the sake of 
‘participation’ that did not lead to longer-term collaboration in decision-
making? In this particular case, there was an active alderman taking 
responsibility for follow-up, who was re-elected27 when his first term was 
finished. But this was on the Dutch side. On the Belgian side, re-election of 
an alderman was perhaps not as important, as there seemed to be a more 
open culture anyway. Aspects like these certainly require further 
investigation.  
                                                        
26  Process-oriented work is increasingly becoming a field of expertise among 
Wageningen researchers. A similar trend can be observed in consultancy agencies. 
Not surprisingly the growth of this field of expertise runs parallel to the practice by 
municipalities and other government agencies of contracting out process facilitation 
work 
27  In the Netherlands, aldermen are not directed elected by citizens. In this case, the 
political party that the alderman represented obtained enough votes to be able to 
keep the alderman.  
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As far as our role was concerned: would process facilitation by the 
municipal officials themselves not have created a firmer embedding of the 
project in the municipal organizations? To some extent, this risk could be 
addressed by intensively preparing the event together with the officials. 
But the confines of a budget also implied for instance that we had to rely on 
the municipalities with regard to the question of who was invited. We could 
not verify whether certain groups would be left out, for instance. Our 
disappearance from the scene after the event meant that we could not take 
responsibility for follow-up activities. On the positive side, it also implied 
that the participants from the area (alderman, officials and citizens) had to 
do without our mediation in the aftermath of the event. In view of the fact 
that they would have to deal with each other in the future anyway, that 
was a good development. Our role remained restricted to the preparation of 
a good two-day programme that was likely to deliver results. With 
hindsight, it cannot be said that the contents of the programme ‘created’ 
the Grensschap, which I consider the most important output of the event. 
The event was also the occasion on which some of the participants met each 
other for the first time – which in itself may have been a major factor in 
their getting organized. 
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Chapter 6: From opposition to collaboration in the 
Loonsche Land 
6.1 Introduction 
The Efteling case provides another example of local actors undertaking an 
initiative to make a difference to the physical appearance of a specific 
territory. Key ‘local actors’ in this case were the Efteling, which is the 
Netherlands’ busiest and best-known theme park, and two nature 
organizations, namely Natuurmonumenten, which is a national 
organization with 913.000 members in 2007, and the Brabantse Milieu 
Federatie (BMF), a provincial branch of a network of twelve provincial 
environmental organizations. In former times, the Efteling and the nature 
organizations had primarily been enemies, opposing each other in court 
when the Efteling wanted to build accommodation on part of their land. 
After years of strife and deadlock, however, they chose to start to cooperate. 
In this new situation, they still had to cope with government bodies and 
their policies, of course. The role of the researchers was different from the 
other cases – here, they were hired by the theme park mainly because of 
their knowledge of landscape and ecology, while the theme park itself took 
the lead role in organizing and facilitating the process of plan development. 
The case also differed from the other two because the plans entirely 
concerned the theme parks’ own private land. Nevertheless, activities on 
that land could not remain a purely private affair, mainly because most of 
it was part of either the national or the provincial ecological network. The 
plans needed to be evaluated in terms of existing policy, especially since 
they included building activities. 
 
Section 6.2 contains a description of the area, with the aid of pictures and 
maps. This is followed by a summary of operative policy in section 6.3. 
Section 6.4 tells my story of what happened in the interaction of initiators 
and policy, and in 6.5 I will interpret the story once again by means of our 
questions: 
1. What was the origin of the initiative and how did it relate to then 
existing arrangements?  
2. How do discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest 
themselves over time, in the interaction between initiative and existing 
policy? 
3. Does the case point to sub-politicization, or can other structural 
transformations be discerned?  
Chapter 6 
150 
4. What types of space for policy innovation emerged as a consequence of 
the interactions? 
 
6.2 The area 
The Efteling is a famous theme park in the South of the Netherlands, in 
the Municipality of Loon op Zand, near the city of Tilburg. Having started 
as a sports park in 1933, the Efteling became a ‘fairy tale’ theme park in 
1952. The larger attractions such as the roller coasters are visible from a 
distance. The land owned by the Efteling foundation covers a larger area 
than the theme park itself, and also contains a golf course, a large car park, 
a former bungalow park in the forest called ‘the Kraanven’ (21 hectares), 
several other plots of land, and the sixty hectares of ‘the Loonsche Land’. It 
was the ‘Loonsche Land’ that was the focus of the new collaborative effort. 
The Efteling had had various plans for the ‘Loonsche Land’, none of which 
had been realized. Local people used the area for activities such as walking 
their dogs or jogging. It is a diverse area in which one can still make out the 
remnants of the former agricultural landscape, with wooded banks, small 
fields and sandy roads. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, many fields were planted with oak forest, used for its tannin in 
the growing tanning industry. With the introduction of synthetic tanning 
products, the oak wood was not needed anymore and the area passed out of 
use, except from a few fields of corn which were still being planted by 
neighbouring farmers. A large part of the area was then planted with birch 
trees. In the first half of the twentieth century, these provided for wood for 
the paper industry and timber for the mining industry (for supports in 
mining galleries). Later, invasive species like American bird cherry (‘forest 
pest’ in popular speech) gained ground and prevented other species from 
growing. The area in its present state was described by ecologists in the 
research team as ‘worn’ and ‘neglected’. 
 
On two sides of the Loonsche Land, there are nature areas: ‘Loonsche and 
Drunense Duinen’ (Dunes) in the East, and ‘Huis ter Heide’ in the 
Southwest. A provincial highway separates the Loonsche and Drunense 
Duinen from the Loonsche Land. To the South there are mainly farms, 
most of them intensive cattle farms. However, most of the farmers in this 
area expect to have to sell their land because of provincial policy decisions 
not to designate this area for this kind of farming. Much of the farmland 
has been handed over to Natuurmonumenten, due to nature compensation 
policy (mainly for the ring road around Tilburg). The largest population 
centre in the municipality Loon op Zand is Kaatsheuvel, located to the 
North-West of the Loonsche Land and the theme park.  
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Map 5: The Loonsche Land 
 
Alterra Top10smart 2006 
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Aerialphotograph 3: The Loonsche Land 
 
© Eurosense BV DKLN-2006 
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6.3 Operative policy  
In contrast to the other two cases, decision-making about the plans for the 
Loonsche Land did not depend on European level policies. Provincial and 
national policies did play an important role, however. Part of the Loonsche 
Land was part of the Main Ecological Structure, a spatial structure of 
protected areas. The entire area was part of the Provincial version of the 
ecological network. Therefore, building activities were not allowed, in 
theory. Exceptions could be made, however, if there was a “demonstrable 
and overriding societal importance”. In this case, the request to build 
should be accompanied by a plan containing measures to compensate for 
‘losses’ of nature, in an attempt to prevent an overall loss of nature values. 
‘Compensation in terms of amounts of hectares’ was prioritized over 
‘compensation in terms of quality of nature’. For instance, every ‘lost’ 
hectare of forest of an age in between 25 and 100 years, needed to be 
compensated by a factor of 1.66. This was partly an exercise on paper, 
because the compensation rule concerned the designation of an area. In 
other words, the issue was how it was labelled in the municipal and 
provincial zoning plans, rather than what kind of nature would actually 
exist in the area. There was also a preference for the compensation area to 
be located in the vicinity of the area that was to be built on and, in 
principle, outside ‘nature areas’ designated as Main Ecological Structure.  
 
The Forest Law, dating from 1961, imposed limits on tree-felling activities. 
The law required advanced notice of all felling activities, and that a felled 
tree should be replaced by a new tree, or compensated for in another 
location.  
 
The Flora and Fauna Law, which was at last operative from 2002, aimed to 
protect plant and animal species in their natural environments. Building 
activities in open space required a formal exemption in the scope of the 
Flora and Fauna Law. An application for such an exemption had to be 
accompanied by an overview of actual nature values, effects of planned 
activities and the projected nature compensation.  
 
The Loonsche Land was not a designated area in the framework of the EU 
Habitats or Birds directives. However, the adjacent area “Loonse and 
Drunense Dunes” was a Habitats directive area. This meant that the 
possible influences of building activities in the Loonsche Land on these 
dunes, had to be predicted and, if required, compensated for.  
 
The municipality of Loon op Zand had to incorporate building activities and 
all other physical transformations in their municipal zoning plan. The 
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municipality considered the Efteling as an important ‘motor’ for the local 
economy. It therefore usually supported activities of the Efteling that 
contributed to employment opportunities. 
 
Expansion policies of the Efteling itself were based on the assumption that 
it was vital for the future of the theme park to increase its numbers of 
visitors. At the time of writing, the park received about 3,5 million visitors 
per year. Competition with other parks was fierce: every theme park was 
trying to stay one step ahead of the others. The Efteling opened a new 
attraction almost every year. However, they did not think this was enough 
to keep them ahead of the competition. So the ‘Efteling Hotel’ was opened 
in 1992, and to accommodate more visitors and cater to a wider range of 
tastes and budgets, plans were made to build apartments on the adjacent 
land owned by the Efteling foundation. These plans had first been tabled in 
the eighties but only the hotel had been realized so far. Travel distances 
and times were considered a barrier to attracting more visitors, and 
facilities for staying overnight were seen as a solution to that problem. The 
management of the theme park expected that providing on-site 
accommodation would improve their chances of attracting people living 
further afield. In the view of the Efteling, such new markets were essential 
for them to ‘survive’ as an economically viable park.  
6.4 A story 
Tree houses and legal procedures 
Ever since the Efteling’s plans to build recreation apartments had seen the 
light of day, they had attracted a lot of attention. ‘Droomrijk’, as one of the 
plans was called, came out in the media at an early stage in the planning 
and decision-making process. The news led to various kinds of protests. 
Protests came from organizations such as ‘GroenFront’, Brabantse 
Milieufederatie (BMF) and Natuurmonumenten: three quite different types 
of organization. The ‘Groenfront’ is an internationally active action group. 
One of its strategies is to build houses in trees in order to prevent the trees 
from being felled. In the case of the Efteling, Groenfront created the 
‘Entenwoud’, referring to the books of Tolkien. Groenfront-activists lived in 
the Entenwoud tree houses for part of the week for about nine months. 
Their action received a considerable amount of (positive and negative) 
attention in the regional and national media.  
 
Natuurmonumenten, one of four official nature organizations in the 
Netherlands, generally focuses on the management of nature areas. When 
the Dutch government acquires land for the realization of the Main 
Ecological Structure, the land is handed over to one of four nature 
organizations, of which Natuurmonumenten is one. At the time of the 
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research, Natuurmonumenten had close to a million members. BMF, a 
provincial umbrella-organization of 130 provincial nature and environment 
organizations collaborates with governments, business and the public to 
achieve its goal of a sustainable society. But when attempts to collaborate 
are not successful, it takes legal action. In the case of the Efteling, 
Natuurmonumenten and the BMF cooperated closely - they worked 
together by filing legal protests against the plans. Their main criticism was 
that the required plans for nature compensation, which were attached to 
the building plans to comply with the provinces compensation policy, were 
not adequate to compensate for losses in terms of nature values. The 
documents in which they made their case contained lengthy explanations of 
the nature values of various involved elements of the area. Discussions 
focussed on the ecological value of fields of maize, which were described by 
the province and the Efteling as polluted dumping-places of pesticides and 
fertilizer, and by the nature organizations as an important food source for 
badgers. The discussion about the ecological value of the field of maize was 
important for the Province. They were afraid that it would create a 
precedent if the field were indeed pronounced valuable in the final 
judgement: the province North-Brabant contained a lot of such fields and 
officials foresaw problems if compensation could be exacted for all 
development activities on them. 
 
A newspaper article of April 2003 reports: 
 
“Efteling building plans stumble over nature compensation (…) The province 
North-Brabant, which had approved of the plans, considered the claims of the 
‘Brabantse milieufederatie’ and Natuurmonumenten completely unreasonable. 
For the building of the accommodation, only 9 hectares of forest were to be felled, 
according to the province. As compensation, the province of North-Brabant 
wished to replant 41 hectares of forest. The milieufederatie and 
Natuurmonumenten demanded 81 hectares compensation however” (ANP, 24 
april 2003). 
 
Clearly, the province took sides in favour of the plans of the theme park. In 
their view, the provincial compensation requirements had been met, and so 
the nature organizations would have to refrain from protesting. The 
municipality sided with the Efteling as well; the theme parks’ contribution 
to the local economy was important enough to strengthen the economic 
position of the company. Possibly as a consequence of that, there was no 
reason at that time for the Efteling to engage in negotiations with the 
nature organizations, except perhaps out of politeness. Looking back, an 
employee of the nature organizations Natuurmonumenten said about that: 
 
“If we had had open discussions earlier, then we would probably also have 
reached agreement earlier. The way in which the Efteling, the municipality and 
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the province related to each other at that time, however, gave rise to rigidity. 
When there is a will, the chances of success are greater if you try to keep 
governments out of it”.  
 
In autumn 2003, the Council of State annulled the case between Efteling 
and BMF, not because one of the two parties was announced to be ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ in its claims about the claimed amount of compensation hectares, 
but because procedural errors had been made. This decision naturally 
implied that building activity had to be delayed again for about two years. 
The legal procedure had to start all over again, and the Groenfront activists 
dismantled their tree-houses. 
 
An important step towards breaking the impasse that the legal procedures 
had created was a decision to collaborate on the basis of a new plan, rather 
than take legal action. A covenant was prepared, to consolidate the rules of 
the game. 
 
A breakthrough: a change of approach and language 
In May 2004, the Efteling, Brabantse Milieufederatie and Natuur-
monumenten entered into a covenant which summarized how they were 
going to bridge the differences of opinion of the past. What preceded that 
crucial step? The covenant did not appear out of the blue, for several 
reasons. Most important, nobody was really satisfied with the situation, 
which would only mean a further delay of a final decision. This created 
insecurity about who would win and who would lose, which was 
unsatisfactory in itself, and most of those involved wanted to come to a 
solution that would not create winners and losers. Now that the struggle 
had been going on for such a long time, the parties were almost ‘forced’ to 
think of alternatives. A report by archaeologists from the bureau RAAP 
about the ‘hidden’ stories about the area’s history which were covered by 
just a thin layer of sand and at times still visible, led the Efteling’s director 
of project development to think of a different approach. To ‘realize beds’, 
would still be the most important objective of the Efteling, but they would 
also invest in the enhancement of nature values in a wider area, especially 
to uncover these stories and make the wider area attractive for the visitors. 
That, in his view, would also distinguish the Efteling from other well-
known accommodation parks, such as Landal and Center Parks.  
 
Moreover, there was a more general trend towards seeking cooperation 
with other actors. In the context of the ‘Uitvoeringsprogramma 
tussengebied Kaatsheuvel-Tilburg,’ the three organizations, together with 
others, had already launched a dialogue to realize projects in the field of 
tourism and recreation. The Efteling had sought partnerships with societal 
organizations in other situations as well. In 2002, The Efteling opened up 
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the Pandadrome, an attraction which it established together with the 
World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). For WWF, the attraction (a three-
dimensional animation movie) was an opportunity to reach children and 
their parents and to try to make them more aware of ecological risks and 
the work of WWF in this field. The intensified contacts between 
Natuurmonumenten, BMF and the Efteling should also be placed in the 
context of this more general trend of building up partnerships – as should 
the increased contacts with organizations such as the archeological bureau 
RAAP, and Das and Boom (an active nature organization protecting the 
badger and its habitat - small-scale agricultural landscapes with small 
fields and nature elements such as twine hedges). Not surprisingly, the 
new coalitions between Efteling and societal organizations were not just a 
matter of charity. On several occasions, the Efteling emphasized that the 
financial benefits of collaboration were still their point of departure. The 
new ideas, even if not yet fully worked-out, were discussed with Das and 
Boom and the archaeologists. They helped to further elaborate the ideas, 
and their support was crucial. Later, the Efteling’s director of project 
development said that if Das and Boom had not supported the idea, he 
might not have pursued it.  
 
Likewise, the strategies of nature organizations had changed. In general, 
they were more inclined to look for coalitions with private enterprise. They 
realized that their past strategies had often not brought about the desired 
results. This trend could be observed more generally among nature and 
environmental organizations in the Netherlands at that time – and still 
today. 
 
The province also chose to take a different role after the decision of the 
Council of State. The executive of the province invited the three parties 
Efteling, BMF and Natuurmonumenten to the Provincial Office. In the 
meeting, he urged the parties to work on a solution together. The province, 
he said, would stay at a distance from then on, so that at the end they could 
form an ‘independent judgement’ about the outcome of the dialogue. 
 
After enthusiasm was aroused among Natuurmonumenten and BMF as 
well, the three parties decided to make a covenant. In the covenant, the 
Efteling and the nature organizations agreed about the maximum number 
of hectares that would be built, about the conditions that needed to be 
taken into account such as compensation requirements, about the style and 
character of the buildings, and about the organization of the follow-up 
process.  
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The covenant: 
 
“Parties commit themselves with this covenant, to make a joint effort to achieve 
an optimal result in terms of nature development which, at the same time, goes 
along with an economically feasible plan to realize accommodation and landscape 
design” (Convenant Efteling Verblijfsaccommodatie en Natuurontwikkeling dd 12 
mei 2004, translation by MB). 
 
This new approach implied changes in the policies of the three partners. All 
of them made compromises. The Efteling adjusted the number of 
apartments to be built: the number of projected beds was reduced from 
3600 to 2100. In their turn, Natuurmonumenten and BMF decided to 
conditionally assent to building development within an area that was a 
designated nature area and to refrain from further legal action as long as 
the plan was realized. Just as the initiators at the Efteling had to defend 
their new approach to the shareholders, who had to gain confidence in the 
financial viability of the undertaking, the nature organizations had to 
defend their new policy within their organizations. What the latter feared 
most was that the example would provide a precedent for other building 
activities in nature areas. They therefore emphasized that the 
accommodation should be realized on the fields of corn and not destroy 
ecologically valuable parts of the area. The fear of precedents played a role 
both before and during this new ‘phase’ of collaboration. As far as 
precedents were concerned, there was another version of the story as well. 
The consultant who was commissioned by the Efteling to do the 
preparatory work for getting the plans through policy procedures said: 
 
“BMF demanded too much of the Efteling. They are getting much more 
compensation than required according to provincial policy. That is a dangerous 
development. In another example, I experience now that the BMF is doing the 
same – asking too much and at the same time threatening to file legal complaints 
if their demands are not met.” 
 
However, from the signing of the covenant on, both the directors of the two 
nature organizations and the relevant director and personnel from the 
Efteling defended the road taken and did not mention such excessive 
demands or their potential adverse effects on future initiatives. 
 
The covenant made mention of two ‘phases’ of building activities. The first 
phase, located to the South-West of the theme park, consisted of 16 
hectares. The Efteling and the nature organizations laid down in the 
covenant how they would deal with compensation requirements for the 
development of these hectares. These 16 hectares would have to be 
compensated according to the provincial compensation policy. A simple sum 
explained that 16 hectares times 1,66 would need to be compensated, plus 5 
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hectares times 0,33 of an adjacent forest patch that would probably be 
‘disturbed’. That would make a total of 28,4 hectares which needed to be 
compensated. The covenant included the exact lots that would serve for 
compensation, totalling 29,8 hectares, 1,4 hectares more than required 
(Covenant 12 May 2004). This was a quantitative approach that was partly 
‘compensation on paper’. In this case for instance, giving up building claims 
that had been previously approved but never realized, was considered as 
compensation. In physical terms, most of the ‘compensation-hectares’ for 
the first ‘phase’ of the plan consisted of ‘the Kraanven’, a deserted park 
with 42 holiday homes, at 1,5 kilometres from the theme park itself. The 42 
holiday homes had been demolished at the end of the eighties. The quality 
of the forest in the Kraanven was higher than that of most of the forest in 
the Loonsche Land. The right to build and exploit 180 such holiday homes 
was still operative at the time of the annulment of the compensation plans 
by the Council of State. Later the cancellation of a permit to build, and the 
simultaneous designation of the area as ‘nature area’ rather than 
‘recreation area’ in the municipal zoning plan, was agreed on as 
compensation (for phase one). Meanwhile, this did not change the physical 
appearance of the area. 
 
The approach to the second phase, located to the South East of the theme 
park, was rather different. For this phase, a plan still had to be elaborated. 
The covenant stated that for the second phase, ‘bureau’ Alterra would be 
commissioned to advise about the design of the area, and that the same 
bureau would give a final, binding judgment on the nature values. The 
reputation of this institute for ecological affairs made it a trustworthy 
partner for Natuurmonumenten and BMF as well. The first contact 
between the Efteling and Alterra came about through a director of the 
World Wildlife Fund. He knew of the work of the institute and when he 
heard about the Efteling’s plans to realize accommodation in an ecologically 
sound way, he brought the researchers into contact with the Efteling’s 
director of project development. Their visions on the potential future of the 
Loonsche Land appeared to be very compatible.  
  
The covenant was signed on the 12th of May 2004, one day before the 
director of the Brabantse Milieufederatie resigned. Relief about the new 
approach was conveyed in the BMF’s press release: 
 
“In the common plan that was presented today, the quality of nature is put first, 
instead of sticking to the letter of the rules and regulations (‘rekenregeltjes’)” 
(www.brabantsemilieufederatie.nl, 17 May 2007, translation MB). 
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According to the press release, the departing director made a point of 
having the covenant signed before his departure. In a press release of his 
organization, he said: 
 
“We have had many meetings with the Efteling and there were considerable 
differences of opinion. With this covenant we can close that chapter. We are 
positive about the future and we are convinced that there are opportunities for 
nature/landscape and appropriate recreation in the entire area” 
(www.brabantsemilieufederatie.nl, translation by MB). 
 
In the same press release, the deputy director of Natuurmonumenten at 
that time was equally positive about the covenant. His emphasis was on the 
ability of parties to look beyond their own interests: 
 
“Because the parties, as good neighbours, were able to look beyond their own 
interest, a much better plan has come into being. (…) In this case it is not just 
‘Longneck’ (a well-known attraction of the Efteling) who has stuck out its neck, 
but the board of directors of the Efteling as well!” (ibid.) 
 
The Chairman of the Board of the Efteling was also given the floor. He was 
a bit more cautious: 
 
“In the course of the meetings it became clear to us that we had to let go of the 
original plans for ‘Droomrijk’. We are therefore making new plans. First the 
feasibility of these plans will have to be assessed within our organization. Then 
we will have to go through juridical procedures. The covenant is a good point of 
departure, but it still offers no security for the realization of the plans” (ibid.). 
 
The covenant was endorsed by both nature organizations in the process 
that followed, despite changes of leadership at the BMF. BMF made an 
arrangement with Natuurmonumenten so that the latter could represent 
the former, for instance in the project group that would be established to 
supervise the elaboration of a plan. When explicitly invited, BMF did 
participate in the meetings, however. All parties saw the covenant as a 
solid basis for creating a ‘win-win’ solution in which nature development 
and increased opportunities for recreation and business development could 
go hand in hand. 
 
In the covenant, it was stated that the BMF and Natuurmonumenten 
would: 
 
“refrain from the submission of complaints (‘zienswijzen en bedenkingen’) and 
from entering appeals against spatial plans such as referred to in this covenant, 
as long as the Efteling operates within the limits laid down in the covenant with 
regard to the plan development” (ibid.). 
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The parties also agreed to hold discussions among themselves if ‘third 
parties’ (private or public) in any way tried to impede or seriously delay the 
realization of the plans.  
 
It was not always clear who took the lead in convincing the Efteling and the 
nature organizations to establish a dialogue and consolidate agreements in 
a covenant. According to one account, it was the member of the Provincial 
Executive responsible for the issue who initiated the revival of the dialogue 
between BMF and the Efteling, just after the rejection of the nature 
compensation proposal by the Council of State. In another account, the 
departing chairman of BMF had played a vital role, since he wanted to 
come to a conclusion before his resignation. The Efteling emphasized that 
they urged him to give himself this ‘farewell-present’. Also, the journalist 
who reported most often on the Efteling urged the member of the provincial 
executive to call for a dialogue in a prominent editorial article. Lastly, the 
Ministry of ANF said that they too had recommended dialogue.  
 
Perhaps it was the deadlock that everybody wanted to break that provided 
the most important incentive to start to think of creative solutions and to 
adopt a different language. When that created an opening, all parties 
reported being glad that the lengthy legal procedures seemed to belong to 
the past, and they all emphasized that a compromise had been made that 
they were very positive about. The Efteling could at last continue with all 
the necessary procedures, elaborate the plans further and set about 
convincing the board of shareholders. It was financially attractive that 
nature compensation could be done on their own property, without having 
to purchase additional land. They also saw the advantages of creating a 
landscape that would be attractive for visitors. Therefore the investment in 
the land on which they would not build, served more than just the purpose 
of realizing accommodation. 
 
The making of a new plan 
In line with the ideas which had been incorporated in the covenant, the 
researchers started creating a plan that would combine the best of both 
worlds – helping both to preserve the natural and the historical values of 
the area, and to enable a profit-making theme park to build accommodation 
for tourism purposes. They tried to create a link beteen the Efteling’s 
tradition of fairy-tales and stories and the ‘real’ history of the Loonsche 
Land. At first the researchers were seen more as researchers who were able 
to assess ecological values than as possible designers of a landscape that 
would tell a ‘story’. The researchers stayed ‘on location’ for a week to 
interview various stakeholders and to get a feel for the area. In the 
interviews, the Ministry of ANF emphasized that it was important for them 
that Natuurmonumenten and BMF would support the plan. From both 
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sides, the officials involved told the team of researchers ‘just to make a good 
plan which would gain the support of the nature organizations’. The 
provincial officials for their part pointed at the legal provision in their 
nature compensation policy for making creative exceptions to compensation 
norms as long as nature would be better off. 
 
The work on the premises of the Efteling allowed the researchers to be in 
frequent touch with the personnel involved at the Efteling, the 
commissioner of their work. At the end of the week, they presented their 
first ideas. By that time, they had the contours of a plan that was 
compatible with the covenant, mainly because they had been inspired by 
the field visits and the stories of two archaeologists who had done in-depth 
research in the area and knew a lot about its history. Both during and after 
this week, the signatories of the covenant and the researchers kept in touch 
about the plan.  
 
During the period of plan development, the Efteling brought together a 
‘sounding board group’ on three occasions. The group was composed of the 
signatories of the covenant, as well as of all the other government parties 
involved, the archaeologists of RAAP and Das en Boom. 
 
The researchers elaborated the ideas which had been summarized in the 
covenant: restoring the varied cultural landscape of wooded banks, sandy 
roads, heather and meadows. They proposed conserving the remains of 
beech lanes and a beech forest the size of a football-field, as well as the 
century-old oak coppice, which would need to be restored by replanting. 
Beyond this, a lot of work would need to be done in order to keep the 
landscape in its historical state, and not let it fall prey to natural processes 
like those that led to the forest’s current neglected state. Suggestions 
included letting a flock of sheep graze the heather and grass meadows. The 
heather would replace the exhausted forest that characterized much of the 
area at the time of the project. A shepherd would look after the sheep and 
once tourists started to visit the area, could tell them about the area and 
the local folklore. The picture resembled the closed cycle of a mediaeval 
farming system. These ideas were derived from the ‘Farming for Nature’ 
idea described in Chapter four with reference to the Biesland case (include 
a diagram of a closed cycle). The sheep would provide for manure for the 
meadows, the grass would be the fodder of the sheep. The wooded banks 
would provide fuel for the houses. The visitors might maintain the wooded 
banks by cutting the branches and burning these in their fireplaces. 
Reintroducing heather was an important element of the plan, and would 
require the felling of a considerable part of the forest. The accommodation 
itself would only be realized on the cornfields which were currently heavily 
fertilized.  
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Figure 8: Drawing of closed nutrient cycle 
 
The plan strongly emphasized the coherence of the area with the 
neighbouring Loonsche and Drunensche Duinen in the West and Huis ter 
Heide in the Southeast. This was in accordance with the ideas of 
Natuurmonumenten and the BMF, who aimed to restore heather in these 
areas too. When it was finished, the plan did gain the support of the 
signatories of the covenant.  
 
From outside the team, the organization Das en Boom voiced its criticism 
at one of the steering committee meetings. Das en Boom focused on the role 
of the badger and the landscapes that the badger required. Das en Boom 
proposed felling far more trees than the plan did. In the steering committee 
meeting, they even referred to the plan as a ‘weak-kneed compromise’. The 
plan was adjusted after discussions on the prepared maps (which were 
multi-interpretable and could also be seen from an angle more in line with 
the ideas of Das and Boom), a visit to Das en Boom by one of the 
researchers and the designer of the map, and perhaps most importantly, 
careful support by the two nature organizations which had signed the 
covenant. More woven fences were added to the plan and some more of the 
existing forest was replaced by heather. The colours on the map were 
adjusted in order to make the transformation of forest into heather more 
visible. Interestingly, the changes made the plan even more contestable in 
view of formal policies: more trees would need to be felled. There seemed to 
be no cause for concern, however, because the parties involved were 
enthusiastic. 
 
From opposition to collaboration in the Loonsche Land 
 
 165 
The Efteling organized a meeting to present the ideas to provincial decision 
makers. In this meeting, the provincial delegates were once again 
optimistic about the chances of approval, as long as there was a convincing 
account of the effects on nature and how these would be compensated, in 
line with their policy. It had already been decided that the researchers 
would add a separate chapter to their report about the consequences of the 
plan for nature values.  
 
Natuurmonumenten made clear its enthusiasm about the plan as well. 
When I asked a representative of Natuurmonumenten how he felt in Spring 
2007, as the plan was about to be realized, he stated 
 
“It is a story that is hard to retell. The activities of the Groenfront for instance, 
which had nothing to do with us, in a way helped push to find a positive outcome. 
Now they also look at the plan as their success. And the badger who suddenly 
appeared in the area! That was a co-incidence that some thought we had 
organized, but which was really that, a co-incidence that nevertheless 
reconfirmed that it was important to make a plan that was good for nature”. 
 
Confrontation with existing policy – translation into operative policy 
Even though government parties had also claimed to have been the main 
instigator of the new approach, some of them still expressed their worries 
about policy directives which they feared would not be met. The member of 
the provincial executive voiced his concern about the plan because it went 
further than requirements in existing policy. Wasn’t it possible that the 
nature compensation would be too much? The Efteling reacted by stating 
that provincial policy offered a ‘minimum limit’ for compensation, and did 
not mention the provinces’ view that the nature organizations had 
demanded too much. Besides, officials of the province, who had become 
enthusiastic about what they saw emerging, pointed again at the 
possibilities for making exceptions offered by existing policy. Nevertheless, 
the participants in the meetings and the respondents in the interviews 
focused consistently on the terms of the forest law and nature 
compensation policy. With respect to the first two laws, which were in force 
nationally, the Ministry of ANF gave the province greater responsibility. As 
far as nature compensation policy was concerned, this division of 
responsibilities made sense to all parties. The province of North-Brabant 
was proud of its nature compensation policy, which was more elaborated 
and set stricter targets than the nature compensation policies of other 
provinces (Kuindersma et al. 1999). With respect to the Forest Law, 
however, the division of responsibilities were less clear. In an interview at 
ANF, it appeared that the Forest Law was assumed to be incorporated in 
the provincial nature compensation policy. During the process, 
stakeholders from the province, the Ministry, and the nature organizations 
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emphasized that the Forest Law was old and outdated. Initially, it was 
frequently cited as a possible ‘threat’ to the aim of converting forest into 
heather. The Forest Law’s main principle was that wherever trees were 
cut, they should be replaced by the same number of trees in an adjacent 
area. But in this case, the Efteling, Natuurmonumenten and BMF agreed 
that this was not desirable, since a forest monoculture was exactly what 
they did not want here. Rather, they wanted to restore heather, as part of a 
diverse, small-scale landscape consisting of different elements. BMF and 
Natuurmonumenten defended the plan as enrichment of the nature values 
in the area. They also continued to emphasize that the argumentation 
behind such plans should be solid, and that it should not be seen as a 
‘precedent’ for other building activities in nature areas or for other felling 
operations. BMF adds, in their first reaction to the plan, that  
 
“it should be very clear that BMF only accepts encroachments within in the Main 
Ecological Structure in cases where both the ecological values and the landscape 
and cultural-historical values which return after realization, are greater than in 
the present situation” (Written reaction to the plan by BMF, July 2005). 
 
The Ministry of ANF initially chose to stay at a distance. In view of the 
budgetary cuts and decrease of personnel, they said that they would leave 
involvement with individual projects such as these to the province. 
Nevertheless, aware of the obstacles that the Ministry could raise in a later 
stage, the Efteling persisted in trying to get in touch with ANF. They 
succeeded in getting the Ministry on board at a ‘policy workshop’ organized 
in summer 2005, when a concept of the plan was finished, with the 
objective of identifying possible obstacles and agreeing upon the actions 
needed to overcome these obstacles. The initiative for this meeting came 
from the Efteling, but all the stakeholders were present. The province even 
sent four delegates. To emphasize the importance that the Efteling 
attached to the workshop, the director of the Efteling opened the meeting 
and participated in it.  
 
At the workshop, it emerged that it was not clear who should take action 
with respect to the Forest Law, due to a recent transfer of responsibilities 
from the Ministry of ANF to the province. Meanwhile, the Forest Law had 
been discussed in several meetings and had been presented as a potential 
barrier to the plan. The necessity of replacing every felled tree by a new 
tree was once again played down. Both Ministry and provincial officials 
adopted an ‘exploratory’ attitude at this workshop however and tried to find 
ways to help each other to take the procedural steps needed in order to 
move on. As one policy official of the province said at the workshop: 
 
From opposition to collaboration in the Loonsche Land 
 
 167 
“The provincial nature compensation policy is meant for the realization of ‘red’ 
developments in ‘green’ areas. The replacement of green with another type of 
green is another thing. 
Looking at the contents of the plan, it seems that there are sufficient arguments 
to convince decision makers about the amount of nature compensation taking 
place in relation to the building development. For the second type of 
transformation, we need to establish new policy and here the Forest Law may 
create problems” (4 July 2005). 
 
The openness at the meeting contributed to an atmosphere in which policy 
became ‘just’ a hurdle that needed to be taken in a collaborative effort. One 
of the proposed solutions was to ‘split up’ the plan into two parts – one for 
the realization of houses on the former maize fields and a second one for the 
transformation of forest into heather. The participants did not expect the 
first part to pose big problems – the number of ‘beds’ was reduced and 
housing development would be restricted to the (polluted) corn-fields.  
 
In the end, it appeared that the problem could be solved: the maps of 
‘nature target types’ that the province made could be adjusted and what 
was at present indicated as ‘forest’ would need to be adjusted into ‘heather’. 
Also present at the July 2005 meeting was the consultancy agency which 
was specialized in spatial planning and other policy procedures and which 
advised the Efteling about its applications for permits, changes of 
municipal zoning schemes, and the argumentations behind nature 
compensation. Their reports would always elaborate in legal and quantita-
tive detail how the plans would match with government policies. They 
contained precise estimations of, for example, hectares to be compensated, 
species that would probably be affected and numbers of visitors that could 
be expected. During the meeting, one of the consultants presented maps 
and calculations to show how the obligation of nature compensation would 
be met. It led the discussion in the direction of the way of thinking implied 
in nature compensation policy, and the corresponding language needed by 
the policy officials to get the plans through their organizations.  
 
For the researchers, the meeting in July 2005 was their last activity at the 
Efteling. It was a positive ending, and a cautious expectation was expressed 
by some of the participants that the plan might be implemented earlier 
than originally expected. On the other hand, the meeting had also shown 
that the new language that had brought the parties together could not 
replace the language of hectares and legal requirements. Every detail of the 
plan would need to be translated back again into the conditions and 
language of established policy in order to get the plans further. After the 
meeting, the researchers finished their report. For the time being, it had to 
be kept ‘under embargo’. The most important reason was that the Efteling 
itself still needed to present it to their board of Commissioners. Offering 
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holiday accommodation was a new economic activity for the Efteling, it was 
argued. The board of Commissioners still needed convincing of the qualities 
of the plan. 
 
State of the Art 2007 
Meanwhile, the agreements made at the meeting in July 2005 were carried 
forward. As I already mentioned, on the ‘nature target types’ map of the 
province, the forest was indeed replaced by heather. The other required 
changes, such as the amendment in the municipal zoning plan, were dealt 
with as a revision of that plan. In September 2006, the media reported the 
agreement between the Efteling, Natuurmonumenten and BMF about the 
building of apartments and luxurious bungalows in exchange for nature 
compensation. It was announced that building work would start on phase 
one of the recreation facilities, with the working title ‘Bosrijk’, in 2007.  
 
A considerable amount of (costly) work still needed be done however. 
Whereas the agreements made at the workshop were smoothly dealt with, 
two other hurdles came as unpleasant surprises. First, new legislation on 
particulate matter put a stop to all building activities in the province of 
Brabant. From January 2005 onwards, all countries in the European Union 
had to meet standards which had been agreed upon at European level. 
These standards related to the deposition of particulate matter caused by 
increased traffic once the accommodation was in use. This appeared to 
necessitate computations which, according to the Efteling’s legal advisor, 
were first not clear, then gave results that were too high, were then 
repeated and the problem was suddenly solved. This delayed the process for 
a year. A second hurdle appeared to be the policy on ‘odour nuisance, which 
included so called ‘odours circles’. That put a weapon into the hands of a 
local pig farmer who feared that his opportunities to expand would be 
limited by the recreational activities on neighbouring land. Calculations 
were made to assess the amount of accommodation which could be built 
under the policy which included a maximum level of odour nuisance, and 
would need to protect leisure-seekers in the accommodation. The 
calculations amounted to approval for building one third of the planned 
number of residences, far too little to make the undertaking financially 
attractive for the Efteling. The pig breeder still threatened to oppose the 
change of the municipal zoning plan, but he was bought out by the Efteling, 
so that the rules with regard to odour nuisance were also met. The 
submitted municipal zoning plan did not provoke any further reactions and 
was approved of. 
 
To avoid turmoil before all the hurdles had been taken, the Efteling, BMF 
and Natuurmonumenten had hoped to avoid exposure in the media in the 
autumn of 2006, and to bring the ‘news’ together, in a joint press 
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conference. However, they were pre-empted by a journalist present at a 
meeting at the Efteling about financial affairs, who went to press. 
  
The building of accommodation in phase two would depend on the financial 
results of phase one. As far as phase two was concerned, the ‘green part’ 
was discussed with a farmers’ organization (ZLTO) that might be able to 
play a role in managing the land, and the flock of sheep in particular. The 
European Centre for Nature Conservation, a European networking 
organization with its office in Tilburg, was asked to look into the 
possibilities for obtaining European subsidies for that part of the project. At 
the time of writing, these discussions were still of an exploratory nature. 
For the Efteling, the prior implementation of the green part of the plan had 
the advantage of allowing the hedgerows and heather to develop before 
guests started coming. It also made it possible to phase the tree felling and 
avoid attracting too much negative attention from people who did not know 
what was going on, employees of the Efteling said.  
 
6.5 Interpretation 
6.5.1 The origin of the initiative 
The collaborative initiative that was consolidated in the 2004 covenant had 
its origin in a commonly felt need to finish with the long-lasting legal 
procedures that had characterized the interaction between the Efteling and 
the nature organizations for such a long time. The costs of these legal 
procedures were high and it was frustrating for both the Efteling and the 
nature organizations that the Council of State dropped the case in the end 
because of procedural errors. Thus, no positive results were achieved for 
any of the parties. The nature organizations could not be sure that 
anything good for nature would result in the long run and the Efteling 
could not pursue its plans for accommodation on its premises. A new 
process was predicted to take another two years. 
 
In the process, nature compensation policy in particular was interpreted in 
different ways by the rivals. The nature organizations claimed that the 
Efteling needed to compensate for far more hectares than the Efteling had 
planned for in its compensation plan. Thus, the initiative originated in a 
legal struggle about differing interpretations of existing policy and the 
widely diverging physical claims of the opposing parties. A deadlock ensued 
in the continued absence of a decision by the legal institutions. Everybody 
wanted a way out and when an idea was launched that provided for such a 
way out, the parties agreed on a covenant that set the conditions for it. 
That decision marked a break with earlier confrontations between the 
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Efteling, the nature organizations and the government’s policy-making 
institutions. The way emphasis on quantitative standards in the 
regulations did not stimulate stakeholders to think of solutions that might 
disregard the quantitative norms, and yet be beneficial to all concerned. 
This experience of legal battles and land claims points at a process of 
juridification and a connected requirement to quantify plans and 
projections that was, in the end, counter-productive. It did, on the other 
hand, give rise to a new type of cooperation.  
 
6.5.2 Discourse, actors, rules and resources 
This section takes up the second question of the research: How did 
discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest themselves over 
time, in the interaction between initiative and existing policy? 
 
Various discourses can be discerned in the above story, at various levels. I 
will concentrate on two which I find crucial to a better understanding of the 
interaction of the new initiative with existing policy. I call the first 
discourse the ‘nature compensation discourse’. For instance, every hectare 
of forest (of a certain age) that was developed for accommodation needed to 
be replaced by 1,66 hectare of nature. 
  
This nature compensation discourse, on paper or otherwise, is still firmly 
embedded in provincial and national policy. Paradoxically, it has its 
counterpart in the economic discourse that focuses purely on the economic 
advantages of accommodation development. In this case, the compensation 
discourse gave rise to fierce opposition between actors representing 
building activities and actors representing nature. It ‘made’ each of them 
think in terms of their own interests. For a long time, the compensation 
idea was reproduced in this struggle because the hostility that character-
ized these interactions militated against the finding of collaborative 
approaches which might make a win-win solution possible. With a court 
decision still pending and the process on the verge of being repeated all 
over again – in other words, with the situation only getting worse – 
everybody wanted a way out. 
 
The discourse that provided such a way out was more integral and 
qualitative in character. It addressed the area as a whole and got its 
inspiration from stories behind the landscape. The change of language even 
led the parties involved to look beyond the 60 hectares belonging to the 
Efteling at the advantages of and for that larger area. ‘Economy’ and 
‘nature’, were no longer viewed as contradictory or incompatible. It boiled 
down to the imposition of ecological conditions on the building of 
apartments and it also emphasized the overall improvement of the area in 
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terms of nature values and cultural history. This second discourse implied 
a new rule of the game: commitment to a covenant, which meant a change 
of mentality to thinking in terms of cooperation instead of conflict.  
 
The shift from operating through legal procedures to engaging in face-to-
face discussions and to commitment to a covenant implied a different way 
of looking. In terms of contents, both parties had to take on a broader 
outlook and widen their perspective to include the perspective of their 
former enemy, without giving up their own point of view. Thus, the Efteling 
no longer ‘just’ promoted its building plans, and the nature organizations 
no longer ‘just’ focussed on quantitative compensation of nature values, 
although each party kept their primary interests and concerns, thus 
keeping their positions clear. In the light of the new idea and their adoption 
of the covenant, the former opponents both now needed to think of options 
for combining nature development with the building of accommodation. 
This shift from thinking in terms of litigation towards thinking in terms of 
cooperation can be called a discursive shift. It entailed a change of rules of 
the game, actor coalitions and allocation of resources. Where conflict had 
dominated, cooperation now became the key word for the new approach. 
Even if their aims (such as the realization of beds and the protection of 
nature values) remained the same, the participating actors were aware of 
the need for flexibility in order to open up a way to create a new plan that 
was different.  
 
At various points in the process, the stakeholders seemed to be caught 
between two stools: the compensation rules and the new perspective. 
Adopting the two languages, one for interacting with the local actors and 
one for trying to get the plans accepted in their own organization, did 
enable them to realize the plan in the specific situation of the Loonsche 
Land. On the other hand, it also meant that the approach that had 
transformed the former enemies into collaborators did not give rise to wider 
policy implications. 
 
It remains to be seen whether in the course of the years the new discourse 
and the accompanying practices will remain an incident or will become 
more widely embedded in the policy-making institutions. Whereas area-
oriented approaches building on collaboration between various public and 
private parties were gaining ground, the fundamental principles of the 
Nature Compensation discourse, whose built-in bias towards claim-making 
behaviour had triggered the confrontational approach, continued to hold 
sway. The most remarkable aspect of this is perhaps that there was so little 
discussion about the enabling and constraining effects of compensation 
policy. Fear of setting precedents played an important role in this. 
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Those officials who had been involved in the plan making intensively 
enough to start to see the new form of collaboration as a solution to earlier 
deadlocks found themselves in two worlds. Most of them did what they 
could to make the initiative possible within the limits of existing policy. In 
an evaluative discussion one of the Efteling directors mentioned this as a 
crucial success factor: 
 
“You have to carry on and look for officials who actually like the new plans. Then 
they start to look at possibilities. Mostly people are more likely to contact 
politicians, but in my experience you have to find the right officials who are 
willing to communicate and to turn doors that are left open into wide open doors”. 
 
As already indicated, what the officials could not do was to ‘raise’ the level 
of the discussion from that of one specific case to a debate on some of the 
fundamental points of departure of the policies themselves, in which 
precedents or ‘exceptions’ simultaneously form a way out and a danger.  
 
The above gives rise to the following overview, in terms of the scheme: 
structural conditioning ? social interaction ? structural elaboration. 
 
Structural Conditioning Social Interaction Structural Elaboration 
Existing arrangement: 
nature compensation 
primarily by means of 
quantitative approach. 
The arrangement is a 
confrontational one – it 
brings with it spatial 
claims and rivalry about 
those claims. 
Coming about of new 
discourse and new 
coalition. Former enemies 
commit to new idea which 
is eventually ‘stabilized’ in 
a covenant. It is a means 
of changing the situation 
at t=1. The qualities of the 
area as a whole start to 
play a more important role 
and parties make 
attempts to get to an 
integrated solution. 
While the covenant is 
implemented for the most 
part, the question remains 
what systematic 
implications will come of 
it. The reason why I am 
doubtful about this is that 
the new plan, 
encompassing the new 
discourse, is translated 
back into the t=1-
discourse in order to be 
implemented. It depends 
on whether there will be 
fundamental discussion 
about how existing rules 
relate to the new discourse 
and about potential 
consequences of the new 
approach for policy and 
policy practices. 
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6.5.3 Sub-politicization 
The question whether this case is a manifestation of sub-politicization can 
be answered from more than one angle. To illustrate this I wish to quote 
from a newspaper article in which a member of the provincial executive 
expressed his perspective on the initiative by the Efteling, BMF and 
Natuurmonumenten after they had entered into the covenant and started 
preparations on the making of a new plan: 
 
“ With their decision about the creation of new nature South of the Efteling, both 
parties, according to [the provincial executive], went further than the 
democratically developed nature compensation policy of the province. “Since BMF 
did not succeed with us, they tried to get their way by other means”, the 
executive for spatial planning said (…) in a debate with the BMF director (…) 
 
According to [the provincial executive], after losing the case at the Council of 
State, the Efteling calculated how long a new hearing would take and how much 
it would cost. “The company compared these costs with the costs of an agreement 
with BMF. The outcome of this calculation was a covenant between both parties. 
If this becomes a trend, it will erode democracy” The BMF director was of the 
opinion that this way of reasoning was nonsense: “At the Efteling, we have 
achieved a wonderful result for nature and landscape” (Brabants Dagblad 10 
September 2004).  
 
Clearly, this member of the provincial executive saw the new coalition and 
the way it operated as an undemocratic undertaking because ‘deals’ were 
made that led to outcomes that were different from those that would have 
followed from sticking to (democratically developed) official policy. On the 
other hand, he had chosen to stay at a distance himself, and had stimulated 
the parties to come to an agreement by themselves “while taking into 
account the rules”. This raises a couple of questions. One question is: what 
alternatives did they have for breaking the deadlock they were in? After all, 
voters were not likely to be any keener on new and costly procedures for 
taking the case to the highest public court, the Council of State. Nor had 
established rules such as the one stipulating a 1,66 level of compensation 
been subject to a democratic vote. As a representative of democratically 
established policy, the member of the provincial executive criticized the 
parties to the covenant for having offered more compensation than was 
officially required. While he described this as an undemocratic act, it could 
also be perceived as a matter of competence. Was the province still in 
control or had the lead been taken over by the new coalition? A second 
question, then, is whether the case therefore exemplifies a trend towards 
sub-politicization. The process remained largely an internal affair. From 
the signing of the covenant onwards, the three parties remained silent to 
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the outside world about what they had agreed on, for several reasons. The 
main one was that the actors from the Efteling wanted time to present the 
details of the plan to the shareholders and the board of commissioners. 
They were also keen to avoid further action by Green Front activists. On 
the one hand, then, there is reason to suggest that private actors took 
charge from below. Yet, on the other hand, their practice was not very open 
to other interested parties. 
 
A further consideration is that, even though BMF and Natuurmonumenten 
are donor organizations, their internal participation procedures are still 
limited. With this in mind, it would be going too far to speak of the case as 
a manifestation of sub-politicization, insofar as sub-politicization is 
understood as a democratizing trend. On the other hand, in line with Beck’s 
concepts, we can say that by entering into a cooperative relationship, the 
three organizations ‘shaped developments from below’. They prevented 
continued legal rivalry and committed themselves to a common plan.  
 
The Efteling case is also an interesting example when viewed from the 
perspective of depoliticization, the structural process that I hypothesized 
about in relation to the previous cases. One possible indicator of 
depoliticization was the way in which, as I have indicated, the planning 
process was a relatively ‘closed’ process, with a limited number of actors 
involved. For this reason, what had in fact already been decided and laid 
down in the covenant in spring 2004, only reached the public in autumn 
2006, due to the intervention of a journalist who released the news before 
the three parties had organized their intended common press conference. A 
second sign of depoliticization was the lack of debate in official policy-
making arenas about the possible wider policy implications of the entire 
process, including the way in which the compensation discourse had given 
rise to deadlock. On the contrary, the contents of the plan had to be 
translated into existing policy terms in order to be accepted by the policy-
making bodies. 
 
6.5.4 Space for policy innovation 
As in the Biesland and the Grensschap cases, with their quite different 
actor coalitions and spatial configurations, a picture emerges in the 
Loonsche Land case of a policy arrangement which is dynamic and stable at 
the same time. The seeds for policy innovation were sown in the direct 
interaction between the private company, the Efteling, and the non-
governmental organizations. Initially, they exchanged the compensation 
discourse for a more integral discourse and invested in research, and in 
dialogue with parties such as archaeologists and Das and Boom. They 
started to work on the basis of their own rules of the game (the covenant 
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and the statements in the covenant about how to deal with conflicts for 
instance). However, this practice was not applied to thinking about of wider 
policy implications - it could not be raised from the level of one innovative 
project to that of a debate about policy innovation. In terms of discourse 
and actor coalitions, eye-catching shifts took place. The Efteling and the 
nature organizations moved towards each other by expressing their trust in 
and commitment to a solution that would be satisfactory for both. Their 
communication was no longer about who ‘won’ or who ‘lost’. The change in 
the contents of the approach was accompanied by a change in their rules of 
the game, embodied in the covenant. Disputing each other through court 
was replaced by a more harmonious approach. Officials from the relevant 
policy-making bodies, the province in particular, also played a constructive 
role in getting the agreement to a successful conclusion. 
 
As stated, the simultaneous occurrence of these changes and the hitherto 
little-debated basis for institutionalized rules, has not yet been 
problematized. In terms of space for innovation, this has meant that the 
space granted did not reach further than the discretionary space that 
officials made use of to foster this initiative, in this specific territory. 
 
6.6 The relational dimension and my own positionality 
6.6.1 Socio-relational factors 
The institutional analysis that I presented in the foregoing surely leaves 
parts of the “Efteling” story untold. For instance, the greatest creativity 
and positive expectations surfaced when people met and started to share 
their stories about the area. I experienced this personally through our 
cooperation with the archaeologists. Through them, we were able to look at 
a history of the Loonsche Land which was hidden beneath the surface. 
Their enthusiasm, the connections that some of the researchers could make 
with features of the landscape that were still partly visible, and the 
encouragements to invent an attractive story for future visitors, brought 
the area to life. This experience and the positive reactions to the ideas it 
engendered formed the basis for the plan. The territory itself and the way it 
contained its story (in this situation mediated mostly by the 
archaeologists), seemed to play a substantial role in making people 
enthusiastic. The ‘click’ factor, and the feeling of trust that accompanied it, 
created a context in which people were willing to step off the barricades 
that they had occupied for quite some time during the period of legal 
battles. Processes like these, which may be summarized by the term place, 
are difficult to translate into numbers or other objective data. Nevertheless 
they were important catalysts for the creation and continuation of a new 
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approach. The place or the ‘territory’ became a binding factor, without 
which the ideas would probably have remained vague and uninspiring. 
Therefore, in addition to discourse, actors, rules and resources, there was 
the dimension of place that operated in the interface of local initiatives and 
existing policy. I can be more precise about place now, as the other two 
cases also revealed the importance of a real contact with each other in the 
field. By place I do not mean the physical location but the emotions that a 
place may engender when people are put in touch with a territory. Thus it 
is very much a relational concept. People may be moved by the own 
experiences that are consciously or unconsciously evoked by a place. Or 
they may be enthused by the history of a place and by how it relates to 
their present-day ambitions. 
 
Just as in the other cases, there were coincidences in the Efteling case 
which facilitated the process; one example was the sudden appearance of a 
badger in the area. By its presence, the badger gave unintended support to 
the nature organizations. Everybody knew that it had brought building 
activities to a halt on several occasions. Organizations like ‘Das and Boom’ 
had successfully used the species and its protected status in European 
nature legislation to prevent building activities in areas where the badger 
had been spotted. The nature organizations therefore felt that the badger 
came to support them, to remind all parties that if the results of the plan 
did not represent an improvement for nature values, they always had the 
option of bringing up the badger. Crucially, however, they did not express 
this feeling during the process, to avoid cooling the relationship. For their 
part, the Efteling did not threaten to use their own fallback option: the 
permit to build on the ‘Kraanven’ site, a former recreation area. Choices 
like these also contributed to ‘keeping the spirit’ of the process. They are 
examples of the socio-psychological factors we should bear in mind when 
trying to understand why initiatives develop as they do. 
 
6.6.2 Positionality 
What I found most difficult to accept in this case was the initiators’ choice 
to keep the process closed. Even though we supported the new approach in 
which building development and nature development were not seen as 
conflicting by definition, and even though we were excited at playing a role 
in the transformation of the process from antagonistic to collaborative, we 
were less positive about the closed character of the process. In the other two 
cases, we had an explicit aim of making the research process itself more 
interactive, and attached considerable value to the openness of the 
research. In relation to the Loonsche Land, we had to adopt a rather 
different role. The confines of the assignment and the related budget did 
not leave much space for our own ambitions. We engaged in it nevertheless, 
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and with hindsight, I do not regret that. In such situations perhaps we 
should not judge the research so much by whether it has contributed to 
democratization as by whether it has been detrimental to it.  
 
At the start of the project, I was also skeptical about the way we as 
researchers were actually ‘used’ by the Efteling and the nature 
organizations to underpin their point of view. Would we be ‘used’ to create 
opportunities to build in a nature area? We discussed this in the team. My 
personal evaluation is that it is not a bad thing to be ‘used’ as a researcher, 
as long as you do not do things that go against your own principles. Thus, 
with hindsight, perhaps we should not ask ourselves ‘what is the risk of 
being used?’ Instead, we could ask ourselves, ‘do we agree to being used and 
what will we do if we do not agree any longer?’ 
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7. Comparison of the cases 
7.1 Introduction  
These were three very different cases, but they all involved initiatives 
which focused on a specific territory. They also all involved a confrontation 
with established, mostly sectoral, policy. The confrontations surfaced 
sooner or later in the decision-making process, in different ways and with 
varying intensity. My wish to know more about these confrontations was 
largely aroused by what I perceived as a remarkable tension between, on 
the one hand, the ubiquitous pleas for a greater role of private actors in 
policy development and, on the other, the sometimes seemingly 
insurmountable hurdles which still needed to be taken to further develop 
such initiatives.  
 
In order to understand these confrontations better, the concept of ‘space for 
policy innovation’ was introduced in chapter two to point at the range of 
possibilities arising when, as a result of their interaction with local 
initiatives, established policy arrangements, ‘opened up’ to policy options 
which they had previously excluded. I explained that space for policy 
innovation reaches further than discretionary space. The latter implies an 
idea of ‘government’ in which the state is the primary locus of policy-
making. ‘Space for policy innovation’, on the other hand, enables us to start 
reasoning from initiatives which had not yet developed into formal policy or 
policy arrangements, and then to assess whether they eventually had 
broader policy implications. By tracing relationships between actor and 
structure (operationalized  by the dimensions of discourse, actors, resources 
and rules of the game) and how these relationships developed over time, I 
was able to describe how new coalitions went about realizing their ideas.  
 
This chapter will be geared to exploring what the three cases had in 
common, and in what ways they differed, in terms of the research 
questions. While these findings are grounded in the local specifics of each 
individual case, the comparison will result in the formulation of hypotheses 
about the conditions that may promote or hinder the development of space 
for policy innovation – or, in other words, the import of local initiatives for 
possible wider policy implications. These hypotheses can serve as the 
subject of a public dialogue and input for future empirical research. This 
chapter will therefore address my fifth research question: What are 
enabling or impeding conditions for the emergence of space of policy 
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innovation? By getting a better insight into these conditions, and by 
opening them up to public debate, I hope that a fruitful policy learning 
process can come into being that lives up to the claims that private actors 
are playing a bigger role in finding solutions for spatial issues in specific 
areas.  
 
The dynamic development of the initiative through the interaction with 
existing policy could be summarized by means of Archer’s scheme: 
structural conditions ? social action ? structural elaboration. This scheme 
elaborates the duality of actor and structure in chronological terms. 
Structural conditions form the context in which the initiatives originated 
(my first question). Social action is what happens next, in the interface of 
these initiatives and existing policy. Social actions in this interface can be 
analysed by means of the interrelations between discourse, actor coalitions, 
resources and rules of the game (my second question). Structural 
elaboration is what happens when a policy arrangement ‘opens up’ to the 
initiative, so that the latter can be ‘scaled up’ to established policy-making 
domains and the rules and resources related to them, in particular. At that 
final stage, the initiative can become more than an individual case or an 
‘exception’ and set a precedent for wider use in other areas as well. I use 
the term ‘space for policy innovation’ to describe the extent to which this 
happens (my fourth question). The third question, about sub-politicization 
and other structural transformations emerges in the first, second and the 
third part of Archer’s scheme. Sub-politicization, for instance, may be 
identified as a structural transformation that partly explains how an 
initiative came into being (my first question). Sub-politicization or any 
other structural transformation may also operate at the micro level of 
society, and manifest themselves in social interactions. In conclusion, it 
may emerge in the cases as a structural elaboration of social action – that 
is, rules and resources may be altered to give impetus to or reconfirm sub-
politicization or any other structural process (my third question). 
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will compare the cases in terms of each 
research question in turn. Section 7.2 deals with the origins of the three 
initiatives. Section 7.3 looks at the confrontation of the initiatives with 
existing policy, in terms of discourse, actor coalitions, resources and rules. 
Then section 7.4 compares the cases in terms of ‘sub-politicization’ and 
looks for other ‘structural processes’ that seem to have played a role in the 
interactions between local initiatives and established policy. Section 7.5 
compares the types of ‘space for policy innovation’ that came out of these 
interactions, and section 7.6 reconsiders additional factors that I came 
across in finding explanations for the nature of these interactions. Finally, 
section 7.7 addresses the fifth research question about the conditions for 
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the emergence of space for policy innovation. In order to fuel debate, these 
are presented in the form of hypotheses. 
 
7.2 Origins of the initiatives 
In all three cases, new actor coalitions were formed. These laid the 
foundation for the formulation of the joint initiatives. The initiatives 
originated from the wishes of local actors to make a difference to ‘their’ 
territory, and were generally related to a growing awareness among the 
initiators that the existing sectoral policies formed an obstacle for them to 
approach the areas as integrated wholes. The partnerships grew and 
intensified in the course of further elaboration of the ideas.  
 
Despite the differences, the initiatives all came about in relation to 
government policy: either because there was a felt need to develop the 
policy further (Grensschap), or because varying interpretations of existing 
policy had led to a paralyzing struggle rather than collective action 
(Loonsche Land), or because existing policy was experienced as too narrow 
to allow for what the initiators wanted (Biesland). It is not easy to find one 
common denominator among the policy domains that these initiatives were 
related to, because the initiatives did not spring from a sectoral policy, but 
from specific territories. What the involved actors shared was a concern 
about that specific territory, even though the nature of their concerns 
varied considerably. Once they met and established more than superficial 
obligatory contacts, once they really got in touch and got to talk about the 
area and about what they thought was needed to make it a better place, 
things got moving, in spite of their divergent interests and points of view. It 
was on those occasions that actors showed themselves to be perfectly 
capable of thinking far beyond their own backyards. This study highlighted 
four structural conditions that made it possible for these initiatives to 
emerge.  
 
One marked characteristic of the conditions under which the three 
initiatives came into being has already been mentioned: the sectoral 
working approach that characterized policy arrangements so far. In the 
case of Biesland, the sectoral orientation that had been dominant tended to 
divorce agriculture from nature; in the case of the Loonsche Land, building 
development and nature were seen as conflicting interests requiring 
quantifications of ‘losses’ and calculations of compensation; and in the case 
of the Grensschap, building development and ‘green’ (be it nature, 
agriculture or cultural history) were still different worlds in the municipal 
organization. From the perspective of the initiators, whose ideas involved 
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an integration of several topics and represented areas ‘as a whole’, these 
divisions did little justice to their vision of desirable developments.  
 
A second characteristic of the conditions that ‘pre-existed’ and shaped social 
action was the claim-creating incentive built into operative policy, giving 
rise to a culture of claims and a fear of creating precedents. Targeting 
specific quantities of hectares for the realization of ‘nature’, specific 
‘building volumes’, and specific nature target types had led to lengthy 
procedures, especially in the Efteling case (in the context of the related and 
equally quantitative compensation policy), and also in the Biesland case (in 
the context of targeted acquisition of agricultural land for the realization of 
the Biesland forest). This approach had done little to inspire people to seek 
common solutions, giving rise instead to conflicting claims. 
 
A third condition which pre-existed these social interactions had to do with 
the involvement of contract researchers or, for that matter, other third 
parties. In all of the three cases, research or process facilitation work was 
contracted out in the form of ‘projects’. This was done either by one of the 
initiators (the Efteling, and the Municipality of Maastricht) or by 
government bodies involved after acquisition by the researchers (most 
notably in the Biesland case). This phenomenon of contracting out part of 
the work is a recognized trend that has been theorized about by several 
authors (Allen 2005). In the cases studied here, the ‘research’ projects, of 
which ‘process facilitation’ was often an important part, contributed to 
setting the three processes in motion. Some authors nowadays emphasize 
the policy bias that contract research institutes have run into because of 
their dependence on funding from government policy institutions. However, 
the cases chosen here point at the use of such a ‘resource’ by private actors 
as well.  
 
The fourth relevant process was the growing attention for increasing the 
involvement of citizens, societal organizations and private enterprise, 
though this did not apply in all cases. In one case, participation was an 
explicit ambition of the municipal government, or at least for one alderman. 
At a very early stage in the policy development, he and his officials brought 
about the founding of the Grensschap by organizing the interactive event at 
which it took place. Their initiative fitted within a more general trend or 
‘structural process’ of finding new ways to involve citizens at an earlier 
stage than was usual in the first generation of participation methods in the 
seventies (see chapter one for a summary of three ‘generations’ of 
participatory approaches). This represents the fourth structural condition 
that promoted at least one of the initiatives.  
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The table below summarizes the main processes that provided the right 
conditions for the emergence of the initiatives. 
 
                      Cases 
 
 
 
 
Conditions 
Biesland  
Agricultural enclave 
in urbanized 
‘Randstad’. 
Agricultural land 
surrounded by parks/ 
forest and urban 
texture 
Grensschap 
Urbanizing area, 
consisting mainly of 
agricultural land, 
but with upcoming 
industry and housing 
across the Dutch-
Belgian border 
Loonsche Land  
Private land of a 
theme park, neglected 
forest with some 
meadows and 
surrounded by 
agricultural land and 
nature areas 
Main sectoral 
policies operative 
prior to the new 
initiatives 
Greenstructure 
policies to realize 
coherent ‘green 
structures’ 
Various building 
operations taking 
place in the area 
Nature compensation 
policy 
Past tradition of 
claim-making 
(juridification, 
quantification) 
Various attempts to 
acquire land from 
agriculture for 
nature development. 
Urban expansion 
seemed to have come 
to a halt 
‘Building volumes’ 
were set and agreed 
on. 
Legal procedures in 
which opponents 
attempted to prove 
that their plans were 
‘right’ in the terms of 
compensation policy 
Contracting out work 
to researchers 
Long term, in 
contents and process. 
Funded by Ministry 
of ANF and Province 
after continuous 
fundraising/ 
acquisition efforts by 
the researchers and 
local officials. 
Researchers took 
part in the initiative 
and facilitated 
raising it to 
provincial and 
national level. 
Short term, more in 
process. Funded by 
Ministry of ANF and 
municipality. 
Researchers 
‘designed’ interactive 
event that led to 
foundation of the 
Grensschap. 
Short term, more in 
issues of content. 
Design of the plan to 
work out the covenant 
that the theme park 
and nature 
organizations had 
agreed on. Funded by 
theme park, one of the 
initiators.  
Type of ‘interactivity’ Citizen participation 
was not a primary 
objective but 
developed in the 
course of time – in 
the shape of the 
‘Friends of Biesland’ 
and as a part of the 
research process. It 
resulted from 
activities in the area 
to influence policy 
making. 
Citizen participation 
was a point of 
departure in process-
design (participation 
initiated ‘from 
above’) and an 
explicit wish of the 
municipal authority.  
 
The initiative was 
about the 
collaboration of a 
private business-actor 
and societal 
organizations. There 
was little direct citizen 
participation. Aside 
from the initiators, 
there was an action 
group resisting 
against building 
activities. 
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7.3 Stability and dynamics 
The conditions under which the initiatives were launched influenced the 
social interactions that followed. In the previous chapters, I described the 
social action at the interface of initiative and existing policy at length, with 
reference to the dimensions of discourse, actor coalitions, resources and 
rules of the game. In particular I looked at the ways in which these 
dimensions were interconnected. I was especially surprised to see how 
manifestations of some of the dimensions were highly dynamic, while 
others appeared to be conspicuously stable. I shall underline this point with 
a short recapitulation of the cases in terms of the interaction of discourse, 
actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game. 
 
In the Biesland case, a new coalition came into being in relation to an 
alternative discourse. I labelled it the ‘Biesland’ discourse because of its 
orientation to a specific territory. More than in the present policy, the 
alternative discourse gave expression to the integrated quality of the area 
as a whole. That more integrated approach, which was mainly based on the 
establishment of a ‘zero-input’ farm, implied that farmers were to be 
financially rewarded for their societal activities in terms of nature 
conservation or landscape management. Not so much because of its 
contents as because of the way it was projected to be financed and the way 
it was perceived as a substitute for land acquisition, the new farming 
system gave rise to a long decision-making process that extended right up 
to the European level. The approach did not tie in with the internal market 
discourse, which imposed strict conditions on ‘state’ support to farmers (by 
any government, at any level). So even if there was support for a certain 
approach at the local level, it would still give rise to lengthy European 
procedures. Also, a national green structure discourse in which nature was 
perceived to be still best managed by one of four professional nature 
organizations added force to the internal market discourse, and vice versa. 
For some time, the ‘internal market’ and ‘greenstructure’ discourses on the 
one hand and the ‘Biesland discourse’ on the other hand could coexist, and 
so could their supporting coalitions. However, the attempt to comply with 
established rules and to adapt the established allocations of resources gave 
rise to an almost unworkable number of bureaucratic procedures. Thus, 
through connected rules and resources, both discourses stood in the way of 
a greater role for farmers in landscape and nature management, especially 
if it was to be integrated in the farm enterprise. 
 
The coalition around the idea became ever stronger and included people at 
all levels. The Friends of Biesland were established, the Minister gave his 
support to the idea, and local administrators at the highest level showed 
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their enthusiasm. They arranged to finance the implementation of the 
approach. The national parliament became involved and submitted 
ministerial questions at crucial moments. Nevertheless, resistance 
continued at the national level and from the legal department at the 
provincial level as well. Rules which were not directly related to the 
integrated approach were referred to as barriers to the implementation of 
the ideas. After a lengthy process, the local initiative was approved of. It 
remained incidental, however, and possibilities for implementing similar 
approaches in other areas were still closed off. In other words, the discourse 
was now endorsed by a growing coalition and could exist alongside the 
‘traditional’ discourses, but there was no change in the rules of the game or 
in the allocation of resources. The latter continued to cater for the 
discourses that formed a part of existing policy.  
 
In the Grensschap case we observed a similar incongruence between the 
space for other discourses and discourse coalitions on the one hand, and the 
stability of rules and resources connected to coexisting discourse on the 
other hand. A new coalition emerged, with new ideas on how the area in 
between the municipalities of Maastricht, Riemst and Lanaken should be 
perceived, designed and managed. This coalition and its ideas were 
accepted and even endorsed by some actors from the existing policy context. 
The Grensschap became a showpiece of cross-border, citizen-government 
collaboration. New, European resources were accessed to realize a project 
that gave expression to the Grensschap discourse. The members of the 
Grensschap were careful, however, not to create controversy. Their in-
depth knowledge of the area was assumed to slowly influence decision 
making in a beneficial way, which meant for them that dimensions such as 
cultural history, water and nature values would become crucial for 
decisions about building development. Fighting against building 
development would, in their view, turn them into an action group. They 
thought that this was undesirable, especially since that would hinder 
cooperation with municipal officials. 
 
The gap between policy sectors remained, however. The ideas of the 
Grensschap did not cross the dividing line between the ‘green’ and the 
‘economic development’ sectors, whose decisions they seemed not to be able 
to really influence. Decisions had been imposed on them in their very early 
days (when the alderman’s wish to involve citizens by means of an 
interactive event was curtailed in terms of possible outcomes by a decision 
of his fellow aldermen), and the pattern continued throughout the process. 
The new coalition, the language that the members of the Grensschap 
developed among themselves to discuss the area, and the resources 
allocated to the Grensschap by a European program, coexisted with that 
which predated the Grensschap. The ‘old’ and the ‘new’ arrangements 
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remained separate worlds that existed peacefully alongside each other. 
This situation could continue as long as the members of the Grensschap 
could realize meaningful projects while it was ‘business as usual’ in the 
other ‘world’. Decisions to build still took place in distinct realms. The 
Grensschap may have been a showcase model and it did realize successes 
due to the vigorous work of its members; yet routinized proceedings were 
not altered or even confronted, and nor were the rules of the game in the 
sectoral discourse that valued the area for its potential for building 
development. The projects that the members of the Grensschap were 
successful in realizing were situated outside routinized practice. The 
overall picture is similar to that of Biesland, with discursive space and 
related coalitions emerging on the one hand, while the traditional discourse 
remained strongly buttressed by rules and resources that appeared to be as 
‘steady as a rock’ on the other hand.  
 
Finally, in the case of the ‘Loonsche Land’, former enemies decided to sit 
around the table and adopt another approach than the one that had not got 
them anywhere so far. The new approach was not just a ‘new instrument’ 
with which all parties could expect to continue to get the same results for 
themselves. A new vision on the contents of plans was needed as well. The 
parties adopted quite a different language to the one used during their 
legal battles in court. Nevertheless, when their ideas needed to be judged in 
terms of existing policies, they were translated into a language reflecting 
the norms and criteria of those policies. While the particular project was 
likely to be implemented in the end, the wider policy implications, 
particularly for the rules related to operative policies, remained undebated. 
 
This comparison demonstrates how new discourses and coalitions were 
formed in the three cases, whereas rules and resources continued to 
support the coalitions behind discourses which were firmly embedded in 
government policies and practices. A change of discourse appeared not to 
bring with it a change of institutional practices. 
 
There is something about the actor coalitions that I did not yet mention in 
the three short summaries. In all cases, elected politicians stood at relative 
distance, while appointed executives (mayor or aldermen, members of the 
provincial executive, the Minister) played a crucial role at specific moments 
by placing an area on the agenda (the alderman in Maastricht), by granting 
an initiative pilot status (the minister of ANF in relation to Biesland), 
raising regional funds to finance an initiative (the aldermen, the member of 
the executive of the Water board and the member of the provincial 
executive in Biesland) or by promoting and denouncing the formation of the 
new partnership (the provincial executive in the Efteling case). However, 
politicians were not absent and it is conspicuous that in the Biesland and 
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the Grensschap cases they did play a crucial role at crucial moments, 
especially when the whole exercise appeared to get derailed or when a 
breakthrough needed to be enforced. Most importantly, the option of having 
a say through the traditional representative system was kept open by the 
initiators involved. In the Biesland case, members of the National 
Parliament played a more prominent role by asking parliamentary 
questions, which served to get middle-level officials at the Ministry of ANF 
moving, while irritating them at the same time. The general view of the 
initiators was that as long as the politicians were kept well-informed, they 
could always be approached if necessary (Biesland, Maastricht). The formal 
representative system and the known formal participation procedures were, 
so to speak, their ‘exit options’. If their influence did not materialize in the 
‘new’ way, they could still use the other channels. 
 
The three examples of local initiatives were each successful in their own 
way insofar as their ideas led to concrete results in the specific areas for 
which they were intended. However, they had little wider impact on 
mainstream policy discourses and practices, and before the ideas (or 
elements of them) could be realized, major moves needed to be made in the 
direction of mainstream policy. At first sight, the emergence of new 
coalitions and discourses, and the coexistence of ‘new’ and ‘traditional’ 
discourses and coalitions gave the impression that there would be 
significant opportunities to deliberate about existing policy and consider 
alternative policy options in a collaborative effort. However, an analysis of 
the ways in which initiatives and government policies interacted over a 
period of time suggested that the discursive space created by the new 
coalitions did not bring about a change of rules and resources connected to 
institutionalised discourses. The latter continued to dominate, forcing the 
initiatives to make moves in the direction of this ‘institutionalized 
mainstream’.  
 
7.4 Sub-politicization and other structural processes 
The three cases suggest that it is important to apply the concept of sub-
politicization more precisely, so as to do more justice to its various 
manifestations. My initial question in Chapter 2 was whether what 
happened in the cases pointed at a trend towards sub-politicization, or at 
other structural trends. As I look at it now, a more pertinent question 
would have been whether the concept of sub-politicization could be refined 
on the basis of the cases. In the remainder of this section, I will first deal 
with the first part of the question about sub-politicization and identify the 
various ways in which developments in the cases were, indeed, increasingly 
being shaped from below (as Beck phrased it). I will then turn to the second 
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part of the question: the extent to which other structural processes 
manifested themselves in the cases. 
 
A comparison of the cases suggests the need to refine the concept of sub-
politicization. The point is that sub-politicization, which Beck related to the 
increasing role of global social movements responding to the side-effects of 
the ‘first modernity’, is often associated with democratization. If sub-
politicization implies democratization tout court, then the term cannot be 
applied to these cases. For, while in each case new territory-oriented 
coalitions and organizations were formed that attempted to influence 
policy-making processes, broader public participation appeared to be 
limited in every case, albeit to different extents. The most open coalition 
was that in Biesland. As far as the Friends of Biesland were concerned - 
even though it originated from an elitist Service Club, it was deliberately 
transformed into an organization open to more civil engagement than is 
generally the case with Service Clubs themselves. The evening meetings at 
which activities were elaborated and planned were well attended. Also, the 
researchers’ explicit aim was to give form to and implement monitoring and 
evaluation of the activities in collaboration with anyone who ever felt 
connected with the polder and was willing to give an input. And yet, 
participation was restricted to a limited group. The organization it took to 
get more people involved was expensive for the researchers, while the 
activities of the Friends of Biesland depended on the input of the Friends’ 
secretary, whose post was vulnerable as it was funded by annual provincial 
subsidies. 
 
The Grensschap as an organization was relatively open, but due to its focus 
on ‘expertise’ and its rejection of people with an action group mentality, it 
also excluded people, however implicitly and even unintentionally. New 
members mostly found their way to the group via existing members, who 
sometimes approached potential members. Partly because they were far too 
busy preparing their landmarks project, they did not pretend to have the 
capacity to represent, or allow for the direct participation, of a lot of people 
in their activities. It may have been their awareness of these limits to their 
capacity that led to their alarm when a newspaper article suggested that 
their input would replace the known formal participation procedures.  
 
With regard to the Loonsche Land, the process remained rather closed from 
beginning to end. In comparison with the pre-covenant period, it became 
even more closed after the nature organizations and the Efteling had joined 
forces because their documents were kept secret for a long time.  
 
Based on these observations, one axis of sub-politicization represents a 
gradient from open forms of sub-politicization to closed forms of sub-
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politicization. I prefer to introduce this gradient, rather than to exclude a 
range of initiatives that shape society from below but which are not totally 
inclusive. The ‘open – closed’ axis challenges analysts to describe to whom 
the initiatives are open and to whom they are closed, and perhaps also how 
this developed over the course of time. 
 
The vertical axis represents the position of the three initiatives vis-à-vis 
traditional governance practice or, in other words, the existing policy 
arrangement. At one end of the axis, the scope for policy change is rather 
large, at the other end it is small, for instance because it takes the form of 
an ‘experiment’ or pilot, restricted to the level of the specific territory that 
the initiative was about. This change may eventually lead to a more 
significant change, but it may also not come off. On the one hand, the 
formal status of the initiatives as ‘pilot projects’ won them a place on policy 
agendas. On the other hand, singling out an initiative as a ‘pilot’ also made 
it possible to exclude it from debate about the transformation of 
mainstream policy. In this study, the special status of a project did not lead 
to a greater scope  in the form of a change of rules or resources. Thus, the 
cases induce scepticism rather than optimism about the significance of such 
status.  
 
The horizontal axis, therefore, is about the democratic character of the 
initiative, and the vertical axis is about the scope of the initiative in terms 
of its impact on policy change. Along the vertical axis, I placed all three 
initiatives towards the ‘limited scope of policy change’ end of the scale 
because they had to shift their terms of reference in the direction of 
mainstream policy before they could get any further, and because their 
impact and their difference from the existing arrangement were hardly 
subjected to deliberation. In fact, reflexivity in this sense did not 
materialize. 
 
I wish to emphasize that the positioning of initiatives and the labelling of 
the four parts of the figure should ideally be done in a dialogue with the 
relevant stakeholders. Unfortunately I have not so far been able to do so. It 
is likely, for instance, that actors from the relevant areas would mainly 
focus on the results of their efforts in the areas themselves. That would 
probably position them nearer the higher end of the vertical axis than my 
own assessment, for which I also took into consideration the wider policy 
implications of the local initiatives. Besides in the Grensschap case such an 
analysis is likely to have different results in Belgium than in the 
Netherlands. 
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Figure 9: Types of sub-politicization 
 
So far, this section has presented a comparison of cases in relation to the 
sub-politicization thesis. But there were also other conditions that can 
reasonably be argued to have had a significant influence on the interaction 
between local initiatives and existing policies. As will be shown, however, 
these are not unrelated to the sub-politicization thesis. 
 
Two conditions stand out. The first is that of Europeanization and the 
multiple levels at which decisions needed to be taken before the initiatives 
got any further. Unexpectedly, the European level played a role in all three 
cases: most conspicuously in the Biesland case, in the Grensschap case 
because of the subsidy that made the realization of their project possible, 
and in the Loonsche Land case when Europe made a surprise appearance 
at a later stage in the process when its directive on particulate matter had 
to be accommodated. So in two of the three cases ‘the European level’ and 
the way that was dealt with formed an obstacle, while in one case it was a 
source of funding to realize regional ambitions. It is important to 
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emphasize the relation between Europeanization in the three cases and a 
second process: regionalization. The fact that the people from the region 
related to a specific territory and organized themselves around that 
territory, points at a local orientation and willingness to invest time and 
energy in it, and in the policy processes related to it. Europeanization and 
regionalization, seemingly opposite trends, both appeared to be at work in 
the three cases. It is interesting to relate both these processes to sub-
politicization. We saw how, in two of the three cases, European rules, 
related to a strong European discourse, led to lengthy decision-making 
processes dominated by arguments about issues that seemed far removed 
from the essence of the initiatives. Instead, they focussed on the outcomes 
of complicated model-based computations that had little to do with the 
initiative. The fact that the initiatives were ‘drawn’ into this corner 
suggests very little resemblance to sub-politics, in which politics is direct 
and society is shaped from below. Instead, European rules and their ‘voice’ 
at national level had taken over and moulded the initiatives into lookalikes 
of European and national rules. Viewed from this angle, the process of 
decision making on the plans (design and management) of three territories 
pointed at depoliticization rather than at sub-politicization. On the other 
hand, the regionalization trend implied that initiatives for specific 
territories had a strong mobilizing impact on a variety of people or 
organizations, who engaged directly in the making of plans for these areas. 
In the three cases, various types of actors organized themselves in new 
formations in order to get to grips with these territories in ways that 
matched their preferences. (To what extent these new formations or 
coalitions were also manifestations of new forms of democracy is another 
question, which I discussed in the above.) People tried to influence 
developments outside the formal channels (although the formally elected 
did occasionally play a role!). So regionalization in itself brought with it 
opportunities to create new political arenas which challenged people and 
organizations to get involved in policy making about specific territories. In 
this sense, it did bear a resemblance to a process of sub-politicization. In 
the three cases studied here, I found a form of sub-politicization which was 
relatively open in two cases and closed in one case, while the scope of all of 
them was limited in terms of structural elaboration. Looking at situations 
in which decisions about the local initiatives had to be taken at remote 
levels which were beyond the control of these coalitions, the sub-
politicization thesis seems to remain valid at the local level but not at the 
level of national and European policy making.  
 
I will now discuss four other structural conditions that contributed to the 
contexts of my three cases. Then I will make up the balance and draw a 
conclusion on the sub-politicization thesis.  
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In addition to Europeanization and regionalization, the cases provide 
evidence for a third, fourth, fifth and sixth structural process at work in the 
interaction between initiatives and existing policy. The third process is 
juridification, and the quantification it entails. This can be seen at work in 
all three cases: in the various procedural hurdles in the Biesland case (e.g. 
the comptability law, the state support test and the computations required 
to pass it, nature target types, and the impossibility of establishing regional 
organization); the laborious undertaking of submitting the proposal in the 
Grensschap case; and the compensation procedures in the Efteling case. 
The processes for obtaining approval in the context of European legislation 
were highly juridical and procedural. Discussions between officials who 
were formally responsible for reaching decisions were no longer about the 
motivations for starting up the initiative or about its substantive relation to 
institutionalized policy (that is, about the landscape and its characteristics, 
about how these would be served best and about how various dimensions of 
the landscape could be related to each other) but focused on computation 
rules and procedural requirements built into existing policy.  
 
Juridification is related to the fourth structural process: sectoralization. 
This was already mentioned in relation to the ‘origin’ of the initiatives: 
sectoral policies were in fact an important motivation to come forward with 
other, more integrated proposals for the areas. But it also influenced the 
subsequent interactions between initiatives and existing policies. 
Importantly, the sectoral standards incorporated in existing policies caused 
reformulations or ‘shifts’ of the contents of the initiatives in the direction of 
the sectoral policies. Sometimes the initiators felt under pressure to 
conform to the terms of such policies even when this was not explicitly put 
forward as a precondition. In relation to Biesland, an example would be the 
European internal market standards and the nature target types which 
were put forward by officials as a ‘conditio-sine-qua-non’; in relation to the 
Loonsche Land, there was the way the claim-making consequences of 
standards were taken up in compensation policy and the Forest Law; and 
in relation to the Grensschap there was the way in which the sectoral 
decisions of the housing- and industry-domains were put forward as a 
unchangeable pre-condition to involvement of the Grensschap. 
Nevertheless, the initiatives transcended established policy sectors in all 
three of the cases, as the initiatives involved several dimensions of life, 
rather than one sector. The interaction with state actors was however 
‘narrowed’ to sectors, precluding any serious debate about the integrated 
character of the proposed alternatives. Both the juridification and 
sectoralization were continuously present, in spite of the initiatives that 
represented a different discourse. What is more, both processes appeared to 
run counter to sub-politicization and to point instead at a process of 
depoliticization.  
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The fifth and the sixth structural process are also interrelated. The fifth 
process, ‘distantiation’28 is not perhaps as widely discussed and elaborated 
as the other processes that I mentioned so far. Discussion on European 
legislation, for instance, took place at a distance from the areas, by officials 
that did not know the areas and its actors. In line with their organizations’ 
rules, these officials were not to be too intensively involved. Even within 
the Netherlands, there was a tendency that officials would ‘stay at 
distance’, to ‘facilitate’ regional processes, often as part of official policy, 
especially at the national level. In fact, those who eventually took decisions 
about the initiatives were at a greater distance and did not take part in the 
new networked forms of collaboration. Eventual ‘go’ or ‘no-go’ decisions 
appeared to depend on them. I have mentioned it already, but I repeat the 
point because I think it is important: the three cases revealed that the 
further policy officials were from the initiatives, the more resistance they 
put up.  
 
Viewed from the perspective of the local initiatives, the frequent changes of 
personnel, especially at those levels, appeared to be a complication in terms 
of building up mutual trust and a bond with the area. This introduces the 
sixth process: personalization. The cases also showed that those officials 
who had been involved for longest played important roles in getting the 
processes further. In all three areas, an emphasis was placed on getting 
people to really experience the various qualities of the areas. We promoted 
this as researchers, but the principle was just as strongly advocated by the 
local actors. Particularly in the Biesland and Grensschap cases, field visits 
were actively used to deliberate about the essence of the ideas and to show 
how various aspects of the plans were related. The field visits were also 
expected to have a mobilizing effect: regional stakeholders believed that 
decision makers would more easily understand the area and the plans once 
they had actually been there and experienced its qualities. It was expected 
that such visits would also influence their decision making, especially when 
a government institution’s sectoral approach seemed to do no justice to the 
multi-faceted situation in ‘the field’.  
 
In sum, the cases do give reason to suggest that decision making processes 
were more easily carried forward when there was real contact and 
exchange of opinions. Importantly, their increased personal involvement 
had a positive impact in two of the three cases  
 
Thus, in all three cases new coalitions were formed among private and 
government actors to get the initiatives further. A key observation in 
                                                        
28  Note that ‘distantiation’ means something else than Giddens’ term ‘time-space 
distanciation’. 
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current governance literature, the trend towards the blending of 
government and private actors, is thereby reconfirmed by this study. 
However, the study also enables us to be more specific about the details of 
this collaboration between government and private actors. It was clear 
that, aside from the Efteling case, collaboration with government officials 
mainly came about because of the personal time and energy that officials 
put into the projects, in their leisure time. In the Grensschap and the 
Biesland cases, the personal zeal and consequent input of public officials 
were the impetus behind key events. Their ‘double roles’ as officials and as 
engaged citizens sometimes caused unease, but at the same time they 
appeared to have become vital for the further development of the 
initiatives, and it was also for this reason that the partnerships could grow 
into something substantial29.  
 
When the six processes (or seven, including sub-politicization) are looked at 
again, it appears that the theory needs some further refinement. We need 
to look at how the processes are interrelated, and seem to be at work at 
multiple levels and in various combinations. An eighth structural process 
needs to be accentuated: depoliticization, which may be situated at the 
same level as the sub-politicization which I started with, and was a striking 
feature of all of the cases. The cases revealed how a combination of 
Europeanization, sectoralization, juridification and distantiation led to a 
failure to discuss the heart of the matter: the essence of the initiatives and 
how they differed from mainstream policy. On balance, depoliticization was 
more prominent than sub-politicization in these processes, although two of 
them – regionalization and personalization – seemed to contribute to sub-
politicization at the local level.  
 
In sum, the cases I studied reveal a complex web of interference by 
structural processes. Examples include a process of Europeanization or 
multi-level governance and the related depoliticization processes, and 
another process of increasing opportunities for sub-politicization through 
regionalization. Two of my cases point at the dominance of the first process 
over the second. This complexity makes it increasingly difficult for local 
parties to create space for their initiatives in relation to existing 
                                                        
29  This observation casts a different light on the terms ‘top-down’/‘from above’ and 
‘bottom-up’/ ‘from below’, a juxtaposition that I was inclined to depart from when I 
started this study. ‘Bottom-up’, to point at initiatives that come from outside 
government, does not reflect the blend of personal efforts by several types of actors 
connected to the initiatives in order to work away at getting them to relevant 
decision-making levels. I therefore prefer to speak of ‘local initiatives’ instead of 
‘bottom-up initiatives’. 
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arrangements, leaving aside the question whether their area-specific 
initiatives were picked up for consideration of their potential wider policy 
implications. Even if European subsidies promoted a local initiative in 
principle, then the process of obtaining these subsidies, as the Grensschap’ 
case shows, is complicated and time-consuming, and mainly takes place 
beyond the influence and comprehension of local actors. 
 
The figure below summarizes the structural processes and indicates by 
means of arrows the supposed interrelations between them, as described in 
the above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: A complex of structural processes 
 
In terms of Archer’s scheme, I concentrated in this section on 
manifestations of the ways in which social action was influenced by 
structural conditions.  
 
Although opportunities for structural elaboration have already been 
touched on in the foregoing, in the next section I will concentrate on the 
second part of the equation: the relation between social action and the 
structural elaboration that can take place in the form of ‘space for policy 
innovation’.  
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7.5 Space for policy innovation 
In chapter two, space for policy innovation was defined in relation to 
‘structural elaboration’. Space for policy innovation refers to the 
possibilities arising when existing policy arrangements ‘open up’ to policy 
options which had not been possible so far. It is the enabling space created 
when the existing order or ‘temporarily stabilized’ relations between actors, 
resources, rules and discourse are challenged and/or changed. 
 
All three cases give expression to significant innovative potential at the 
local level. In the three cases, coalitions were formed around discourses 
which were significantly different from the discourses that had formerly 
dominated the policy making affecting the areas. Perhaps most 
importantly, the specific territories stood centre stage in the orientation of 
the new coalitions. New discourse coalitions could be discerned that cut 
across a variety of groups and organizations at various levels. Local 
officials, and at times national parliamentarians or even a Minister, used 
their discretionary powers to help the initiative further. The discursive 
potential that was created, however, could not be translated into space for 
policy innovation.  
We may yet see ‘postponed effects’ of activities such as the creation of 
“landmarks” in the Grensschap area, and these should be the topic of future 
research. However, for the present, the cases demonstrated few wider 
policy implications. 
 
A focus on particular resources might lead to different conclusions: in all 
the cases financial or knowledge resources were mobilized and granted in 
order to realize part of the initiatives in the specific territories. My point, 
however, is that the established ways of applying mainstream resources 
and rules were not changed or even reconsidered in the light of the 
initiatives. A fear of precedents prevailed. Although their longer-term 
impact cannot be predicted, this turned the initiatives into relatively 
isolated undertakings. Resources had been granted, but one could say that 
they were granted as exceptions that prove the rule. Of course, rules do not 
easily change overnight, especially when their tentacles reach into many 
levels of decision making. That the implications of the initiatives were 
hardly a topic of deliberation, however, shows that the potential to create 
space for policy innovation was restricted to the new discourse coalitions 
that concentrated on the specific areas. And even there, the potential was 
curtailed by the (at times self-imposed) adaptation of the contents of the 
initiative to the rules – even to rules that were fundamentally at odds with 
the initiatives.  
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An important explanation for the lack of space for policy innovation was the 
fact that, in several ways, the debate about the meaning of the local 
initiative for policy-development was not politicized. I do not consider this 
‘depoliticization’ as some structural force that was imposed on the process 
from outside, leaving actors no possibility of even attempting to politicize 
the essential issues. Nevertheless, depoliticization was what happened in 
the selected cases, and it contributed to the lack of wider policy 
implications for the time being. 
 
7.6 Other explanatory factors  
In the cases, other dimensions than discourse, actor coalitions, rules and 
resources were identified as crucial for understanding and explaining the 
stability or dynamics of a policy arrangement. These were mostly 
summarized in the case chapters as ‘socio-relational factors’ and as 
‘coincidental factors’. Although these factors could be subsumed under 
other dimensions such as actors, or resources, I wish to draw special 
attention to them as a ‘fifth dimension’ of their own. Their presence might 
suggest that no one theory will provide an all-encompassing explanation for 
the stability or dynamics of a policy arrangement. Other theories and 
frameworks, possibly from disciplines such as social psychology, pedagogy 
or communication sciences, can also help us understand these factors.  
 
Here, I wish to refer to some episodes in the cases which could be connected 
to one or more of the dimensions, but which I considered so crucial to the 
progress of the initiatives that I think they deserve explicit attention. The 
first one that caught the eye was perseverance. It was remarkable how 
people persevered with their initiative, even in the face of years of waiting 
and repeated setbacks. Without their persistence, the initiatives would 
probably have come to a premature end, before decisions had even been 
reached. Others have referred to these capacities as ‘human capacity’ or 
‘capital’ and ‘resources’ (compare Healey 2006). This puts them in the same 
category as resources such as finances or knowledge. While the latter are 
mostly referred to as institutional resources, I prefer to see phenomena 
such as endurance as something with a different character, and operating 
at a different level. Other examples are trust and empathy. Even though 
there was an institutional dimension to them in the sense that they could 
only evolve when there was real contact between people (and the rules of 
the game hindered this at several occasions), I see trust and empathy as 
more than just capacities of actors or resources that can consciously be 
drawn upon. Trust and empathy may grow or diminish in the course of 
interaction. In the cases that I studied, they were important for keeping the 
local initiatives and their interactions with existing policy going. Also, the 
Chapter 7 
198 
feelings of connectedness with the areas, especially when the land was not 
the property of the stakeholders, were a crucial factor in getting and 
keeping the initiatives going. Where resistance occurred, it was related to 
feelings of ‘not invented here’. This was yet another phenomenon that I find 
difficult to position in terms of the institutional terms of the policy 
arrangement approach. In all three cases, these sentiments came up in the 
policy-making organizations at various times. They are important for my 
research question, because they partly explain why some of the processes 
were so tough.  
 
Yet another, not to be overlooked, explanatory dimension which was 
identified in all three cases was coincidence. As was explained in the 
preceding chapters, change in the policy arrangement was largely 
determined by coincidental meetings or events. How can coincidence be 
accounted for by means of the dimensions of discourse, actor coalitions, 
resources or rules of the game? Complexity analysis may offer useful 
insights for elaborating on this highly unpredictable aspect of policy 
processes, which - despite its elusive character - partly explains why a 
process was either hampered or promoted. As Owen (1995) states: 
 
“If the policy process and policy networks are so difficult to break down in any 
useful way how can analysis be made manageable? Complexity analysis is not 
one ‘theory’ but a number of interlocking theories and may offer interesting 
possibilities for utilising established political theories in new ways”. 
 
I suggest drawing on other theories and cooperating with other research 
disciplines in order to elaborate on these factors in future research. 
 
7.7 Conditions impeding or enabling space for policy 
innovation 
This section deals with the fifth question of my research. What are the 
enabling or impeding conditions for the emergence of space of policy 
innovation? My suppositions, or assumptions, with regard to these 
conditions are based on what was observed in the three cases. They are 
categorized by means of Archer’s time-sequenced scheme that was 
presented and elaborated in chapter two. 
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Structural Conditions in which local initiatives originate 
There is significant potential at local level to come to innovative ideas about how to 
design and manage specific territories, even when the latter reach beyond the nearby 
street or park. NIMBY has wrongly received too much attention.  
 
The sectoral organization of various existing policies gives rise to new ideas because 
local actors focusing on a specific territory cannot solve their problems by means of 
sectoral policies and are therefore challenged to develop alternative, more integrated 
options.  
 
Specific territorial spaces and the ways by which people feel attached to these, offer 
great potential for mobilizing people to come up with their own solutions and designs, 
even if their interests are very different.  
 
Like policy makers, local initiators increasingly mobilize ‘formal research’ as a source 
of empowerment for their ideas. 
 
The initiatives emerged in a context of generations of participation policy which had 
not significantly empowered local actors. In spite of claims belonging to a third 
generation of participation theories, which observed a trend of dispersion and 
displacement of participation, ‘displacement’ can not be confirmed by this study. 
Traditional democratic procedures remain an important precondition for local 
initiators to get their ideas realized.  
Everyday social interactions (in terms of discourse, actor coalitions, resources and 
rules of the game) between local initiators and actors representing established policy 
Although local initiatives may convince a wide array of actors to adopt a new 
discourse that emphasizes the qualities of areas as ‘integrated wholes’, rules and 
resources supporting the established sectoral or economic discourses and their 
coalitions remain unchanged. 
Incongruence of change of discourse on the one hand and stability of practices on the 
other hand can largely be explained by a process of depoliticization. 
 
Depoliticization is a greater force than sub-politicization. 
 
Multi-level governance in general and Europeanization in particular imply 
considerable obstacles for the realization of territory-related initiatives ‘from below’. 
 
The sub-politicization thesis is problematic in the context of Europeanization (except 
when local actors can make use of existing EU rules to reinforce their point of view). 
 
The ‘not-invented-here’ syndrome in bureaucracies is an irrational and outdated 
obstacle to the promotion of local initiatives. 
 
Establishing ‘distantiation’ in the policy process causes depoliticization of that 
process and as such forms an obstacle for the creation of space for policy innovation. 
 
Discursive space relating to specific territories is created and sustained by new, 
challenging coalitions that reach across various levels. 
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Chances for continuation of an initiative are significantly enhanced when officials 
start to devote personal time and energy to a project. 
 
Real contact and exchange of arguments in the areas themselves are under pressure 
from a policy of ‘distantiation’, while they are important for establishing 
understanding between initiators and other policy actors. 
 
Endurance and social-relational factors are essential to keep an initiative going in its 
confrontation with mainstream policy. 
Structural Elaboration in terms of Space for Policy Innovation 
A process of depoliticization, taking place in different ways, prevents local initiatives 
from leading to wider policy implications. 
 
The creation of ‘space for policy innovation’ ‘from below’ is avoided by means of the 
creation of exceptions to the rule (pilots etcetera.) that are not deliberated more 
widely. 
 
Cultural work of new territory-oriented groups (such as the Grensschap and the 
Friends of Biesland) represents a new type of political action with a long-term effect 
on decision-making which needs to be investigated. 
 
The three cases offered a rich base of data for descriptions and explanations 
of what happened at the interface of local initiatives and ‘temporary 
stabilized’ policy. The above table summarizes the conditions that promoted 
or hindered the creation of space for policy innovation. They included 1) the 
structural conditions in which the initiatives came about, 2) the social 
interactions taking place once the initiatives and existing policy needed to 
find a position in relation to each other, and 3) the eventual ‘structural 
elaboration’ of the meaning of those confrontations into changed rules or 
alternative distributions of resources that would endorse the new discourse, 
or at least into a dialogue about such changes. 
 
Most importantly, the cases show that, in spite of the energy, personal 
commitment and creativity that went into them, the three innovative 
initiatives have so far had limited wider policy implications. Government 
actors declined to create space for policy innovation in a wider sense than 
the uncontroversial experimentation that was cautiously allowed on a local 
scale. This puts a question mark over the various pleas for a greater role of 
citizens or other private actors in the spatial policy domains. What is the 
worth of such pleas if the conditions that hinder these groups from playing 
a greater role remain unchanged? I will get back to this in the next chapter, 
which contains the conclusions of my research regarding theoretical 
repercussions, my own positionality and wider socio-political relevance. 
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8. Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This study was embarked on with optimistic expectations about the 
ambition and capacity of local actors such as city dwellers, civil society 
organizations and businesses to improve the planning, design or 
management of specific territories. Indeed, in the cases that were studied 
here, the ambitions of local actors went beyond the level of ideas; they 
made considerable efforts to make a real difference to the territory that 
their ideas were about. However, this study uncovered a complex set of 
conditions that either enabled or hindered the realization of these ideas. 
The tension between the richness of local initiatives, on the one hand, and 
the limited capacity of various government organizations to deal with that 
richness, on the other, is all the more remarkable given the historical 
context of decades of participatory projects and “interactive policy making” 
ambitions, and various present-day calls for new forms of partnerships 
between governments and private actors. This irreconcilability gave rise to 
an uneasy feeling and formed my main motivation to take a closer look at 
three situations that involved confrontations between local initiatives and 
established policy. I wanted to know what was achieved over the years and 
what was not, and – particularly – to understand the processes involved.  
 
In chapters four, five and six, I outlined the course of events involved in 
three initiatives by mainly private actors, directed at three specific 
territories. The stories were mainly based on my participation in the cases 
as a contract researcher, and also on subsequent interviews, document 
analysis and group discussions.  
 
Two of the three initiatives had a clear history of conflict. Despite these 
histories, local actors appeared to be highly creative in proposing solutions 
for ‘their’ areas. Their plans came about in a mutual dialogue and 
developed over the course of time. It was therefore as informative to follow 
the processes and the currently ongoing changes in the contents of 
initiatives and relevant policies, as it was to find out more about their 
history.  
 
In chapter seven I dealt with each research question in turn by scrutinizing 
the three cases once more, in a comparative manner. In the next section, 
8.2, I will summarize the theoretical insights yielded by a comparison of the 
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analyses of the three empirical situations. The section will be subdivided 
into the following parts: 
a. the meaning of the four dimensions of discourse, coalitions, rules of the 
game and resources, for the analysis of interactions between local 
initiatives and established arrangements 
b. analytic dualism: a realist approach to bringing a time dimension into 
the analysis; 
c. sub-politicization and depoliticization and still more structural 
processes 
d. the way in which the above conditions enabled or constrained the 
formation of space for policy innovation  
e. a missing dimension: the role of socio-psychological and relational 
factors 
In section 8.3 I will reflect on my own positionality as a contract researcher 
in the three cases, before presenting the potential wider societal 
implications of the research in section 8.4.  
 
8.2 Theoretical reflections 
a) The relations between dimensions of a policy arrangement 
Policy arrangements were defined by Van Tatenhove et al. as the 
“temporary stabilization of the contents and organization of a policy 
domain” (Van Tatenhove et al. 2000). The authors operationalized contents 
in terms of discourse, and organization in terms of actor coalitions, rules 
and resources. I described what happened in the three cases by means of 
these four dimensions and concentrated on their interrelatedness.  
 
Such an approach may perhaps seem inappropriate in a study whose focus 
was not a policy domain but the interaction between not yet stabilized 
initiatives and ‘established’ policy. For one thing, the studied interactions 
between initiatives and existing policies were not primarily about a specific 
‘policy domain’. Rather, by focussing on specific spatial areas, the 
initiatives pertained to various domains. On top of that, it was unsure 
whether the interactions between the initiatives and established policy 
would indeed give rise to a situation that could reasonably be called a 
‘temporary stabilized’ policy arrangement. Indeed, it was possible that the 
initiatives would die an early death and not stabilize at all. So the question 
whether an initiative would indeed give rise to renewed ‘temporary 
stabilization of contents and organization of a policy domain’ was left open 
to the outcomes of empirical analyses. What remained, however, was the 
expectation that an understanding of the initiatives and their interactions 
with established policy could be enhanced by adopting the ‘lens’ of the four 
dimensions, and particularly by looking at how they are related.  
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The analysis of the interactions between local initiatives and government 
policies over the course of time revealed that the discursive space that the 
new coalitions were able to create, did not bring about substantial change 
of rules and resources. In other words: practices of discourse and coalitions 
could be reshaped, but this was not accompanied by a reshaping in terms of 
resources and rules of the game. In the following I will speak of ‘elasticity’ 
and ‘inelasticity’ to refer to the possibility or impossibility of reshaping 
practices.  
 
On the one hand, there was the possibility for new discourses and discourse 
coalitions to co-exist with established discourses and coalitions. If there was 
a certain definable ‘discursive space’ in the three cases, that space proved to 
be elastic. On the other hand, the rules and resources related to established 
discourses proved to be of limited elasticity. As a result, the options that 
seemed to become possible in terms of changes of vocabulary and coalitions 
did not translate into alternative options as far as rules and resources were 
concerned. This asymmetry in the elasticity of the different dimensions 
meant that the initiatives did not penetrate policies. Their alternative view 
of territorial development and management could not therefore be applied 
more widely.  
 
I have chosen to use the word ‘elasticity’, in spite of the fact that its use is 
largely confined to the field of economics, because it expresses the idea of 
including scope for options for alternative action. Thus, in the cases, 
inclusion of alternative discourse and new discourse coalitions appeared to 
be possible. It was as if these dimensions could be ‘stretched’ like an elastic 
band to hold more options. By contrast, other elements of social interaction, 
the structural mobilization of resources or the reformulation of rules, 
proved to be largely inelastic. This asymmetrical degree of elasticity 
prevented the initiatives from having wider policy implications. It also 
forced the initiatives to make moves in the direction of the ‘institutionalized 
mainstream’ in order to comply with the rules and resources of the existing 
discourse. Discursive latitude, therefore, remained a temporary thing 
because of this asymmetrical situation. The elastic band returned to more 
or less its previous form. Of course, we wanted to know how and why that 
happened. Since the research focussed on the interactions between local 
territorial initiatives and the established policy that pre-existed the 
initiatives, it was important to bring a time dimension into the analytical 
framework. The next section summarizes how that was done.  
 
b) Bringing in a time dimension 
One of the sources of inspiration for the policy arrangements approach was 
Giddens’ ’structuration theory’ (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004). The main 
point of structuration theory is that neither agency nor structure dominates 
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over the other. Giddens’ message was that in order to understand change or 
stability, the interrelationships between actor and structure needed to be at 
the heart of the analysis. “The constitution of agents and structures are not 
two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a 
duality” (Giddens 1984: 25). His idea was a reaction to the prevailing 
dominance of ‘either/or dualism’ in sociological theory. Dualistic approaches 
would explain change or stability by foregrounding agentic or structural 
power, but not their interrelatedness. Those who are emphasizing the 
capacity to change of individuals or organisations are generally called 
voluntarists, and those emphasizing the (mostly restrictive) conditions 
imposed by structures are called determinists (Archer 1982, Arts 1998). In 
terms of the object of this research, Giddens’ plea means that the processes 
determining whether a local initiative is realized, and whether it results in 
wider policy implications, cannot be explained by either deterministic 
reasoning (such as orthodox Marxism), or by voluntaristic approaches. So 
far, a useful theoretical backbone has been found instead in structuration 
theory and its operationalization in the policy arrangements approach 
(including, as chapter two elaborates, the interaction between agentic and 
structural properties at the level of day-to-day interactions in policy 
arrangements as well as the interaction of those day-to-day interactions 
with wider structural processes). 
  
Like Giddens, Archer seeks to understand and theorize about the 
interrelations between actor and structure, rather than to overemphasize 
the influence of either one of them. 
 
“Both the ‘morphogenetic’ (Archer’s approach, MB) and ‘structuration’ approaches 
concur that ‘action’ and ‘structure’ presuppose one another: structural patterning 
is inextricably grounded in practical interaction. Simultaneously, both 
acknowledge that social practice is ineluctably shaped by the unacknowledged 
conditions of action and generates unintended consequences which form the 
context of subsequent interaction” (Archer 1982: 456). 
 
However, she objected to conceptualizations of agency and structure that 
were limited to their relation to one another; one example was the way the 
notion of ‘duality of structure’ was applied. Her main objection here was 
that it would implicitly make it impossible to analyse how their 
interrelationship evolved over the course of time. So inseparability or, in 
other words, a ‘collapse’ of these concepts would prevent researchers from 
investigating precisely that which the whole undertaking was about: 
getting to grips with the interrelationships between agency and structure. 
For that reason, Archer proposed to ‘separate’ actor and structure, in order 
to make them researchable. She called this ‘analytical dualism’. Archer’s 
main motivation for doing this was to bring in the time-dimension (Archer 
1996). Analytical dualism would enable us to look at actor and structure as 
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essentially separable categories, and to investigate how pre-existing 
structures conditioned present-day interactions, and how present-day 
interactions would be structurally elaborated. I found analytical dualism of 
great value for elaborating the policy arrangements approach, precisely 
because it brings in the time dimension. By separating the constituent 
parts of the approach (the four dimensions, as well as the distinction 
between policy arrangements and structural processes), their 
interrelationships could be revealed. The scheme Archer proposed consists 
of: structural conditions (t=1) ? social interaction (t2 – t3) ? structural 
elaboration (t=4). The scheme is iterative: it is continuously repeated. That 
which is structurally elaborated forms in turn the structural conditions for 
social interaction in a subsequent phase. I used this as an additional 
analytical scheme for ordering my empirical findings, for I assumed that it 
would help me to achieve a balance between attention to the more 
deterministic (i.e. structural conditions ? social interaction) side of the 
equation, and attention to the more voluntaristic side (i.e. social interaction 
? structural elaboration), without losing sight of the time factor i.e. how 
they influence each other over time. 
 
In terms of the research questions, structural conditions shed light on the 
origins of an initiative: the subject of the first question. Social interaction 
could be specified in terms of the social interactions taking place at the 
interface of initiative and existing policy, and in terms of the four 
dimensions of a policy arrangement. This was the focus of my second 
question. The third question, about structural processes, covers the entire 
spectrum t=1 – t=4. It is about the structural processes that pre-existed the 
interactions between local initiatives and established policy, about how 
these processes manifested themselves in those interactions, and about 
whether they were likely to change, even if only to a limited extent, as a 
result of those interactions. Finally, structural elaboration was addressed 
within the scope of this study by narrowing it down to space for policy 
innovation: the subject of the fourth question. 
 
An example illustrates this: Europeanization was present as a structural 
force in the way it conditioned the interactions between local initiatives and 
established policy. In concrete terms, ‘Europe’ provided sources of funding 
and imposed requirements on government subsidies. Europeanization pre-
existed interactions in these cases. Local actors were not always 
knowledgeable about this condition, however, and became aware of part of 
its influence only during the process of trying to realize their ideas. 
Europeanization was reproduced in the course of the process because actors 
reckoned with the rules and resources imposed and provided on behalf of 
‘Europe’. In one case, attempts were made to alter, however marginally, the 
contents of the European rules, and even although results were limited, the 
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single acts of some individuals may have contributed to setting the stage 
for later, wider structural changes. 
 
By means of Archer’s scheme, the initiatives could be placed in the context 
of policies that pre-dated the social interactions that I was ‘witness’ to in 
the three cases. The scheme also helped to relate these social interactions 
to the question of what kind of structural elaboration could be observed in 
the cases. It brought a temporal dimension into the policy arrangements 
framework that made it possible to analyse how actor and structure 
interrelated over the course of time.  
 
c) Sub-politicization and depoliticization in a complex of structural 
transformations 
Beck’s sub-politicization thesis was highlighted in chapter one and two to 
point at a structural force that was considered relevant and likely to 
influence the interactions in the three cases. While the first and the second 
research question respectively addressed the origins of the initiatives and 
their everyday interactions with established policy, the third question 
focused on whether the cases do actually demonstrate that society was 
increasingly being shaped from below. Was politics increasingly taking 
place outside the representative institutions of the political system? Or 
were other structural forces more important? The cases in this study 
revealed that the answer to those questions cannot be answered by a 
straightforward yes or no. Rather, several structural forces were found to 
exist alongside each other and to influence the interaction between 
initiatives and existing policy in multifaceted ways. These cases therefore 
showed that, rather than one dominant force, a complex set of interrelated 
structural forces, occurring at different levels, both conditioned and 
resulted from social interactions. A second conclusion was that sub-
politicization appeared to go along with the opposite trend of 
depoliticization. Thirdly, sub-politicization was shown to be of less 
importance than depoliticization. These three major conclusions will be 
summarized in the following. 
 
I have used a number of abstract terms – regionalization, personalization, 
Europeanization, juridification, sectoralization and distantiation, and at 
another level, sub-politicization and depoliticization – to identify certain 
aspects of the complex set of structural processes which were observed to 
influence the interactions between local initiatives and established policies. 
Obviously, there are many more at work. However, these were the ones 
which emerged in the cases and were considered relevant to the research 
questions. These processes could reasonably be assumed to have pre-existed 
the interactions between local initiatives and established policy. They did 
not appear out of the blue but, in Archer’s terms, formed part of previous 
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cycles of structural conditioning, social interactions and structural 
elaboration. It was not possible within the time-frame of this research to 
translate interpretations of the manifestations of these processes into 
projections about their ‘structural elaboration’. An example of such a 
projection would be: Distantiation (referring to the growing distance in the 
cases between local initiators and formal policy decision makers) will 
constrain the creation of space for policy innovation for local initiatives 
even more in the future. What was possible was to formulate assumptions 
that could inspire further research in other cases and stimulate policy 
debates about distantiation. Such suppositions or assumptions were 
proposed in chapter seven. An example is: the establishment of 
‘distantiation’ in the policy process forms an obstacle for the creation of 
space for policy innovation. Such an assumption may lead relevant policy 
makers to re-evaluate their ever more widespread policies of ‘steering from 
a distance’. It may also lead to discussions about the desirability of giving 
‘remote’ European rules and the officials representing those rules 
significant influence in decision making about the fates of local initiatives, 
especially if these officials cannot know the local situations in which these 
initiatives originated. The term regionalization was used for the way people 
in the cases showed considerable willingness to invest time and energy in 
an area and often identified with it to increasing extents. The term 
personalization was used to refer to the instances in which people started 
to relate to the territorial initiatives on a personal basis. In addition to 
their professional roles, they aimed to influence decision making and what 
happened to ‘their’ areas on that personal basis. 
  
A second major conclusion is that at the level of sub-politicization, the 
analysis unveiled parallel processes of sub-politicization and, contradictory 
as it may seem, depoliticization. Of these two, the latter even appeared to 
be more influential than the former because it severely limited political 
discussions outside the formal representative system about the essence of 
the initiatives and the question why their translation into policy was 
considered undesirable. Sub-politicization and depoliticization were 
situated at another level than the other structural processes. In accordance 
with the sub-politicization thesis, for instance, personalization and 
regionalization contributed to the emergence of new forms of politics 
outside the traditional democratic system, or in other words, to sub-
politicization. On the other hand, Europeanization, juridification, 
sectoralization and distantiation appeared to contribute to the opposite. 
These processes gave rise to a situation in which the ideas that formed the 
heart of the initiatives, were no longer at the heart of decision-making 
process once the initiatives ‘arrived’ in the ‘world of established policy’. 
Europeanization, for instance, caused complicated computation rules about 
the maximum permissible compensation for loss of income to dominate 
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decision-making for years in one case. Yet that was not what occupied the 
minds of the people in the area. There were clearly two worlds, dealing with 
the same area and determining ‘together’ what was to happen, but far 
apart in terms of preoccupations and visions of what would best serve the 
public good in a specific area.  
 
A third conclusion from the studied cases is that the forces giving rise to 
depoliticization were actually stronger than the forces leading to sub-
politicization. An important feature of the process of depoliticization was 
the gradual transformation of initiatives into ‘lookalikes’ of established 
policy. The possibilities for adjusting to operative procedures became the 
initiators’ chief preoccupation, not because it was their prime objective to 
comply with those procedures, but because they felt they had no other 
choice. The point is that differences of underlying ideas and values 
remained implicit during these processes. Meanwhile, the shift of focus to 
already existing rules and to standard ways of distributing resources 
reproduced established policy in a subtle way. The asymmetrical elasticity 
of the dimensions surfaced again; at first sight, a culture of openness 
appeared to exist, and discourses and discourse-coalitions co-existed, but on 
closer inspection it appeared that the established discourse coalitions 
‘overruled’ the new ones. That was so mainly because already 
institutionalized discourses and their connected coalitions were buttressed 
by rules and resources that the new discourse coalitions could not alter.  
 
It is important to note that depoliticization means something else here than 
an absence of the ‘elected’ (see also Van Tatenhove 2006, referring to 
Duyvendak). Importantly, members of the representative system did play a 
role, particularly in the Biesland case, where even members of the national 
parliament promoted the initiative. In this context, then, depoliticization 
does not mean that the traditional political procedures stopped playing a 
role; indeed, established policy had come about exactly via these routes. 
Depoliticization needs to be understood as the lack of fundamental debate 
about the essence of the controversies, resulting in the exclusion of 
divergent ideas from debates. It refers to the absence of sub-politicization. 
Fundamental political debate about the contents did not take place in the 
formal representative system, nor did it take place in the supposed ‘new 
places of politics’. While the contents of the initiatives shifted in the 
direction of existing policy, there was no discussion about what these shifts 
meant in terms of attention for some issues at the expense of others, or in 
terms of the inclusion or exclusion of specific actors. The inclusion of 
farmers in substantive and thus long-term forms of nature management, 
for instance, continued to be a non-option after the Biesland process. Long-
term approaches incorporating farmers in substantial nature management 
ran counter to the mainstream line of thinking, which consisted of an 
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emphasis on the ‘free’ operation of the internal market and related 
prevention of state aid that would distort competition. It also ran counter to 
the idea that nature was best managed by nature organizations. The 
excluding effects of these two lines of thinking have not so far been 
politicized. Therefore, it may help to unveil the more hidden dimensions of 
power in these complex webs of interrelations to make explicit what 
discourses ‘European policy’ represented, how they coalesced with 
influential frames at national level, how they differed from the discourses 
implied by the initiatives, how the respective discourse and their coalitions 
were or were not supported by rules and resources, and what possible 
outcomes of a confrontation between these arrangements could imply in 
terms of inclusion or exclusion. A normative result of this study, therefore, 
is a plea to put these issues back on political agendas. For in the cases that 
I studied, these agendas were mainly dominated by the procedural, 
bureaucratic practices that needed to be overcome to get the initiatives 
further. Despite the input of locally active officials, often in their personal 
time, the increasing distance between local initiators and other influential 
officials remained problematic. At the middle level of bureaucracy, the 
combination of rules geared to ‘steering from a distance’ and frequent shifts 
of personnel also mitigated against any real contact between these middle-
level officials and local initiators. It is therefore hardly surprising that it 
remains to be seen whether the initiatives will have wider policy 
implications, even if they are realized at a local level.  
 
The fact that depoliticization was observed did not exclude the presence of 
forces that promoted sub-politicization. On the basis of the cases, I would 
like to suggest that various types of sub-politicization can be distinguished. 
I proposed a scheme with two axes, each representing a continuum. One 
continuum ranges from open variants to closed variants of sub-
politicization. Beck’s examples are representations of the open variants: 
everybody can participate, for instance by choosing not to buy Shell petrol 
as a protest against the dumping of the Brentspar platform in the North 
Sea. Examples such as the Biesland community and the Grensschap are 
located somewhere in the middle of the continuum. While no groups were 
explicitly excluded from the arrangements, the emphasis that the 
researchers or the local stakeholders placed on everybody’s potential to 
bring in expertise was experienced by some people as an obstacle to joining 
in the activities. They did not perceive what they knew about the places as 
‘expertise’, which they associated with ‘scientific knowledge’. The Efteling 
example represents an even more closed process. While the theme park and 
the nature organizations gained influence by making agreements with each 
other, they sought limited public and media exposure of their undertaking, 
in order to prevent protests. The second continuum ranges from a large to a 
limited scope of ambition for policy change. The three initiatives 
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investigated here aimed for a realization of ideas in specific territories. But 
for that to happen, policies applicable to wider areas needed to be changed. 
Despite the differences, all the variants imply that society is increasingly 
being shaped from below. However, applying these continuums suggests 
that it is important to look at the scope of the initiatives and their varying 
degrees of openness, and also that these change during the process. This 
leads us to a perspective on sub-politicization which takes into account 
other forms of politics outside “the institutions of representative opinion-
formation”, forms which are not entirely open to individual participation 
(such as the mass consumer actions that Beck referred to), and which may 
have a limited scope, as ‘limited’ as a specific territory just beyond the level 
of a backyard or a neighbourhood park. In relation to depoliticization, the 
next step – beyond the scope of this research – could be to distinguish 
between variants as well.  
 
In sum, initiatives coming ‘from below’, evolving from other sources than 
the formal representative system, have to deal with the simultaneous 
occurrence of sub-politicization and depoliticization. Awareness of these 
forces, operating by way of the above-mentioned structural transfor-
mations, may help to focus conscious efforts on the mitigation of their 
effect, namely preventing new coalitions and new discursive notions from 
leading to reconsiderations of established rules and allocated resources. 
Placing substantive matters back on agendas can forestall a silent shift of 
attention in the direction of procedural matters.  
 
d) Space for Policy Innovation 
The above summarized how, in this research, the interactions of the three 
initiatives with existing policies were analysed in terms of their origins, 
and in terms of the dimensions of discourse, coalitions, resources and rules 
of the game and their interrelationships. It then dealt with structural 
processes which were assumed to have an impact on these interactions. My 
fourth research question asked what space for policy innovation resulted 
from all of this. Interestingly, it was at the junction of social interaction 
and structural elaboration (the latter was understood here as ‘space for 
policy innovation’), that the influence of the initiatives remained limited, 
although we do not know what delayed effects may occur in the future. So 
far, structural elaboration in the cases consisted of reproduction, rather 
than transformation or innovation in existing policy. That is, although new 
discursive notions had been embraced by new actor coalitions, the 
initiatives that these notions were part of gradually shifted in the direction 
of existing policy, sooner or later in the process.  
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e) The socio-psychological and the socio-relational  
Socio-psychological and socio-relational aspects were found to be important 
in all three cases. These two aspects, the first denoting what takes place 
between people and the second denoting personal characteristics with 
relational effects, such as humour or expressiveness, deserve more explicit 
attention than they have received so far. For instance, the personal drive 
and perseverance of initiators help to explain why the initiatives endured. 
People got to know each other well, and were able to overcome 
disappointments through dialogue and empathy. Factors such as personal 
contacts, the trust that could arise because of direct communication, were 
essential. Where did their perseverance, which sometimes seemed almost 
limitless, come from? It would be too simplistic to reduce these factors to 
the capacities of actors or to ‘human resources’. These terms would turn 
this part of the story into something institutional or instrumental, which 
would do insufficient justice to the unregulated, spontaneous side of it. This 
dimension bears more resemblance to processes of identification. When 
people felt connected to an idea or to each other, they were also able ‘to go 
for it’, to exercise patience, and to persevere. A similar process of 
identification was observed with regard to established policy and its 
representatives. At various moments, official allowed exceptions to ‘their’ 
policy, but only insofar as the mainstream could remain unchanged. The 
initiatives could take place, but only within the limits imposed on them by 
the ‘mainstream’ rules of the game. These limitations on change were 
voiced most clearly by legal experts and policy officials at the middle level, 
who identified with their ‘world’ of rules and discourse. A good example is 
the ‘not invented here’ idea, which officials themselves gave as an 
important factor in the delay. Processes of identification contributed to the 
continued existence of two worlds – which remained worlds apart.  
 
There is an institutional side to elements such as identification and trust30. 
In the three cases, trust could only grow when there was real contact 
between the actors involved. However, crucial decision-making officials 
often did not know the local situations and were also hampered in getting 
to know the situations better, not just for the above-mentioned reasons but 
also because of the rapid turnover of personnel. An institutional question of 
topical interest comes up: if it becomes more and more difficult for 
government officials to attend to local processes, and to be present in the 
field - if there is, in other words, a process of ‘distantiation’ going on, how 
can trust then come about or be restored?  
 
                                                        
30  Various authors write about the role of trust in policy processes: Van Stokkum 1997, 
Rothstein 2000, Egestad 2002, Van Ark and Edelenbos 2003, Putnam 2004, Eshuis 
2006, Edelenbos and Klijn 2007. 
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Here a picture emerged of ‘two worlds’: one of ‘the field’ and the concrete 
problems of the local situation, and one of the rules and organization that 
the middle-level officials knew well. 
The cases demonstrated how difficult it was to bring the two worlds 
together, even when there appeared to be (political) support from higher 
levels in the administration (up to the ministerial level in one of the cases). 
The question that could not be answered in this research is whether more 
frequent direct interaction between middle-level officials and the local 
situations would have changed the course of events and whether, as my 
findings suggest, this would have led to a more productive reciprocal 
learning experience.  
 
In view of the foregoing, I suggest further study of what I called the 
‘relational dimension’ in the future. On the basis of a review of literature 
and additional empirical investigations, it can be further refined and 
theoretically underpinned. An assessment can then be made of the 
relevance of this dimension for the understanding of policy arrangements, 
or, such as in my study, the interaction between local initiatives and policy 
arrangements. 
 
Conclusion 
In this section I summed up how, by using the elements of the policy 
arrangements approach of Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, and Giddens’ 
structuration theory as sensitizing concepts as well as Archer’s time-
ordered scheme, a tool could be developed that addresses  
a)  The relationship between structural transformations, especially 
depoliticization, and the interface of local initiatives and established 
policy; and 
b)  The relationships between the four dimensions, which uncovered 
asymmetry between the elasticity of discourse and coalitions and the 
inelasticity of rules and resources.  
 
In themselves, the concepts were rather open, which facilitated the 
grounding of the findings in the three empirical situations. The comparison 
of cases in chapter seven gave rise to further substantiation. At this point, 
the findings from the three cases could be used to ‘fill in’ the concepts. 
Based on the three empirical situations, I presented a set of assumptions in 
chapter seven. These assumptions related to the conditions that further or 
hamper the creation of space for policy innovation for the realization of 
local territorial initiatives. The assumptions require further research and 
attention from local stakeholders and (other) policy makers. 
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8.3 Positionality 
I emphasized in the case chapters how contract researchers had agency. 
That situation created possibilities for experience and for learning ‘from 
within’. It also gave rise to dilemmas, in particular with regard to the aim 
of democratizing the research. Moreover, there are methodological 
challenges which still need to be tackled. In the following, these three 
topics (learning from within, dilemmas and methodological challenges) will 
briefly be discussed.  
 
‘Learning from within’ 
My position as a contract researcher set limits on what could be done, and 
it also created possibilities. On the one hand, being ‘hired’ by funders who 
were dealing with concrete problems in concrete situations, allowed me to 
experience from close up the social processes going on in those situations, to 
see how actors tried to influence policy-making, and to get to understand 
their lines of argument and preoccupations at different stages in the 
process. It also helped me to get a feel for their emotions and their ways to 
relating to each other. For example, it enabled me to gauge the value of 
their perseverance and mutual trust. Having experienced the frustrations 
(sometimes even personally) of repeated and sometimes inexplicable delays, 
it was easier than it would be in a one-off interview to talk about these 
events and feelings with the people involved. But it is not easy to combine 
contract research work with the reflective work required to make analyses 
such as this one. I found that the complex realities of contracted projects, in 
which many projects are usually carried out at the same time, offers little 
time and peace of mind to get round to in-depth analyses of the micro-
dynamics of how things worked. While doing the hectic project work I was 
mostly ‘living from day to day’. It required a lot of energy to make switches 
from one type of activity to the other. The fact that the projects involved 
various stakeholders from different levels (citizens, officials, 
administrators, politicians), with their own, at times unpredictable meeting 
schedules, made it impossible to plan in temporary breaks, in order for me 
to concentrate on academic work. In such a situation, although it might be 
more expensive, working in pairs can be recommended for the sake of 
academic depth and reflection. This should be facilitated by funders and 
research institutions. I am convinced that, if done like this, grounding 
research in day-to-day experiences in concrete projects has many 
advantages (as indicated above) which are still underrated and under-
explored. It is precisely the position of working ‘in the mud of policy 
practice’ (Hajer 2003) that challenges the researcher to find alternative 
techniques. These deserve to be elaborated in greater detail in the future, 
especially in research environments such as that of Wageningen University 
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and Research Centre. Policy-oriented contract researchers and academics 
can apply their respective qualities to mutual benefit and add value to our 
research in terms of contributing to democratization – a field in which I 
think there is a lot of room for improvement. 
 
Dilemmas of democratizing research 
Acting as contract researchers also brought dilemmas with it. Ambitions to 
‘democratize’ research, for instance, were not automatically in line with 
what funders wanted. Due to local circumstances, they sometimes preferred 
to avoid increased public attention. Where funders did promote or at least 
tolerate involvement by citizens, for instance in setting up monitoring and 
evaluation, they sometimes showed little involvement themselves and 
stayed at a distance. “Just make sure that the nature target types are 
evaluated”, they said, without consideration of the option that their policies 
could benefit from the findings of citizens. Pointing out the disadvantages 
of their absence from the start might have made them less willing to fund 
the participatory research, reducing the chances of connecting the wishes of 
‘the public’, researchers and policy makers. Situations like these generate a 
risk of diverging expectations of this interactivity in the research process. 
Funders and policymakers may, in the end, ask for different information 
than that which local people consider important. On the other hand, 
engaging in an activity while staying aware of the risks may also be the 
only way to confront these problems and discuss them as soon as they 
emerge. This is another task for the researchers. Ambitions and dilemmas 
such as these deserve more explicit discussion between funders, 
researchers and local stakeholders. In such discussions, simple issues such 
as the timing and location of meetings need to be agreed on. Evening 
meetings nearby may be a pre-condition for volunteers to participate in 
their free time, but would require a different work schedule for policy 
officials coming from elsewhere. More general issues such as expectations 
of the democratization of research for policy development also deserve a 
place on the agenda of such dialogue. This will help to clarify the position of 
the ‘formal’ researcher, whose attempts to democratize research often lead 
to such seemingly simple dilemmas as the above.  
 
My examples are not textbook cases of democratized research, but we tried 
to work towards it in two of the cases and were successful to limited 
extents. The first step towards this aim was to acquire research funding for 
projects that were not so much geared to implementing the details of 
operative policy as to formulating alternatives in collaboration with local 
stakeholders. In my view, this should receive a lot more attention than it 
has done up to now, and the conflicts it will entail need to be faced. This 
will not happen as long as most policy research still continues to focus on 
(formal) policy implementation, creating a bias against policy ideas coming 
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from other actors. This does not tally with the aim of democratizing 
research, and it is researchers themselves who are in the best position to 
try to change this. This task deserves to be taken up by researchers from 
various disciplinary backgrounds.  
 
Methodological challenges to action researchers 
As indicated in chapter three, this research under-utilized the possibilities 
for involving peer professionals in reflecting on methods, interpretations 
and preliminary conclusions (peer debriefing), and for systematically 
documenting raw data, interpretive steps, methodological choices and other 
notes on the process of research (audit trail: Guba and Lincoln 1989, 
Erlandson et al. 1993). It is in this respect that I expect that intensified 
cooperation between contract researchers and researchers at universities 
can considerably improve the quality of our researches. This cooperation 
should at least involve a critical analysis of the role of the contract 
researchers in ‘real-life projects’, such as the ones discussed here. In the 
context of this research, an obvious question would be to what extent 
contract researchers themselves could have prevented the contents of the 
initiatives from gradually conforming to mainstream policy. This could be 
followed by a second question: “is that desirable”? Such questions can be 
raised within a ‘reflective sparring partnership’ that makes it possible to 
develop the kind of peer debriefing and audit trail that matches our 
methodological ambitions. Making explicit ones positionality and how that 
may possibly have an impact on a situation should also be part of such 
reflection. Lastly, such discussions should not of course remain a scientific 
‘tête-à-tête’. The desirability question in particular is as relevant for other 
stakeholders as it is for researchers. I believe that there is still a lot of 
unexplored potential in such working relationships. 
 
8.4 The Need to Reconnect 
In the introduction to this study, we distinguished three generations of 
thinking about how citizens could more actively participate in policy 
making. The first two generations were based on the idea that participation 
could supplement the existing political system. Practices following these 
lines of thinking were generally labelled ‘consultation’ (inspraak) in the 
sixties and seventies (often accused of having little impact on the influence 
of the political elites), and were more recently dubbed ‘interactive policy 
making’ (equally blamed for being ‘one-way-traffic’ and giving right of way 
to plans that had already been decided). A third generation takes a more 
radical turn. It does not label specific kinds of procedures or working 
methods, but considers a multitude of initiatives as possible manifestations 
of sub-politicization. It places politics both inside and outside the 
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traditional representational system. Politics is shaped in policy making 
processes, and not everything is decided in advance in the formal political 
system.  
 
I chose to focus on three local initiatives which were geared to improving 
the management and design of specific territories. I believed that this 
would offer a better understanding of ‘where we stand’ in terms of the 
participation of private actors than would have been gained from an 
examination of participatory projects that had mainly been initiated ‘from 
above’. How successful were these (mainly) local initiators in realizing their 
ideas? Obviously, the answer to this is not a categorical ‘successful’ or 
‘unsuccessful’.  
 
Perhaps what stood out more than anything else was the creativity of these 
local actors, along with their commitment, their continuous searches for 
face-to-face contact, and (above all) their perseverance. On all these points, 
they surpassed expectations. Some officials also tried to facilitate decision-
making by whatever means available to them, including making use of 
personal contacts. However, most of the bureaucracy, especially at the 
middle-level, stayed in their own world of established rules and restrictions 
(‘it was not invented here’). They identified with that world, while the local 
actors identified with their territories.  
 
In view of these diverging identifications, it was not surprising that officials 
in the Biesland case wondered: “Do we do all this for just one farmer”. In a 
similar vein, the alderman in the Grensschap case asked “What if there 
were a hundred ‘Grensschappen?’” And in the Efteling case, the ANF 
official said “We can not invest time in specific projects”. All these officials 
were expressing their conviction that it would be impossible to attend to 
processes like these if there were more of them. This conviction helped to 
prevent the initiatives from opening up a debate about possible wider policy 
implications, and therefore also helped to reproduce existing policy. This 
raises serious doubt about three generations of pleas for a greater say for 
private actors: If initiatives such as the ones investigated here were not 
weighed up against mainstream policy as an alternative or additional 
option, then it would appear that policy-making is still the one-way traffic 
that it has so often been accused of being.  
 
To cope with these competing identifications and to find ways to bridge the 
distance between these two worlds requires leadership and, at a minimum, 
more explicit attention. The people from the areas in my three stories 
continued to try to bring decision makers to ‘their’ places. It was their 
experience that they could best tell their stories at those places, where they 
were better able to convey what their ideas meant to them. However, their 
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attempts were often in vain, especially when those making the final 
decisions were concerned. The research field of Social Spatial Analysis 
focuses on the multiple meanings of specific territories for various groups of 
people and on the ways in which these meanings are translated into action. 
By revealing the conditions under which such translation did or did not 
occur, Social Spatial Analysis can also play its part in systematically 
elaborating what is needed to bring the separate worlds of local initiators 
and government decision-makers together.  
 
In any case, the cases offer sufficient argument to believe that there is a 
considerable amount of innovative potential at the local level, not just in 
terms of the contents of ideas, but also in terms of abilities to cooperate and 
cope with conflict, capacities to form empathic relationships, willingness to 
invest personal time (by local level officials as well) and eagerness to learn.  
 
This positive side of the story is followed by a major and troubling ‘but’. The 
complexity of the institutional environment and the power of processes 
such as Europeanization, proved to reach far beyond the influence of the 
initiators. 
 
Especially when restrictive ‘European’ rules were concerned, there was a 
wide gap between the contents of the original ideas for the three territories 
and the contents that were the subject of the final decision making. Legal 
conditions needed to be met and procedural steps taken in order to get any 
further with the ideas. In terms of representational democracy, this does 
not seem to pose much of a problem. After all, these procedures and rules 
are its very products. In the end, however, they left little space for local 
innovative initiatives, and this is problematic, especially in terms of aims to 
promote participation. 
 
Decision making in the context of these rules took a painfully long time, 
and required an unbelievable amount of perseverance by the initiators. 
These lengthy decision-making processes no longer addressed the essence 
of either the initiatives or the rules. The procedural, juridical reasoning 
that went on was often incomprehensible to the initiators, for whom it was 
hard to understand why these processes took such a long time. The 
contents of the initiatives were not weighed against the essentials. To 
varying extents and in various ways, the final decision making had become 
cut off from the original contents of the ideas. They were ‘worlds apart’. 
There had been some politicization at the moment of initiation of the local 
ideas, but they got depoliticized again during the highly procedural parts of 
the processes. Moreover, in the course of these lengthy processes, the 
question of wider policy implications was no longer asked. 
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In Dutch politics and the media, discussions on European democratization 
have so far mainly focused on the role and powers of the European 
Parliament. It is clear from the detached ways in which ‘Europe’ played a 
role in the cases, not just at the level of the European Commission but at 
national level as well, that this discussion should be much broader in scope. 
The pleas for a greater role of citizens and private enterprise in planning 
and decision-making processes about specific territories, proved to be 
hardly realistic in the context of the imposition of requirements formulated 
at the EU level, limiting considerably what could be done at the local level. 
Especially when agriculture was concerned, there appeared to be a great 
tension between calls for greater local influence, and operative bureaucratic 
policy practices dictated ‘from above’. Questions such as whether such 
consequences of a European political system were desirable, and what 
alternative options there were, were not debated, however. There appeared 
to be a lack of awareness of the discursive dominance of EU lines of 
reasoning (following World Trade Organization rules), how these were 
taken up at other levels, and of the consequences of this in terms of 
inclusion and exclusion. Keeping these structural issues off policy-making 
agendas soon will lead to negligence of local innovative potential.  
 
The situation described above precluded the establishment of the right 
conditions for creating new political spaces in which people could openly 
speak and deliberate about the heart of what the initiatives were about, 
and in which trust could slowly be built up.  
 
Therefore, despite generations of ‘participation policy’ ever since the sixties, 
a key question remains: How established arrangements deal with what was 
not invented within ‘their domain’, especially when it concerns wider policy 
implications of local ideas? The cases highlighted here underline the 
continuing validity of that question. 
 
In contrast to the optimistic expectations at the start of the research, this is 
not a very optimistic conclusion. However, it is of course possible that the 
interactions that gradually intensified and shaped coalitions will open 
doors to more fundamental involvement at later stages. Perhaps there will 
be delayed effects of the ways local actors organized themselves to get 
things done. That is for the future to tell. We must not just sit back and 
wait for that future, however. What is badly needed is active direction of 
dialogue about how structural forces such as Europeanization, distantiation 
and juridification affect the scope for local actors to realize their own ideas 
about a specific territory. Inspiration for this could be found in examples 
such as the future collaboration between the Efteling and the nature 
organizations, the wider impact of the ‘cultural work’ done in the 
Grensschap, and the future role of the ‘Friends of Biesland’ and their 
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activities in research processes. Politicians and policy makers should start 
to work on how such territorial initiatives could actively be ‘taken up’ in the 
context of structural forces such as Europeanization and distantiation, 
rather than restricted to a pilot or experiment. They should also, at the 
very least, start to ponder how to politicize and democratize decision-
making about such initiatives, and, above all, how to seize opportunities for 
collaborative reflection on their possible wider policy implications. 
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Summary 
 
Introduction: Interactive – two-way traffic!  
Governments often express the wish to involve citizens and civil society 
organizations more closely in policy development. This applies as much to 
spatial planning as to any other policy area, and to issues which go beyond 
the scale of a street, square or park in the neighbourhood: issues such as 
who will manage green space in the future, and how; issues such as how 
the relationship between city and countryside can be strengthened. 
Governments attach various labels to these ambitions, such as: ‘interactive 
policy development’, ‘co-responsibility’ and ‘new division of roles between 
governments and society’. But what are their full implications? Both 
governments and researchers tend to look at this issue from the 
government’s point of view, emphasising how interactive processes can be 
used to increase support for established policies, and how this can lead to 
more effective and efficient implementation. Many studies look at 
‘interactive projects’ initiated by governments, and often concentrate on the 
limited influence of citizens and their subsequent disillusionment.  
 
This research approaches the issue from the opposite direction, focusing on 
innovative initiatives by private actors which target the management of 
green space in the urban-rural interface. The study looks at the 
confrontation between these initiatives and established policy, and asks 
what the conditions are for getting such initiatives off the ground. The 
research is based on the assumption that genuinely interactive 
policymaking must be a matter of two-way traffic. The research analyses 
three situations in which non-governmental parties tried to realize their 
ideas for the design and /or management of green space in urban areas. 
This study asks what influenced the development of both the policies and 
the initiatives.  
 
The Case Studies  
The first case – Biesland – concerns an agricultural enclave situated in the 
midst of the towns and recreation areas of the Randstad, in the West of the 
Netherlands. There is only one active farmer left in the area, and together 
with researchers, civil servants and a few local residents, he worked out a 
concept of ‘nature-oriented’ farming. The Minister of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food Quality (ANF) reserved budget for this. What is more, he 
promised early in the process to finance half of the plans, provided that the 
other half would be financed by regional parties. He also stated that the 
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European Commission should approve payments to the farmer before 
further steps could be taken. Indeed, the initiative was supported 
financially by regional administrators and politicians. However, the process 
got stuck in Brussels and there was a danger of its progress being blocked 
in ‘the region’ as well. So how did this initiative get as far as it did, and 
which obstacles proved surmountable and which did not?  
 
The second case – Grensschap – involved a group of residents who 
organized themselves as ‘the Grensschap’ following an ‘interactive event’ 
which the municipality of Maastricht and the Ministry (ANF) asked a 
group of researchers to organize. The Grensschap group aimed to influence 
the land use in a green zone between the Dutch municipality of Maastricht 
and the Belgian municipalities of Riemst and Lanaken. The Grensschap 
proved to be more than just a flash in the pan. For years, Dutch and 
Belgian residents collaborated with a few civil servants to organize various 
activities. So what kinds of changes were the members of the Grensschap 
able to make to municipal policy plans, and on which fronts did they 
encounter bottlenecks? Where did they find the inspiration to persevere?  
 
In the third case – the Loonsche Land – the theme park ‘ the Efteling’ and 
two nature conservation organizations reached an agreement about the 
development of a joint land use management plan, which was spelled out in 
a covenant. The initiative came about after years of conflict between these 
parties over the building of accommodation in an area of woods and fields 
bordering the Efteling theme park: conflict which led to legal cases that 
went right up to the Council of State. So were the initiators able to carry 
out their new ideas? And what are the broader implications of this 
initiative?  
 
These three cases have several things in common. They all concern 
innovative initiatives at the interface between such different policy 
domains as urban planning, cultural history, recreation, economics, 
agriculture, and nature. Although they go beyond the level of a street or 
neighbourhood, all three case areas are relatively small-scale: the Efteling 
area is seventy hectares; the Biesland area is one hundred hectares; the 
Grensschap area is a couple of hundred hectares. All three initiatives came 
primarily from private actors, although the government played a role in the 
ensuing processes and there was a complex network of communication 
channels between citizens and/ or civil society organizations, businesses, 
politicians, managers, researchers and civil servants. Another thing the 
three cases have in common is that all the initiatives involved some sort of 
conflict with established policy.  
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There are also a number of differences between the three cases. They had 
different origins, for example. In the Grensschap case, citizens met each 
other through an ‘interactive event’ organized by the Municipal Council and 
the Ministry. In the Biesland case, collaboration grew up via a ‘chance’ 
encounter between a farmer, a volunteer and some researchers. And in the 
Loonsche Land case, a private party and some civil society organizations 
wanted to break an impasse when facing the prospect of yet another long-
running legal battle. There were also differences in the roles played by 
researchers, who might act as researchers, or as process facilitators, or as a 
combination of the two. The different initiatives also had an impact on 
different policy domains and were subject to decision-making processes at 
different levels of government. For example, agricultural policy is very 
much steered by the EU, while cultural history and spatial planning are 
largely regional and national affairs. It is the differences between these 
cases as much as the similarities which make them a rich empirical source 
for determining which circumstances can enable a confrontation between 
an initiative and established policy to lead to policy innovation.  
 
Theoretical starting points  
This research makes use of the policy arrangements approach developed by 
Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy. This approach aims to elucidate change 
and stability of policy arrangements by analysing the interaction between 
everyday policy practices and the overarching structural processes of 
‘political modernization’ such as individualization and Europeanization. 
Every day policy practices are described with reference to four dimensions: 
discourse (which relates to content), actor coalitions, resources and rules of 
the game (all of which relate to organization). The assumption is that these 
four dimensions can help clarify how change – or indeed stability – comes 
about in a policy arrangement. In this research, the dimensions are used as 
‘sensitizing concepts’, which means they provide guidelines as to what to 
look at, but do not impose narrow definitions. A policy arrangement is 
defined as a temporary stabilization of the substance and organization of a 
policy domain. The approach tackles policy development from the point of 
view of a number of interactions:  
1. between actor and structure; 
2. between content and organization; 
3. between discourse and practice; and 
4. between everyday practices and structural processes.  
 
The relationships between them are looked at from the point of view of an 
‘analytical dualism’, which will be explained in the following.  
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1. Actor and structure 
The sociologist Anthony Giddens’ claims that too many attempts to explain 
social change have focused on the behaviour of actors, or on the potential 
and limitations that structures (such as rules and resources) provide or 
impose. He asserts that these possibilities or impossibilities come about 
through an interaction between the two, and that there exists a ‘duality of 
actor and structure’. Neither the actors nor the structures are omnipotent. 
There has been serious debate as to the feasibility of researching the 
interaction between actor and structure: if they influence each other so 
much, how can we distinguish between them? And what becomes of the 
time dimension if actor and structure cannot be differentiated in terms of 
time? Margaret Archer has a solution to this, and proposes applying an 
‘analytical dualism’, treating actor and structure as distinguishable, in 
order to be able to analyse the relationship at all. In two ways, the policy 
arrangements approach elaborates the duality of actor and structure: in 
terms of the four dimensions which together form everyday policy practices, 
and in terms of the interaction between these everyday policy practices and 
structural processes, which will be elaborated in the following (4). In this 
thesis I use these concepts and Archer’s approach to arrive at an 
understanding of initiatives which are not yet institutionalized, but which 
do confront established policy.  
 
2. Content and organization 
The relationship between content-related and organizational aspects is also 
important, as indicated by the definition of a policy arrangement. 
 
‘Content’ is translated into ‘discourse’ because ‘discourse’ suggests that 
content implies a point of view: whether in policy or through a local 
initiative, the social reality is given meaning. Such content is therefore not 
objectively ‘true’, but is a social construct. Policy is packaged in words 
which conceal versions of reality, as well as opinions on what should be 
done to change that reality. 
 
In defining the concept of ‘organization’, I also make use of the concepts 
used in the policy arrangements approach. I see ‘organization’ in terms of 
the dimensions of actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game. Actor 
coalitions are people or organizations who join forces around a certain 
discourse – in other words, a ‘discourse coalition’. The concept of ‘resources’ 
encompasses for example money, knowledge or number of members: all the 
resources which can be used to achieve a goal – something which can be 
very difficult, if not impossible, if there is a shortage of resources, or if a 
certain group lacks access to them. The ‘rules of the game’ are the formal 
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and informal rules which influence the process and are used by the actors 
in all their activities.  
 
3. Discourse and practice  
Discourse entails more than just words: it also involves practices. This 
understanding of discourse, not just as a linguistic concept but also as 
something institutional and practice-related, makes it possible to pursue an 
enquiry into the meanings, the hidden conceptual frameworks and the 
consequences of these for institutional practices, as well as into the way 
these practices influence the conceptual frameworks in turn. The 
interaction between discourse and practice therefore constitutes a third 
relationship which is significant in this research.  
 
4. Practice and structural processes 
The duality of everyday practice and structural processes is discussed here 
in terms of Ulrich Beck’s sub-politicization theory. According to Beck, it is 
in the context of the present-day risk society that sub-politicization takes 
place. In Beck’s own words, this means that “There are even opportunities 
for courageous individuals to ‘move mountains’ in the nerve centres of 
development”. Centralized management takes a back seat, and consumers 
can wield an influence through their spending power, as they did for 
example during the discussion about the Brent spar oil rig. Other observers 
speak of political displacement or dispersion. The formal representative 
system that we know of old is no longer the only political arena; instead, 
political ideas start to emerge from many other places as well. In this 
thesis, I examine the three cases in the light of this posited political 
development. How do the three cases exemplify sub-politicization? Or are 
there also other structural processes that influence the outcomes of the 
interactions between local initiatives and established policy? 
 
Aim, questions and method 
In short, the main aim of the research is to expand our understanding of 
innovative, local initiatives by (mainly) private actors, and their 
interactions with established policies. This is pursued by means of the 
presented conceptual points of departure.  
 
Specifically, the concepts discussed feature in this thesis in terms of five 
research questions:  
1. What was the source of the initiative and how did it relate to 
established policy?  
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2. How do discourse, actors, resources and rules of the game manifest 
themselves over time, in the interaction between initiative and existing 
policy? 
3. Does the case point to sub-politicization or can other structural 
transformations be discerned? 
4. What types of space for policy innovation emerged and how can they be 
characterized? 
5. What are enabling or impeding conditions for the emergence of space 
for policy innovation? 
 
My own experiences in various contract-research projects laid the 
foundation for this PhD research. These projects were commissioned by 
government institutions (national government, province and municipality) 
and (in one case) by a private company. In terms of methodology, my study 
consisted of various elements: participation in meetings, following the 
exchange of e-mails, frequenting kitchen-table discussions, talking during 
occasional car rides and the constant exchange of phone calls all gave 
insights that allowed detailed descriptions of what had happened, of 
emotions accompanying key events in the process and of strategic thinking 
of actors involved. Because of this, I often felt like an ‘anthropologist in the 
field’ who was, at the same time, involved in the process of change. I also 
did desk-work, consisting mainly of analysis of documents and websites. In 
two of the three cases I did in-depth interviews to add to what I had 
experienced in the field. 
 
The main results 
In spite of the differences, there turned out to be a few striking similarities 
between the three cases. The most salient of these similarities is the way 
these cases reveal the great potential for innovation among private parties 
– a potential which is far greater than you would think if you listen to 
pessimists who emphasize the role of NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) 
behaviour by local residents. Their initiatives related to issues going well 
beyond the borders of their back yards, and getting them onto the agenda 
and ensuring they were carried through required a lot of stamina, 
creativity and adaptability. Without this, it would not have been possible to 
obtain the necessary authorization and financing. In contrast to the 
question often posed within government as to ‘how to stimulate support 
among citizens for policy implementation’, these examples suggest that the 
real issue is ‘how to involve governments in realizing the wishes of 
coalitions of private parties?’  
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In the following, I will summarize the results of the study in terms of the 
above-mentioned research questions.  
 
The origins of the initiatives  
In different ways, these initiatives all stemmed from the wish to approach 
the design and management of a public space near a city in a manner that 
was not possible within the terms of existing policy. Two of the three cases 
had a history of years of unresolved conflict. In the Biesland polder case, 
there was an impasse over the conversion of part of the polder into forest, a 
plan which formed part of the plans for ‘Randstad green structure’ 
(Randstadgroenstructuur) and the ‘green-blue streamer’ (Groenblauwe 
slinger). The farmer and a nature conservation volunteer believed that they 
could create a natural environment that would be attractive to city-dwellers 
themselves, and did not see the need to buy up agricultural land for forest 
development. In the Loonsche land case, there was a conflict between the 
Efteling and nature conservation organizations over the building of holiday 
accommodation. A legal battle was fought right up to the Council of State, 
contesting the harmful impact of the building plans and the accompanying 
compensation rights and obligations. In the Grensschap case, there was no 
one clear conflict, but there was a general dissatisfaction among a number 
of residents, civil servants and an alderman about the lack of a coordinated 
approach to the Western city boundary of Maastricht, an area which also 
borders the Belgian municipalities of Lanaken and Riemst. In other words, 
these initiatives did not come about in a policy vacuum, but in reaction to a 
policy. 
 
Moreover, this study has revealed the need for greater subtlety in 
differentiating between government and non-government. Civil servants 
who are involved ‘in the field’ were particularly active in their efforts to 
promote these initiatives, even out of working hours. Their dual role was 
often very fruitful. One example of this was when a provincial official 
introduced a Service Club to the Biesland polder, inspiring the latter to set 
up a broader residents’ organization which mobilized people in various 
ways to protect the polder area.  
 
Interactions between initiatives and established policy (in terms of relation-
ships between discourse, actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game) 
If we consider the three cases from the perspective of the relationships 
between discourse, actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game, we are 
struck by a number of features.  
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Firstly, there was a lot of potential in terms of discourses and coalitions, 
with new coalitions being formed and various discourses co-existing. In 
other words, we can speak of a discursive space, fostered by new coalitions. 
In Biesland, alongside the well-established sectoral nature-oriented or 
‘green structure’ discourse and the strong internal market discourse, a new 
approach grew up in which the qualities of the area were central, and 
which managed to combine the priorities of agriculture, nature 
conservation and access to the area for city-dwellers. In this context, and in 
defiance of the fear of unfair competition, the farmer could be paid for his 
nature conservation activities, which consisted for example of a closed 
nutrient cycle. Discourse and coalitions were therefore ‘flexible’, and could 
co-exist or even overlap each other. The flexibility of the rules of the game 
and resources was much more limited, however. In order to move things on, 
the content of the initiatives was partially adapted to comply with existing 
rules. Biesland provides a clear example of this: in the final EU directive 
approving implementation of the measures, a number of measures were 
included which ensured that the initiative broadly tied in with established 
policy. Similarly, in the Loonsche Land case, thinking in terms of the area 
as a whole, and of combining various different interests was sacrificed to 
thinking in terms of ‘compensatory hectares’. This made it possible to get 
the initiative approved by policymakers, but it also made it more difficult 
for the ‘new way of thinking’ to be disseminated further. In the Grensschap 
case, the new coalition of initiators stuck to proposals they considered 
feasible from the start. It is possible however that the Grensschappers’ way 
of thinking in terms of the connections between ‘city’ and ‘country’ and their 
expression in the form of viewpoints (‘kijkvensters’) or ‘landmarks’ will 
have a longer term impact beyond the time span of this study. In the 
meantime, these conclusions mean that justice is not done to some of the 
essential elements of the original idea, and there is a certain asymmetry 
between the flexibility of discourses and actor coalitions and the 
inflexibility of resources and rules of the game. The main point here is that 
this significantly reduces the chances of the initiatives being able to prove 
their worth in a wider context, even though the perseverance, efforts and 
courage of the initiators has enabled them to achieve their goals within 
their own areas.  
 
Sub-politicization and depoliticization  
These are interesting cases in terms of Beck’s theory of sub-politicization. 
Firstly, it was clear from the analysis of the relationships between 
discourse, actor coalitions, resources and rules of the game that new 
coalitions of actors create a new discursive space in which they can develop 
and implement their ideas. This discursive space mainly comes into being 
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in places outside the formal representative system. This doesn’t mean, 
however, that there is no role for the municipal council or even for 
parliament – sometimes they can provide just the right bit of support at a 
crucial juncture. Yet the ideas for these initiatives were largely developed 
outside these formal political arenas – they evolved round a farm kitchen 
table in Biesland, during a field trip in the Grensschap or in a workshop on 
the golf course at the Efteling. The initiators used symbolic gestures to 
draw attention to the area, for example through the presence of cows at the 
signing of the agreement by the Minister and the regional administrators 
in Biesland, or through the viewpoint ‘windows’ (‘kijkvensters’) designed by 
the Grensschappers to point out certain features of their area to visitors. 
But what is most striking is the way people organized themselves, formed 
new coalitions and developed a new language in order to gain an influence 
over the land use and the management of the three areas.  
 
However, these three areas also demonstrate a tendency that would seem 
to run counter to the trend towards sub-politicization: namely, ‘depoliti-
cization’. The core ideas of these initiatives were often sidelined in the 
context of the conditions prevailing in the system. These conditions 
included Europeanization (meaning that ideas for just one polder were 
discussed at length detail in Brussels for years before they got the go 
ahead); the sectoral nature of current policy; a growing distance between 
policymakers and ‘the field’; and the dominant role of formal rules which 
were only indirectly relevant to the content of the initiatives. By contrast, 
discussion within the initiative focused on things like adapting maps of 
nature target types at the Efteling, doing the sums to determine whether 
there was a case of unfair competition through income support in Biesland, 
obtaining permits in order to establish ‘landmarks’ in the Grensschap. 
Procedural detail set the tone, as opposed to what the initiatives were 
really all about: the possibilities for farmers to manage nature in new ways 
in Biesland; opportunities to combine holiday accommodation with nature 
conservation in the Loonsche Land; promoting the qualities of the area ‘as a 
whole’ in the Grensschap. In the most extreme of the three cases, the 
Grensschap, efforts were restricted from the start to what was estimated to 
be feasible. In the other cases, the content of the initiatives was adapted at 
a later stage in the process in order to fit in with the rules in force at the 
time. This change in content facilitated the admission of the initiatives onto 
policy agendas, but at the same time meant that any discussion of 
fundamental principles was avoided. There was, then, at the same time, a 
process of inclusion (of the adapted content of the initiatives) and of 
exclusion (of crucial issues such as the distinctions that were built in to the 
rules: between nature and agriculture, city and country, nature and 
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construction projects). This observation enables us to further refine the 
sub-politicization theory. The fundamental, or political implications of the 
issues at stake were not made explicit, and the issue was therefore not 
accessible to joint decision-making, or even to simple discussion, with non-
governmental actors. The same thing can be seen in the way that legal 
jargon gradually became dominant, in the shift in the content of the 
initiatives in the direction of the established arrangement, and in the 
sustained lack of face-to-face contact. These depoliticization mechanisms 
led to experiences loaded with negative emotions among the people who 
operated at a distance from the procedures concerned.  
 
I see this distance between civil servants and people in the field, described 
in the thesis as ‘distantiation’, as a particularly significant factor. It is a 
widely applied rule of the game in policymaking ministries that civil 
servants regularly change jobs. This had drastic implications for the 
Biesland case, as there was never enough time to build up trust. By 
contrast, civil servants who did stay in one post throughout the period 
contributed a lot to the continuity of efforts to get the initiatives off the 
ground. They took on the initial ideas, helped to develop them further, and 
stood their ground, sometimes against their own colleagues. What 
happened cannot therefore be summed up in terms of contents and 
organization, but had more to do with personal commitment, trust and 
identity. Where there was contact, this contact bore fruit in the form of 
taking the initiatives further. However, major final decisions were usually 
taken by civil servants, sometimes as far away as The Hague or even 
Brussels, who didn’t know the situation in the field. The frequent ‘changing 
of the guard’ was very frustrating for the initiators at times, because they 
repeatedly had to invest in new relationships. The ‘not invented here’ 
attitude exacerbated the effects of this rule of the game because this 
attitude hindered the transfer of knowledge about the idea within the 
organization. The current policy of frequent changes of job is problematic if 
governments want to ensure that interactive policymaking is a matter of 
two-way traffic, in which initiatives can come from non-governmental 
parties as well as from government. 
 
Perseverance, trust, empathy and other social-relational factors 
The fact that the initiatives did bear fruit, in spite of everything and even 
though the content was partially adapted to established policy, has a lot to 
do with a dimension that has not yet been explicitly mentioned here. 
Perseverance, trust and empathy are all aspects of what can be called 
‘human resources’, or features of the actor dimension. I believe that these 
social-relational factors deserve special attention. The trust nurtured 
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through the actual contact between people who developed a feeling for a 
place during their time ‘in the field’ made it possible to build up long-term 
relationships. The cases demonstrated various situations in which personal 
contact on the basis of mutual trust survived even quite difficult 
confrontations. The trust that grew up in the course of intensive 
collaboration, the stamina, the skills in dealing with conflicts, the empathy 
fostered by face-to-face contact all made it easier for those involved to ‘go 
for it’ and not to throw in the towel too soon. Personal friendships often 
developed, and participants were inspired to keep going through their 
sharing of the pleasures and the disappointments, of the feeling of 
powerlessness or indeed of the sense of combined power. However, as soon 
as the chances of implementation of the initiative or emergence of space for 
policy innovation grew, the discussion shifted to the level of legal and 
accountancy issues, which were a long way from what was important in the 
field. There was less face-to-face contact too, notwithstanding the repeated 
stress laid in the region on the importance of ‘real’ contact. In the course of 
the process, it took more and more creativity on the part of the initiators to 
find ways of really applying their own ‘rule of the game’ about contact with 
‘the field’.  
 
In the light of all this, then, in order to reach a better understanding of 
policy innovation, we clearly need to take into account the social-relational 
factors and, ideally, to experience them first-hand.  
 
Our own position as contract researchers  
 A connection is often made between research by knowledge institutions 
and the legitimation of existing policy. These cases show that local, private 
initiators of innovative policy ideas also make use of ‘contract researchers’ 
in order to promote their ideas. Accepting the fact that knowledge is used 
strategically by various parties in various ways in order to promote their 
own interests is important in order to be able to evaluate the influence of 
that knowledge and to deal with it ethically. As researchers, we can choose 
to focus on the knowledge of local actors and to combine it with our own 
insights. Through seeking dialogue with established policy, research can 
facilitate the discussion of several different alternatives. However, these 
cases make clear that this is no simple matter. Paradoxically, making use 
of our knowledge in a non-governmental initiative contributed to the 
reproduction of existing policy because the initiatives were translated into 
the language and procedures of established policy in order to be 
implemented. This poses a difficult dilemma: the shift towards the 
language of established policy helped put the innovations on the agenda 
but at the same time transformed them, sometimes in ways that were not 
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altogether transparent. This is an important issue that deserves attention 
in future research.  
 
In conclusion – space for policy innovation  
It is essential that research looks for local initiatives that are not yet 
‘bogged down’ in established policy. There seems to be plenty of potential 
for local initiatives, but the translation of that potential into public 
discussion of possible improvements to government policy seems to lag 
behind. It is in this sense that we can note the presence not only of sub-
politicization but also of depoliticization. This study sheds some light on 
why this is so. For the time being, the space for policy innovation is to be 
found in the discursive space that is created by new actor coalitions. There 
seems to be very little prospect of a broader impact such as a rethinking of 
rules or resources. This would require a discussion of the following 
questions about the necessary conditions for policy innovation:  
- Does the distance from ‘the field’ and the habit of frequently 
transferring civil servants from one post to another lead to a lack of 
political discussion over the implications of a local initiative for existing 
policy?  
- If trust, empathy and perseverance emerge chiefly from situations in 
which there is ‘real contact’, what are the implications of this for a 
policy of ‘remote control’?  
- If a shift in the content of a local initiative towards established policy is 
a condition for realizing the initiative, what are the implications of this 
for the nature of the space for policy innovation and of interactive 
policymaking (as one-way or as two-way traffic), and is that desirable? 
- How can the considerable local potential for innovation observed during 
this study generate wider policy implications?  
- In the context of the increasing influence of European regulations, with 
their own specific discourse, how can space be preserved for debate 
about content at local level?  
 
These issues deserve to be addressed more often, and in dialogue, by 
researchers, policymakers and practitioners. This makes it possible to 
bridge the gap between established policy and the wealth of ideas 
generated by local private parties - currently still 'worlds apart'.  
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